The 2024 “presidential election” (March 15th to 17th) is intended to consolidate Putin’s neo-totalitarian grip on Russia. The West should not recognize its results and hamper the Kremlin’s efforts to pursue its aggressive goals both in its foreign and domestic policy.

Russian war crimes in Ukraine and the terror against people in occupied territories will go down in the history books. In a sense, the Russo-Ukrainian War is a clash of civilisations. Wartime politics has exposed the long-known yet startling truth about the low price of human life in Russia – a product of a deeply entrenched culture of violence. There is a direct link between the war in Ukraine and the political disempowerment of Russian society.

Both Ukrainians and EU citizens have been shocked by Russian war crimes, but equally shocking may be how Russia’s politicians and military leadership treat their soldiers. They are nothing more than cannon fodder, utilised in the name of Putin’s neo-imperial ambitions. Even more perplexing is the fatalism and the lack of resistance from conscripts sent to be slaughtered on the frontline, as well as from their families.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has exposed the nexus between repressive domestic rule and aggressive foreign policy. As long as Russia remains a dictatorship, it will pose an existential threat to the security order in Europe. It is, therefore, in the West's interest to see a permanent dismantling of the current model of government in Russia. Putin's departure from office will create a short-term window of opportunity for political change. Contrary to widespread fears, the end of this autocratic pseudo-stability may pave the way for sustainable peace in Europe.

Declared support for the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine among Russian citizens remains high. Despite this, new polls that look at more than just “yes or no” have revealed a complex reality in which citizens try to reach accommodation with the authoritarian state.

A book review of Navalny: Putin’s Nemesis, Russia’s Future? By: Jan Matti Dollbaum, Morvan Lallouet, Ben Noble. Publisher: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2021

The ongoing consolidation of Putin's dictatorship has been accompanied by a deepening, though still passive, public dissatisfaction with the political system and the ageing leader. Demands for change are subsequently on the rise. These attitudes may accelerate the erosion of a seemingly stable model of rule.

The Kremlin is striving to erase any historical discourse that undermines the official narrative that Russia must be ruled by an authoritarian system of government. History is rewritten, its dark chapters are glossed over, and independent historians are repressed. This is not just a whim of the former KGB officers who rule the country. Their goal is to perpetuate practices that strengthen Russian authoritarianism, which is based on systemic violence against the country’s citizens.

The course of this year's Russian State Duma elections demonstrates that the Kremlin has finally abandoned the pseudo-democratic game of appearances. In the coming years, a further tightening of the screws is likely. However, instead of complete control over the political system, the government may face a radicalisation of the social protest mood.

The Kremlin is now frantically looking for tools to strengthen its censorship of the internet, which is perceived as a ‘Trojan Horse’ of the American secret services. This ‘besieged fortress’ rhetoric has been accompanied by a flood of repressive laws, increasing surveillance, and attempts to establish state sovereignty over the Runet.

The 2021 State Duma election will be the most important stress-test for the Russian regime in the run-up to a possible transition of power in the coming years. The Kremlin has responded to real or imagined threats linked to this election with a new wave of highly repressive laws. However, this authoritarian overreaction may backfire, thus confirming the Kremlin’s fears of a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Parliamentary elections in Russia are about much more than just window-dressing. They serve to legitimise the authoritarian regime in the eyes of the public as well as verify the efficacy of the state administration machinery. The tangible unease among the Kremlin’s decision-makers, provoked by an unfavourable economic future and a worrisome evolution in the social mood, has accelerated efforts to consolidate authoritarian rule.

The COVID-19 pandemic has clearly accelerated the use of digital surveillance technologies in Russia which had been planned earlier but tested only on a limited scale. Their increased use by the state will not end with the pandemic, but will determine the “new normal” where civil liberties are restricted more than ever before.

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is a classic example of an extraordinary situation which adds to the discussion regarding the ideal balance between public security and civil liberties. As expected, in Vladimir Putin’s Russia, security has been treated as a pretext to expand the state’s authority at the cost of individuals’ rights. The pandemic has been a catalyst which accelerates and expands implementation of advanced digital technologies that are aimed to tighten the authoritarian hold over society. The authorities use them to monitor the citizens, manipulate behaviour, coerce people into political loyalty and to repress the opposition.