Now available - the latest issue of New Eastern Europe: On how China approaches Russia and the region.

While China may be growing into an economic, military and technological giant, the experience of Central and Eastern Europe indicates that this “hegemon in the making” is much more vulnerable and isolated than it likes to believe. At the same time, wishing China away is impossible. Ignoring the fact that it is already a stakeholder in the complex European landscape comes with great risk.

On the pleasant sunny morning of June 14th 2023, pedestrians crossing the iconic Charles Bridge in Prague found themselves navigating through multiple meticulously-staged Chinese couples. These groups were taking their pre-wedding photos against the scenic skyline of the city. Locals have probably become accustomed to this sight. Ever since the Taiwanese singer Jolin Tsai released her Mandopop hit “Prague Square”, hundreds of thousands of Chinese tourists have been flocking to the city to enjoy its romance.

The threat of a China-Russia alliance poses significant geopolitical challenges to the United States and the European Union. However, the strength of their relationship may not be as powerful as they declare.

In his September visit to Stockholm, the Republican chairman of the US House Foreign Affairs Committee, Representative Michael McCaul, warned that the strengthening relationship between Russia and China was the most significant “threat to Europe and the Pacific … since World War II”. This viewpoint, as sensationalist as it appears, has some merit. Both China and Russia are nuclear-armed, both can paralyse the United Nations Security Council with their veto powers, both have in the last decade become more authoritarian at home, and both have engaged in a variety of malign activities that damage democracy abroad.

The strengthening of China-Russia relations has raised concerns in the countries over which Russia still projects its ambitions, including the Baltic states. Thus, China's position on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has only served as the tipping point in an already souring relationship between the Baltic states and Beijing.

Both Russia and China have ventured into each other’s perceived space over centuries of mutual interactions. Still, there are no grounds to argue that China would go against Russian claims in Europe. Russian actions, including the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24th 2022, minor inconveniences aside, have proven to be useful for China's rivalry with the United States. The two countries are not allies, yet a mutually beneficial relationship has emerged with Russia as a spoiler and China as a global agenda shifter. On top of an array of other issues shared across Europe – such as unequal trade practices, economic coercion and values – it is this consideration that serves as the strongest argument limiting Baltic engagement with Beijing.

A conversation with Michał Lubina, associate professor of political science at the Institute of the Middle and Far East at the Jagiellonian University. Interviewer: Maciej Makulski

MACIEJ MAKULSKI: I want to start with a personal question about your approach to learning about, researching and describing Russia and China. It is a broad subject and, I guess, it is quite easy to replicate western calques when talking about these countries.

MICHAŁ LUBINA: Thank you for this question. No one has ever asked me that before. I research Russian-Chinese relations and Myanmar, and it is a lot. Regarding my cognitive beginnings, when I was 17, I went backpacking in Syria, and since then, I have travelled a lot. I cannot talk about a country if I haven't been there. Later, I enrolled in a Russian studies course at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków which taught me to look at a country through its culture, language and codes. It is, therefore, the antithesis of western universalism. Cultural relativism makes you look at each country through its lens.