Analysis

Between 30 and 40 per cent of Slovaks have positive feelings towards Russia, which makes Slovak society one of the most pro-Russian in Europe. And yet, pro-Russian Slovaks do not want to leave either NATO or the EU. This simultaneous support for Russia and western alliances is a phenomenon that demands a deeper look.

At this year’s NATO summit in Washington DC, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico sent, not for the first time, a radically pro-Russian message to his voters. In a video posted on Facebook he said that Ukraine’s NATO membership was unacceptable and “a guarantee of a third world war”.

From the perspective of Kosovo, the aggression exerted by Russia against Ukraine is seen similarly as the acts committed by Serbia. The aim of both is territorial expansion. While Russia is trying to maintain its influence, Serbia aims to create what is called the “Serbian world”. Both call for greater autonomy for local citizens to justify their aggressive aims.

Kosovo and Serbia cannot agree on a sustainable political solution. The conflict between these two countries is deeply rooted and has not been resolved even after tense negotiations in Vienna in 2006-07. These negotiations produced a document known as the Ahtisaari Plan. Kosovo then declared its statehood in 2008 based on this agreement but Serbia did not accept it.

A military intervention by Serbia into Kosovo would be the biggest upset to the political order in the Balkans since the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s, with consequences that few have considered. Not only would such action do damage within Serbia, but neighbouring states and other powers could see similar repercussions as well. Even though such a scenario is not a certainty, these consequences must be considered.

The year 2008 is one that is singed into the mind of Serbs, both in Serbia and abroad. In February of that year, the Autonomous Province of Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia. To the outrage of Serbs across the world, a part of the country regarded as integral to the Serbian identity itself left with minimal resistance and effort being made by the Serbian government. Since then, the question of Kosovo remains one of the most important political issues both within Serbia and major nations involved in the political order of the Balkans.

The war in Ukraine has encouraged discussion on Russia’s wider designs for the region. This is particularly clear with regards to Kazakhstan, which is also home to a large Russian-speaking population. Various scenarios are possible regarding this pivotal Central Asian state.

The messaging found in Chinese foreign policy is used for specific purposes. For the most part, China is presenting itself as a positive alternative to western domination and a country interested in peace and stability. Under the surface, however, a closer examination reveals different intentions.

After decades of a focus on the West in global politics and the dominance of “Westsplaining” therein, the focus of the international community is now, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, visibly shifting towards the East. This shift is of course dictated by Russia’s unprovoked aggression against Ukraine and the immediate threat that it poses to the European Union and NATO. However, the eyes of free world’s public and policymakers are not stopping only at Russia’s borders. They look further, all the way to China.

The war in Ukraine serves as a stark reminder of the diverging approaches to establishing red lines in the realm of cyber operations, accentuating the complexities inherent in establishing normative frameworks for governing cyberspace. The intersection of cyber warfare with traditional kinetic conflict further exacerbates the complexities of norm development, underlining the urgent need for sustained efforts to bridge gaps and address grey areas in international law.

In the contemporary landscape of warfare, the lines between traditional kinetic operations and cyber warfare are increasingly blurred. Last year alone, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) thwarted over 4,500 major cyber-attacks. Many of these cyber-attacks were coupled with scores of conventional missile strikes. This underlines the urgent need for international cooperation to confront cyber threats.

Negotiations concerning Russia’s war in Ukraine have been going on for many years at this point. While there have been almost continuous discussions regarding peace, it has become clear that Moscow does not place any real value in such talks. The war will therefore be decided on the battlefield.

Peace talks between Ukraine and Russia broke down completely on September 30th 2022, when the Ukrainian National Security and Defence Council made a unanimous decision that it was impossible to negotiate with Vladimir Putin and approved Ukraine’s symbolic application for NATO membership. The decision was preceded by seven years of fruitless attempts to settle the conflict between the two countries through diplomatic means, which was followed by the full-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine and several more fruitless negotiation rounds.

It is clear that Turkey is very keen to be increasingly involved in the South Caucasus region. Its interests in this region are inextricably linked to cooperation with Azerbaijan and numerous transport projects, particularly those that allow for the transportation of energy resources. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the importance of supplying energy from the Caspian Sea to Europe has only become more crucial.

Much has been written about the Turkish involvement in the South Caucasus in 2020, when the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh re-ignited after a period of calming. As expected, Turkey supported Azerbaijan, its close ally. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called on the Armenian government to withdraw from Nagorno-Karabakh and gave assurances that Ankara would support Baku militarily if necessary. There were even rumours that a Turkish F-16 fighter jet shot down an Armenian plane, which was denied by Ankara.

On October 20th 2024, Moldova will simultaneously hold its presidential elections and a crucial referendum on the country’s accession to the EU, a strategic confluence that was initially seen as a mobilization tactic by President Maia Sandu but now looms as a substantial risk. If the referendum fails to engage sufficient voter turnout, it could not only undermine the current government but also potentially benefit pro-Russian factions in upcoming parliamentary elections.

In October 2022, the Ukrainian researcher Volodymyr Ishchenko wrote a piece titled "Russia’s military Keynesianism". While the Kremlin – in his assessment – was implementing policies of statism and redistribution, Kyiv focused on the neoliberal limitation of state participation. Belarus – as it frequently happens, sadly – was omitted from this comparison despite likely looking much like Moscow.

Dissatisfaction with the Social Democrats and nationalist demands from Bulgaria have shifted the country to the right.