Analysis

The Serbian-Russian friendship is a politically constructed myth that emerged during the Milošević era but gained prominence after changes in Russia and the strengthening of Putin's position. Serbia, with its anti-NATO and anti-western sentiments that were caused mainly by the 1999 bombings and the activities of the Hague Tribunal, became a useful partner for Russia, opening a window for renewed influence in the region.

After reading a series on Serbian history of the 19th and early 20th centuries by Slobodan Jovanović, a highly esteemed Serbian historian, lawyer, philosopher, literary critic, diplomat and politician from the early 20th century, one might wonder why the myth of Serbian-Russian friendship appears so enduring in contemporary Serbian policy, culture and society. Indeed, Russia's historical presence was less significant than that of other European powers. The answer lies in the political construction of this historical friendship over recent decades. This myth serves both nations. For Russia, it helps maintain influence in the Balkans and counter EU presence, while for Serbia it supports its position in the ongoing Kosovo issue and reinforces illiberal policies.

The small Balkan state of Montenegro has been an official European Union candidate for many years. In spite of widespread support for integration, the political situation in the country has made accession an increasingly unlikely prospect. This challenge is compounded by growing influence of Serbia’s autocratic regime, which poses an immediate threat to Montenegro’s EU aspirations.

In a recent article, the New York Times suggested that Russia poses the primary external threat to Montenegro’s aspirations to join the European Union. This narrative, while appealing to many western officials and pundits, is misleading. Russia certainly plays a disruptive role in Montenegro and the broader Balkans, but it is Serbia, under the increasingly autocratic regime of Aleksandar Vučić, which presents a far more immediate and significant challenge.

Nowhere is the choice between Europe and Moscow more evident than in Moldova’s energy sector. By promising cheap gas, Moscow offers pro-Russian actors a powerful campaign tool. This quick fix appeals to both the population and oligarchs. To break free from the Kremlin's grip and pursue a pro-European future, the stakes in these elections will have major repercussions on the energy sector.

Data from the first half of 2024 shows that all three countries affected by the war continue to show GDP growth and relative internal stability. However, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine continue to seek new ways to strengthen their economic positions.

The targeted sanctions imposed on Belarus in 2022 did not take long to deliver a powerful blow to the nation's economy. The immediate aftermath was characterized by a sharp contraction, marking the onset of what economists have termed a “transformational recession”. Yet, the Lukashenka regime, bolstered by its close ties with Russia and its tight grip on domestic power structures, has so far weathered the storm.

Telegram is a growing digital platform that is being used in the region and around the world. Yet, out of all major social media companies, it remains the least transparent in its content moderation and curation practices. The platform makes vocal commitments to protecting user privacy but practice shows otherwise.

Russia and Ukraine share few things in common when it comes to their respective social media environments. Following the start of the full-scale invasion, Russia banned the use of Meta’s platforms – Instagram and Facebook – in addition to the wholesale blocking of various domestic and foreign media outlets. Ukraine, for its part, blocked the Russian social network Vkontakte long before the invasion.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has involved the most extensive use of offensive cyber operations by one state against another in history. It is now obvious that blurring the lines between competition, crisis and war in cyberspace requires continuity in cyber defence. As a result, national cybersecurity must be one of the state's top priorities in terms of policy focus and budget allocation.

Forces that influence the world order are constantly evolving, and therefore, the global security landscape has become even more dynamic. For decades, the power dynamics of global balance were different to those today. Those with an economic advantage had the upper hand and dictated the rules to the rest of the world. Soon after, the emphasis moved towards military might, particularly during the Cold War. Of course, the economy is also the backbone here, as the development of weapons requires a strong and stable economy.

November could see former US President Donald Trump return to the White House. His rather unpredictable approach to foreign policy could subsequently leave an even greater impact on the world than it did in his first term. This is due to various new conflicts like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with both Kyiv and Moscow preparing for Trump’s potential victory.

Over the last month, Democratic nominee Kamala Harris has upended the presidential race in the United States by opening a small lead over Donald Trump in national polls. However, historical experience suggests early leads are often overturned and the upcoming presidential debates may prove decisive. With Trump still very much in the race, policymakers in Russia and Ukraine are bracing for what could be a seismic shift in US foreign policy.

While Ukrainian society generally acknowledges the forthcoming difficulties related to the reintegration of the generation having grown up under Russian occupation, there is little research which explicitly focuses on schooling in these areas. Early in 2022, we interviewed university students and experts under condition of anonymity who had experience in the educational systems of the Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics”. They provide valuable accounts of their memories of schooling and add insightful personal reflection and analysis.

Presuming a Ukrainian victory, when the Russian war against Ukraine comes to an end, Ukraine will face the daunting task of reintegrating the territories currently occupied by Russia. For Crimea and parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, this means undoing a decade’s damage on these regions’ economies, but especially on their social fabrics. Elsewhere, Moscow’s strategy has been to fast-forward the de-Ukrainianization of the occupied territories, epitomized by the vulgar slogan that “Kherson will be Russian forever.”

Georgians overwhelmingly support NATO and EU membership and deserve a government that aligns with their aspirations. The West requires reliable partners in the South Caucasus and access to critical checkpoints in connectivity and trade. The current decline in relations between Tbilisi and the West can only be seen as a victory for Russia and China. The elections in October 2024 will provide one last chance for the country and its democratic perspectives.

Georgia is a small country with unique geopolitical importance to Russia, China and the West. Its regional and international positioning is heavily determined by the role of connecting Europe and Asia through the Black Sea. In this light, Russia’s war in Ukraine has profoundly affected the shift in Georgia’s foreign trajectory and democratic backsliding.

Moldova has been preparing not only for presidential elections this autumn, but also a nationwide referendum on the country’s European Union membership. Opponents of the pro-EU ruling party claim this tactic is illegal and will cause irreversible harm to the society. Moldova’s president, Maia Sandu, meanwhile is hoping to capitalize on Moldova’s EU path to help score a victory for her second term.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moldova, another ex-Soviet country, has been described by several propagandists associated with the Kremlin as the next target of possible “liberation”. Moldova had been blamed by them for discriminating against and offending Russian speakers, even those from the left bank of the Dniester River, or Transnistria, the region now controlled by the Russian army.