Lithuania’s Taiwan pivot became the most high-profile example of the country’s proclaimed values-based foreign policy. Behind the layers of rhetoric, the emerging picture hints at other motives behind the move.

The inability of some NATO Allies in the West to not see the bigger picture in Ukraine is costing lives every day. While states in the region continue to raise the alarm, many of their partners are still frozen with indecision.

With a new law in Lithuania, Belarusian exiles in Vilnius have found themselves facing a new reality – are they no longer welcome?

Russian and Belarusian citizens applying for residence in Lithuania have to prove they are not a threat to national security. They have to fill out questionnaires with questions like “Whose is Crimea?” and fear arbitrary decisions from Lithuania’s institutions.

With little leverage against social media giants such as Meta, countries like Lithuania face an uphill battle in the fight against disinformation online.

Preparations are in full swing for what will undoubtedly be the most important event for Lithuania in 2023: the NATO Summit in July. Vilnius, which will host the leaders of the world’s most powerful military bloc, has set itself ambitious goals. But security experts interviewed by New Eastern Europe's partners LRT stress that although Lithuania is organising the summit, this does not mean that it will have more influence on the agenda.

In 2022, Europe was hit by a historic drought, which made it re-evaluate its water reserves. Satellite data collected by scientists show that the continent has been experiencing a steady decline in freshwater for decades. Lithuania is not yet facing a shortage but may soon become one of Europe’s few freshwater exporters.

With regards to Belarus, it is difficult to ask Lithuanians, or actually any other neighbouring society, about how they perceive Belarusians. The truth is that in this country we are dealing with two entities: the official Belarus and the Belarus of the opposition.

At first glance, in the autumn of 2022, Vilnius has enjoyed a normal life. The capital of Lithuania has finally almost returned to its pre-pandemic pace of life. The majority of institutions are now working like they were before. The same can be said about small shops, coffee shops and restaurants. Even though the prices that you pay there are much higher. It is also not difficult to notice that some new places have been set up. For example, on Gediminas Avenue there is a bar called Pahonia, while Vilnius Street is now home to the Belarusian House, which is located near the main government building.

From the region’s perspective, the 1922 Warsaw Accord between Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Poland was a significant step in strengthening geopolitical interests and safeguarding against Russian aggression. Unfortunately, the agreement ultimately failed. This year’s ratification by Finland’s parliament of its application to join NATO can be seen as a final step in this process that began over 100 years ago.

The most promising and – to a certain degree – surprising declaration made by Finland on its interest in joining the NATO Alliance immediately reminded me of the so-called Warsaw Accord. This treaty was drafted 100 years ago on March 17th 1922 and embodied the initiative of a Baltic alliance between Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Poland. Anti-Soviet in nature, cooperation ultimately failed due to reservations expressed by Helsinki. In the summer of 1922 the Finnish parliament – Eduskunta – decided not to ratify the pact. A century later, on May 17th 2022, 188 out of 200 Finnish MPs voted on accession to NATO. The story has come full circle. A story which deserves to be told.

The war in Ukraine has put many of Europe’s traditionally pro-Kremlin parties in a difficult situation. This is no more clear than in the case of Lithuania’s EAPL-CFA, which has maintained links with Russia as part of its attempts to represent various national minorities.

As of September 28th 2021, 4,163 migrants have illegaly crossed Lithuania’s border with Belarus. To deter migrants – now and for good – Lithuania has pinned its hopes on a fence along the frontier.

Rudninkai, a sleepy Lithuanian settlement of 500 inhabitants in the Salcininkai district along Lithuania and the EU’s border with Belarus, has been in both the local and international media spotlight this summer. Over 700 illegal male migrants had been placed for nearly three months in a makeshift tent camp, which is now eerily empty. All the migrants, mostly Iraqis, Kurds, Afghans and Sri Lankans, have been moved from the settlement to a former correctional facility in Kybartai, in the south-western district of Vilkaviskis near the Russian border. At the same time, around 400 vulnerable migrants have been moved to a refugee reception centre in Rukla, which is located in the central Jonava district. Some others are still living in municipal shelters, mostly crumbling dormitories in municipalities located along the 680 kilometre border with Belarus.

The recent migration crisis has brought new issues to Lithuanian politics. Home to the country’s Polish minority, the south-eastern part of Lithuania was one of the regions most affected. It appears that the situation has opened up new opportunities for the ‘Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania – Christian Families Alliance’ to sustain and mobilise an electorate that remains highly responsive to “traditional values”.