How Fidesz’s irredentism strains neighbourly relations

Illustration by Andrzej Zaręba

The so-called “Trianon Trauma” after the dissolution of the Kingdom of Hungary is an often-referenced cornerstone of Hungarian history, politics and identity. It expresses the sentiment of over three million Hungarians who suddenly found themselves in foreign lands due to the loss of two-thirds of Hungarian territory. While this experience left deep marks in Hungarian collective memory and traumatised an entire generation, it is important to note that the majority of the population in those lost territories was not Hungarian. Nonetheless, some of these regions are still home to Hungarian minorities today, who speak Hungarian and uphold Hungarian culture and traditions. As a result, a deep-seated feeling of responsibility for these Hungarian communities still exists.

Revision via commemoration

Already in the 1930s, irredentist, revisionist ideas and the desire to recover the lost territories were revived, leading Hungary to form an alliance with Nazi Germany in the Second World War. Although Hungary managed to temporarily regain some of its former territories, the end of the war led to the restoration of the borders laid out in Trianon. During the communist period, Trianon and the question of minorities in the neighbourhood disappeared from Hungary’s political agenda. The issue resurfaced only after the fall of socialism.

The Trianon Trauma still serves Hungarian politicians today, more than 100 years later. Hungary’s populist right-wing Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, in particular, exploits nostalgia around Trianon for his ethno-nationalist politics and political gains. By reinvigorating the trauma brought upon the Hungarian people in various ways, he not only perpetuates the nation’s self-victimisation but furthermore ensures that Hungarians do not forget the perceived injustices done to them. The commemoration practices introduced by Fidesz are one stringent example of this.

In 2010, shortly after the Fidesz takeover, the Hungarian parliament introduced “National Unity Day” as a remembrance day to commemorate Trianon and its consequences for millions of Hungarian families. This day of “National Unity” is held annually on June 4th, the day the Trianon Treaty was signed. According to a government website, it “is a day of mourning and remembrance, and a historical lesson at the same time”.

For the commemoration of the centenary of Trianon on June 4th 2020, church bells rang throughout the capital, while a moment of silence was held and public transport stopped at 4:30 in the afternoon. Additionally, the government commissioned the construction of a monument, the “Memorial of National Unity”, that was placed near the Hungarian parliament. The construction consists of a downward-sloping 100-metre-long ramp, which represents the 100 years since the signing of the Treaty of Trianon, leading to an eternal flame. The black granite walls hold the names of around 13,000 places that formerly belonged to historical Hungary and have been lost.

Considering the memorial’s triste and mournful aesthetic, it represents an exclusively Hungarian interpretation of the consequences of the Treaty of Trianon. Moreover, it sends a revisionist message that could be interpreted as a provocation to Hungary’s neighbours, according to experts like the late Gáspár Miklós Tamás, who came from Transylvania and was part of the Hungarian minority in Romania. In an article in the Hungarian weekly Life and Literature (Élet és Írodalom), he pointed out the hypocrisy and one-sidedness of the interpretation of Trianon in Hungarian national debates, as well as the lack of focus on the root causes of Trianon. Furthermore, he explained that while June 4th has been a day of mourning in Hungary since 2010, it is a day of joy in Romania. This juxtaposition demonstrates the one-sided and exclusively Hungarian interpretation of Trianon in Hungarian commemoration practices and national debates.

Citizenship law

Besides the national commemoration and mourning over Trianon, the Fidesz government introduced other laws and practices that are emblematic of its revisionist, irredentist political idea of “Greater Hungary”. Perhaps most controversial for Hungary’s neighbours was the introduction of the new citizenship law.

Already during its first period in power from 1998 to 2002, the Fidesz party introduced the “status law”, which granted special rights to ethnic Hungarian minorities and caused anger among Hungary’s neighbours. After the renewed Fidesz takeover in 2010, the government once again attracted attention with the introduction of its citizenship law, according to which ethnic Hungarians abroad can now apply for Hungarian citizenship through a simplified procedure. Once they have received Hungarian citizenship, they are also allowed to vote in Hungarian elections, which they do – and overwhelmingly so for Fidesz.

The law’s irredentist underpinnings caused alarm among Hungary’s neighbours, however, the matter proved to be particularly contentious for Slovakia. Robert Fico, back then prime minister of Slovakia, argued that the law presented a security threat to the country and considered it an attempt to revise history. Romania, another EU member state, and Croatia, an EU candidate country at the time, reacted in a more placid way. Romania allows dual nationality and likewise provides Romanians in other states with the opportunity to obtain Romanian citizenship, thus rendering the issue less controversial.

Serbia is a special case in this regard, as it is an EU candidate state. Members of the Hungarian minority in Serbia who receive Hungarian citizenship thus subsequently have access to the EU single market. The same goes for ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine, who benefit from receiving Hungarian citizenship as they henceforth enjoy the EU’s freedom of movement. Thus, the possibility of obtaining Hungarian citizenship is overall more consequential for the ethnic Hungarians in Serbia and Ukraine than for those in EU member states. Still, the law was heavily criticised by Ukrainian politicians, who considered it a threat to their national security. Ukraine also prohibits dual nationality, unlike Serbia. Although the matter has been condemned by some neighbouring countries, the law seems to be welcomed among the Hungarian minority populations. Between 2010 and 2019, over 1.1 million ethnic Hungarians acquired citizenship through this “simplified naturalisation”, the majority of them being from Romania, which has the largest share of ethnic Hungarians outside of Hungary.

Overall, however, the commemoration practices, as well as the simplified naturalisation process for ethnic Hungarians abroad, serve a more symbolic purpose. The Orbán government’s display of irredentist symbols are tangible instances and open demonstrations of irredentism in practice. The frequent depiction of the map of Greater Hungary is a prominent example of this, with the “scarf affair” being a recent and representative case in point.

The scarf affair

During last year’s FIFA World Cup football tournament, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s revisionism once again made international headlines, when he was seen with a football scarf that depicted the pre-Trianon map of imperial Hungary. Although Orbán later in a Facebook post stated that “Football is not politics. Let’s not see what is not there,” the political message of the scarf was obvious and was promptly criticised. Romania and Ukraine were especially not amused, and both countries condemned this behaviour. Slovak members of parliament called it a “senseless provocation”, and the Slovak Prime Minister Eduard Heger stated that he had noticed Orbán had “an old scarf”, and gave him a new one.

Contrary to this, the Austrian foreign ministry responded with humour to the affair, telling Politico that “A quick glance at historical maps in the Viennese ministry of foreign affairs has confirmed initial suspicions, according to which Translithania (the Kingdom of Hungary) ceased to exist around 100 years ago,” adding that “we will inform our Hungarian neighbours of this development at the earliest opportunity.”

That Austria is less sensitive about this issue can be explained by two facts. The first is rooted in the history of Austria and the Austrian Empire. During the time of the Habsburg monarchy, Vienna ruled Hungary. Only with the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 which established the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary, did the Kingdom of Hungary receive full sovereignty and equal status. Second, Austria was admitted to the EU almost ten years prior to Hungary, which could be another explanation for why it did not perceive its eastern neighbour’s revisionist ideas as a security threat. Despite the inappropriateness of Hungary’s behaviour, Austria is able to shake it off with humour.

For other countries in the neighbourhood, specifically those who were subject to such revisionist claims before joining the EU, the issue hits differently. Croatia, for example, only joined the EU in 2013, almost a decade after Hungary, and experienced a brutal war in the 1990s. Such irredentist behaviour, therefore, strikes a nerve, which is exemplified by an incident in May 2022. In a statement, Orbán tried to justify the blocking of EU sanctions on energy imports due to Hungary being landlocked. Referring to the part of the Adriatic coast that was part of Hungary before Trianon, he stated that “Those who have a sea and ports are able to bring oil on tankers. If they hadn’t taken it away from us, we would also have a port.” The statement which once again aimed at presenting the loss of Hungarian territories as continuous tragic injustice, caused outrage and was condemned by the Croatian foreign ministry. In Ukraine, a country already facing irredentist claims by another neighbour – Russia – the Hungarian government’s repeated claims over Transcarpathia are alarming. This is even more so since the Russian annexation of Crimea and the full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Yet, the “scarf affair” is not an isolated incident of the Hungarian government clearly demonstrating its irredentism. In fact, Fidesz politicians are time and again found to perpetuate their revisionist claims and show off the map of Greater Hungary instead of modern Hungary. For example, in 2020, Orbán wished students luck for their final exam in history and posted a globe that depicted Hungary with its pre-Trianon borders. Similarly, the government spokesperson Zoltán Kovács has been photographed in his office, with a huge map of Greater Hungary displayed behind him. Maps depicting historic Hungary are also hung on walls in other offices, as a picture taken during a presidency meeting in a different room proves.

These incidents have time and again been pointed out and criticised by journalists and politicians in the neighbourhood, only to then be ridiculed and any specific motives denied by the Orbán government. Most recently, during an event under the motto of “peace and security”, when the Orbán government reiterated its support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, a banner depicting the map of Hungary also showed the outline of Greater Hungary around it. The incident not only once again demonstrated the Hungarian government’s unabated and unabashed irredentism but also its insensitivity. This is because it was displayed during an event in support of “peace” in Ukraine, with the outline of Greater Hungary including Transcarpathia, which belongs to Ukraine. While this behaviour is frowned upon by Hungary’s neighbours who were also handed territories from Greater Hungary, the issue is particularly sensitive for Ukraine and strained relations with Kyiv further, as the country finds itself in its second year under attack from Russia.

Hungarian irredentism in the context of Russia’s war in Ukraine

The relationship between Hungary and Ukraine has been marked by tensions for years, not least due to Orbán’s irredentist claims over Transcarpathia, where ethnic Hungarians live, as well as over Ukraine’s treatment of Hungarian minorities. Already in 2014, Orbán called on Ukraine to grant the country’s ethnic Hungarians autonomy and dual citizenship. As inappropriate as the demand might have been, it was particularly untimely as it came on the eve of referendums in Eastern Ukraine. These were followed by Russian separatists declaring independence from Ukraine and subsequently calling for their regions’ incorporation into Russia.

In 2017, tensions flared up again when the Fidesz government harshly criticised the Ukrainian government over its language policies, specifically legislation stating that Ukrainian shall be the only language of education in state schools, an attempt to mitigate the influence of the Russian language in the country. According to Hungary, the law discriminates against and violates the rights of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia and threatens their existence.

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Hungary’s continuous Russian-friendly course, despite Russian aggression and its constant undermining of EU support to Ukraine, further complicated their relationship. The Fidesz government in part justified its lack of support for weapons deliveries due to the danger the war poses to the ethnic Hungarians in Western Ukraine, also claiming that they are being called to fight and die in this war. Although Orbán’s lack of support for Ukraine was explained by some as part of his Russia connection, his attempt to position himself as a “protector” is also in line with the Hungarian political elite’s rhetoric on the need to support and protect ethnic Hungarians in the neighbourhood.

Given the Hungarian government’s history of irredentist talk, rumours circulated that the Hungarian government hopes that, in the case of a dissolution of Ukraine, they would regain Transcarpathia. In February 2023, then Slovak Foreign Minister Rastislav Káčer even argued that Hungary could make territorial claims over southern Slovakia, where most of the Hungarian minority lives, in case Russia conquers Ukraine. He added that “had Vladimir Putin succeeded in Ukraine, Hungary would have already made territorial claims against Slovakia.” While the comment only referred to Slovakia, it is in line with the previously voiced suspicion by, for example, former Polish foreign minister and current member of the European Parliament, Radosław Sikorski, or Ukrainian politician Oleksiy Danilov, that Orbán would try to strike a deal with Russia over Transcarpathia if Putin wins. Orbán’s behaviour towards Ukraine and his Putin-friendly policy are among the main reasons for these accusations. Ukrainian Vice Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk in a Facebook post also questioned the Hungarian government’s behaviour, saying, “is this because of cheap gas or because Hungary is still secretly dreaming of the Carpathians?” According to a survey by the Kyiv Independent, over 40 per cent of Ukrainians think that Hungary could make territorial claims against Ukraine.

A short “documentary” on Greater Hungary by the Russian propaganda channel Russia Today, which describes the historical importance of Transcarpathia for Hungarians, presenting it as the “cradle of their nationhood”, further feeds these fears. The short film also argues that regaining these native Hungarian lands is a prominent idea in Hungarian public circles and features pro-Russian Orbán propagandists who further reinforce the symbolic significance of this region for Hungary. Overall, it not only emphasises the Orbán government’s irredentist narrative about Greater Hungary in relation to Transcarpathia but further bolsters the false view that Ukraine is a “fabricated country”, and that other states like Hungary also have territorial claims against Ukraine. Hungarian officials obviously refuted claims that Hungary plans to take over Transcarpathia. Nonetheless, the Hungarian government’s past and present actions sadly justify such presumptions.

Whither, Greater Hungary?

Trianon and the dissolution of Greater Hungary are central focal points of Hungarian history. The perceived injustice done to Hungarians is deeply embedded in the country’s society and political culture even today. This self-image of Hungary as a victim also supports Orbán in his rhetorical battles against the EU and “global elites”, by presenting Hungarians as a people persecuted and wronged over centuries. Over the years, the Orbán government time and again reinvigorated the “Trauma of Trianon” and perpetuated irredentist claims and politics. The telling of Trianon as a one-sided story of the dissolution of Greater Hungary and as an injustice done to the Hungarian people helps Orbán unite the people behind him and his politics.

Whether politically useful at home or not, this policy course has angered allies and neighbours, who perceive this type of language and politics to be inappropriate in the 21st century. While neighbouring EU countries may perceive the Orbán government’s revisionism as an annoyance, it can pose an actual danger to neighbours that are not a part of the EU, such as Ukraine, a country under attack due to Putin’s own irredentism. Moreover, it has the potential to hamper existing cooperation between Hungary and its neighbours while also complicating the living conditions and integration of the Hungarian minorities in the neighbourhood.

Knowing that the notion of “Greater Hungary” and the well-being of ethnic Hungarians are still of relevance today, Orbán’s populist right-wing government will continue to exploit the issue and the emotions it evokes for personal domestic gains, regardless of criticism from abroad. In fact, condemnation by Hungary’s neighbours and the EU further underlines the Fidesz government’s narrative about Hungary as a misunderstood and wronged country. This makes it a successful strategy after all.

Gabriela Greilinger is an Austrian-Hungarian political scientist and the co-founder of the youth platform, Quo Vademus. She regularly writes about EU politics and international affairs and specifically about democracy and populism, with a regional focus on Hungary and Central and Eastern Europe.

history, Hungary, memory, memory politics, Trianon