A conversation with Tomas Venclova, Lithuanian philosopher and writer. Interviewer: Nikodem Szczyglowski

The Tatars of Poland remain one of the country’s most enduring ethnic minorities. Arriving in the area as early as the 14th century, this group has maintained its own distinctiveness while adapting to many wider Polish customs. This process has involved as much positive as negative developments.

Had you, 30 or 40 years ago, visited Kruszyniany, a village near the Belarusian border that is home to one of the two traditional Tatar settlements in Poland, you would have encountered the tranquil rhythm of community life centred around bayrams (a Turkic word for festivals or celebrations). In Muslim tradition, religious holidays are moments for families to gather in prayer at a mosque or a cemetery (mizar). To join their relatives in these celebrations, descendants of Tatars from all around Poland would flock to Kruszyniany. However, once the festivities were over, only a few Tatar families stayed in the village, enjoying its tranquillity and the slow pace of life.

Standing fast by Poland’s national “master narrative”, the country’s schools teach that the Polish nation, defined as all the speakers of the Polish language, is a millennium old. Yet, this pairing of the Polish nation and language dates back only to the late 19th century.

In Polish popular opinion, the view that the Polish nation consists of all the speakers of the Polish language is not controversial. Hence, the Polish speech community is unreflectively equated with the Polish nation. In turn, all the territories where speakers of Polish reside compactly are deemed to rightfully constitute the Polish nation-state. 

The legacy of the Byzantine Empire in the Balkans stretches back for centuries. Today’s politics should remember that the idea of Balkan states as homogenous entities is not natural. This is a relatively new idea that was realized through violence, population exchanges and expulsion at the turn of the 20th century. This process then continued well into the 1990s with the Yugoslav Wars.

The Byzantine Empire is the medieval successor to the ancient Roman Empire. Its origins are traditionally traced back to the time when the Roman Empire began to re-position its centre of power towards the Eastern Mediterranean, adopted Constantinople as its capital, adopted Greek (rather than Latin) as its primary language, and Christianity as its official religion. This all roughly happened in the period between the years 300 and 400.  

Among its Central Asian neighbours, Tajikistan’s history textbooks still most closely resemble official accounts from the Soviet era. They stress the evils of the Russian Empire’s expansion to the region. At the same time, they also remain fairly positive about Tajikistan’s Soviet experience, underlining the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic’s contribution to the Soviet state. Perhaps as a result, they have been caught in Russia’s crosshairs.

School textbooks are telling examples of official interpretations of history. They exemplify the narratives that are taught to children as part of their civic socialization controlled by governments. In countries that gained independence after the Soviet collapse, the shifts in historical narratives have been intrinsically linked to the reimagining of these countries’ Soviet past by attributing them with new meanings through the prism of post-Soviet nation-building processes. With Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the debates about history textbooks gained a new momentum, and a new meaning.

As Ukrainians took their first steps in exploring their own history, they began uncovering a wealth of previously forbidden topics and figures. Following the country’s independence, the exchange of academic research between Ukrainian and western historians became possible. This significantly contributed to shaping Ukraine’s historical policy, which was also in many cases in direct opposition to the Kremlin’s interpretation of history. Unsurprisingly, history and memory are key components of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

History and memory regarding the events of the past have always been, and still are, powerful tools in relations between Ukraine and Russia. While Russia has tried to shape its historical policy since the late Middle Ages, when Moscow declared itself the “third Rome” and pursued “the gathering of Russian lands”, modern Ukraine, which was without statehood for a long time, began to develop and restore its true history after independence in 1991. It would also develop its own historical policy. 

This text is a reprint of Egelbert Besednjak’s 1922 analysis of fascism after its rise to power in Italy. The text is not only a solid analysis of the process of the rise of fascism over 100 years ago, but also a reminder how the reins of power can swiftly shift in a dangerous direction, even in a democracy.

In the shadow of Cold War tensions, covert diplomatic talks took place in Warsaw from 1958 to 1970 between the United States and the People's Republic of China. These talks, today largely forgotten, laid the foundation for a rapprochement that would change the course of global politics in the 1970s.

The 1950s were an immensely complex decade for global geopolitics. Numerous African and Asian nations started to regain their independence, redefining the old colonial world order and thus weakening past colonial superpowers, such as the United Kingdom or France. Above all, however, the new world order was emerging, dominated by the duopoly of the United States and Soviet Union and a visible division of spheres of influence between them.

An interview with Jacob Mikanowski, author of Goodbye Eastern Europe. An intimate history of a divided land. Interviewers: Adam Reichardt and Nina Pániková