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Is Abkhazia being absorbed by Russia?

After the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, Moscow recognized the independence of the separatist regions of Georgia – Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. After the recognition, Moscow pursued relations with both regions, which Georgia considers to be occupied by Russia, as those with equal states. Moscow took into account the sentiments of the local population and the political elite in the occupied regions, especially in Abkhazia, and refrained from intense pressure. However, after the start of Russia’s full-scale military aggression in Ukraine in 2022, Moscow’s attitude has changed.

Before the August 2008 war, Moscow formally recognized the territorial integrity of Georgia and refrained from relations with the separatist regions at the official level. It was only after the August war when the situation changed. Russia recognized the independence of both regions, after which Moscow’s influence over Sokhumi (the capital of occupied Abkhazia) and Tskhinvali (the capital of the occupied Tskhinvali region) increased in all directions. In particular, the fourth and seventh military bases of the Russian defence ministry and Federal Security Service’s border service were established to ensure the security of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. The budget and economic life of the occupied regions are also completely dependent on Russia.

April 11, 2024 - Mamuka Komakhia - AnalysisIssue 3 2024Magazine

Illustration by Andrzej Zaręba

Changing relations

In the case of the Tskhinvali region, the population and the local political elite are in favour of joining Russia and support full integration into the legal and political-economic space of Russia. At the same time, the situation is different in Abkhazia. There, the local elite supports strategic relations with Moscow, but strives to strengthen their own “statehood” and “sovereignty” and are against further integration into the Russian legal and political system. On November 12th 2020, shortly after the end of the second Nagorno-Karabakh war, Moscow and Sokhumi signed a “programme for the formation of a single socio-economic space”. Yet, some of the requirements of the programme were perceived by Abkhazia as a loss of its “sovereignty” and did not arouse much enthusiasm. In this regard, Moscow took into account local sentiments and avoided excessive pressure. However, the war in Ukraine changed the nature of the relations between Moscow and Sokhumi. Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine and the protracted war have presented Moscow with several challenges that have also affected its attitude toward the occupied regions.

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