Analysis

Europe’s active response to the millions of Ukrainian refugees who fled Russia’s invasion has often been viewed as a positive approach to migration policy. Despite this, the future remains uncertain for these new residents. Government decisions across the continent will now play a role in deciding not just the economic future of the EU but Ukraine itself.

Russia’s decision to launch a full-scale war in Ukraine has resulted in millions of Ukrainians fleeing the country via its western border. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as of April 2023, 8,174,189 people have been recorded as refugees from Ukraine across Europe. Exactly 5,044,039 of them registered for temporary protection schemes in Europe.

Five years ago, North Macedonia and Greece signed the ground-breaking Prespa Agreement, paving the way for North Macedonia's accession to NATO and the European Union. However, the provisions of the agreement proved to be difficult for the Macedonians to accept. Now, Bulgaria has erected new barriers by vetoing North Macedonia's progress towards EU membership unless it agrees to Bulgaria's equally challenging prerequisites, further adding to the Macedonians’ hardships.

Five years have passed since the signing of the Prespa Agreement between North Macedonia and Greece. It was, and still is an agreement that left no one indifferent, Macedonian or Greek alike, and the consequences, both positive and negative, are felt to this day. The agreement was praised throughout the world as a visionary, modern and progressive way to solve the name issue, which plagued bilateral relations between the two countries for almost three decades.

For years, Hungary’s Fidesz government under Viktor Orbán has employed historical revisionism and irredentist symbols in domestic politics. The notion of “Greater Hungary” and grievances over the loss of territories due to the Treaty of Trianon, as well as referring to it as a national trauma, are central to this. While the strategy may help Orbán domestically, it negatively affects Hungary’s relationships with some neighbours.

“Greater Hungary”, also known as “Historic Hungary”, refers to the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary as part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire before the First World War. Today, the notion of Greater Hungary involves an irredentist political idea and refers to territories Hungary lost through the Paris Peace Treaty, in Hungary more commonly known as the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, which ended the First World War between the Allies and Hungary.

As one of the only democracies in Central Asia, Mongolia remains a relatively small country surrounded by two geopolitical behemoths. Yet, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has shown Mongolia that nothing can be predicted and that it must be ready to face any situation. The support it provides to Buryats and others fleeing Russia indicates that it does not see eye-to-eye with Moscow’s aggression.

Former Mongolian President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj spoke out on September 23rd 2022 about Russia's invasion of Ukraine, calling on Vladimir Putin to end the war. Elbegdorj condemned the “killings” and “senseless destruction” caused by the conflict. His statement does not represent the official position of the Mongolian government, which is more restrained in its condemnation of Russia. However, the comments highlight the complexity of Mongolian-Russian relations and the conflicting voices within the country.

Identifying, analysing and countering foreign information interference and manipulation is one of the biggest challenges that the West will face for the foreseeable future. While it may be considered late, a lot has been done in this field both at the EU and international level. However, as the results of recent IRI research show, the need for further action is still clear.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24th 2022, the International Republican Institute (IRI)’s Beacon Project has been conducting analyses of online media data from multiple Central and Eastern European countries in order to track aspects of key narratives that have the potential to erode support for Ukraine.

Putinism has been built as a model of the Russian state envisioned for decades, if not centuries. In this way, Putinism has ended history for all who are subordinate to it.

“The collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century,” said Vladimir Putin in 2005. These infamous words were a sign that a political change had taken place in Russia. It marked a departure from the not so successful attempts at democracy building in the 1990s towards the path of authoritarianism. In that very same speech, however, Putin also declared the responsibility of the Russian Federation to protect Russian-speaking populations outside Russia, which was later used as the key argument to start aggression against Ukraine.

Russian war crimes in Ukraine and the terror against people in occupied territories will go down in the history books. In a sense, the Russo-Ukrainian War is a clash of civilisations. Wartime politics has exposed the long-known yet startling truth about the low price of human life in Russia – a product of a deeply entrenched culture of violence. There is a direct link between the war in Ukraine and the political disempowerment of Russian society.

Both Ukrainians and EU citizens have been shocked by Russian war crimes, but equally shocking may be how Russia’s politicians and military leadership treat their soldiers. They are nothing more than cannon fodder, utilised in the name of Putin’s neo-imperial ambitions. Even more perplexing is the fatalism and the lack of resistance from conscripts sent to be slaughtered on the frontline, as well as from their families.

In 2014 Vladimir Putin and his propagandists did everything to convince the public that Ukraine was a failed state. By the end of 2022 the situation appears to have reversed. Over the last year, Putin has turned Russia into a failed state.

On August 6th 2022 a programme on the YouTube channel BesogonTV featured a story about a prisoner who died in Ukraine during the “special military operation” while he was simultaneously serving a sentence in a federal correctional facility in Russia. The next day, Russia-1, a state-sponsored TV channel, aired his story as part of its daily news programme.

The decision to invade Ukraine was made by a tiny circle of people within the Kremlin. However, as it turns out, Vladimir Putin’s “advisors” have something unique in common with one another: they have been dead for hundreds of years. What does it mean for Putin, the war in Ukraine and the Russian standoff against the West, when the Russian president lets his actions be inspired and driven by historical precedent?

How many individuals does it take to decide upon invading a neighbouring country? After February 2022, the world learnt that you apparently do not necessarily need to consult a whole lot of people if you are intent on taking what is not yours. For sure, one could suggest that the fear of any leaks concerning your invasion plan could very well mess up your plans in the first place. Therefore, secrecy is a prime matter of recourse.

After years of struggle, political corruption and non-compliance with obligations from both sides, the Franco-German proposal for Serbia and Kosovo came as some kind of relief for those who want to normalise relations. It can be seen as an ultimatum for the political elites, but also an opportunity for extremists on both sides to blame their opponents for “treason”.

On the evening of February 27th 2022, the day-long meeting in Brussels between Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, Kosovar Prime Minister Albin Kurti, the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell, and the EU Special Representative for Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue Miroslav Lajčák, finally came to an end.

Poland used various discursive practices to shape diverging social perceptions about two groups of migrants/refugees entering Poland: those crossing from Ukraine, on the one hand, and those crossing from Belarus on the other. The Polish government’s portrayal of the crisis on the Poland-Belarus border as a hybrid war, whilst helping Ukrainian refugees, was presented as being in line with Poland’s national interests.

Poland has been witnessing two very different waves of migration on its eastern border: the arrival of millions of Ukrainian refugees since February 2022, and the arrival of people, predominantly from the Middle East and Africa, through Belarus since June 2021. These two groups are quite different in their nature and origin and arouse different reactions both on part of the Polish authorities and broader society. While those fleeing Ukraine have been warmly welcomed, people trying to enter Poland via Belarus have been predominantly denied the right to apply for asylum and pushed back into Belarusian territory.