Budapest’s readiness to block military and financial aid to Kyiv, delay EU sanctions against Russia and its outspoken criticism thereof are creating serious repercussions for the EU’s image as a foreign policy actor vis-á-vis Russia. These issues further indicate deep divisions among member states and call into question European unity. They also reveal one of the EU’s most discussed weaknesses, namely, its inability to speak with one voice in foreign policy.

To the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, any measure is welcome to achieve his personal and inner circle’s objectives. While being a member of western institutions, such as the European Union and NATO, Orbán consistently seeks contact with autocrats from the East, particularly Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. This double-faced foreign policy benefits the Hungarian government in two ways: first, it helps to uphold its image as a credible actor on the world stage back home; and second, it ensures that Hungary continues receiving financial support and legitimation for its illiberal model of governance from outside of the EU.

Since February 24th 2022, Georgia’s economic ties and dependence regarding Russia have markedly increased, leading to heavy criticism of the Georgian Dream-led government about its lack of transparency around ties to Russian business interests. Most obvious among these concerns are those centred on the party’s founder, Bidzina Ivanishvili, the billionaire and former prime minister who made his fortune in Russia before entering Georgian politics.

Nearly one year on from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a stroll through the streets of Tbilisi provides a visual reminder of both the ongoing conflict and the Georgian population’s prodigious support for the Ukrainian people. With billboards flashing blue and yellow and Ukrainian flags nearly matching their Georgian counterparts in representation, it is unsurprising that a March 2022 poll commissioned by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) showed that 98 per cent of Georgians support the Ukrainian people.

Soon after it became clear that Russia’s brutal aggression on Ukraine was nowhere near the rapid military campaign it had hoped to be, the international debate on the reconstruction of Ukraine started. Backtracking through the focal points of this debate gives us a clue as to where the primary financial and non-financial obstacles lie.

The current phase of Russia’s war against Ukraine started on February 24th 2022. Evidently, it marked a turning point in Europe’s history, whose consequences we will be seeing in the long years to come. As of January 2023, there are no clear signs suggesting how long the war will last. In fact, there is no end in sight. Nevertheless, alongside the ongoing negotiations on the armament of Ukraine and the next round of sanctions on Russia, there is also a process taking place around establishing the framework for future reconstruction efforts. There is no doubt that without a clear and effective institutional architecture, the recovery will become bogged down in a ton of risks and problems.

The human cost of an armed conflict produces the most damaging and long-lasting societal consequences. Unlike residential buildings or infrastructure, which can be rebuilt through various forms of financial aid, human suffering cannot be remedied by financial assistance alone. Any discussion of a Marshall Plan for Ukraine needs to have a strong element of reparations for all those victims harmed during this past year.

A Marshall Plan for Ukraine is a recurring idea that is regularly featured in policy discussions both within Ukraine and abroad among policymakers, the media and academic circles. In many ways, this is a unique example of preparations to rebuild a war-torn country as that very war still rages on. Planning for reconstruction early is certainly the correct approach and the best evidence of a collective faith in Ukraine’s prospects to win the war.

The war in Ukraine strengthened the de-Sovietisation process already taking place in Eastern Europe. It has pushed states to further remove the remnants of the Soviet past, including monuments, which are believed to have ideological symbolism and play a significant role in shaping collective identity.

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia’s actions have been discussed not only as a brutal violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a neighbouring state, but also as a continuation of Russian imperial policy and a desire to rebuild the Soviet Union. Yet, amidst the war in Ukraine, Eastern Europe showed its powerful counter-desire to be freed from the Soviet past and Russian influence.

An interview with Arkady Rzegocki, Head of the foreign service of the Polish ministry of foreign affairs. Interviewer: New Eastern Europe

Had Moscow used cyber operations to substitute kinetic operations in February 2022, we would have seen a full-blown cyber war instead of a conventional invasion. In fact, the consequences of the pre-war period were modest and most of the actions taken seemed to be rushed or poorly planned. Russia failed to achieve its strategic objectives using cyber operations and the Kremlin concluded that its only option was to launch a military campaign.

At the 2013 meeting of senior Russian and American defence officials, General Nikolai Makarov ridiculed the lack of information warfare in the US Cyber Command’s (USCYBERCOM) mission. In his provocative speech he told his counterparts, “one uses information to destroy nations, not networks” and taunted that the omission of information warfare proves the Americans’ ignorance. That was also a clear message about Russian priorities for cyberspace, which were later reflected in Russian strategic documents and also applied in Ukraine in 2022.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been characterised as the first full-scale “social media war”. Russia uses social media to not only spread propaganda but also the “fog of war”. Its efforts aim to both demonise Ukraine in the West and strengthen Russian support for the war.

War propaganda is the deliberate use of factual or fictitious information to sway public opinion and trigger strong feelings like fear, hatred, guilt, adulation or outrage. It has been a crucial tactic of battle throughout history and has evolved into a “necessity” of warfare that can take many different shapes. Even if Russian claims of significant successes over “Ukrainian Nazis” may be mocked in the West, these strategies have been very successful within Russia and among supporters of the country.

In the era of social divisions, public disputes and widespread polarisation of views, one phenomenon seems indisputable – social media has become an important element of life both in the private and public spheres. Understanding the peculiarities of these tools has also become an important social and business skill. Yet should social media management be considered a political and military competence as well? The Russian war in Ukraine suggests a positive answer. The terms “like”, “share”, “click”, “comment”, “tweet” or “swipe” have begun to have serious consequences and are – literally – a weapon of mass (media) destruction.

Surveillance is nothing new when it comes to authoritarian regimes as it has always been a tool to keep control and maintain order. The rise of digital technologies, however, has made it easier for regimes to monitor and control their populations. But it is not only autocratic governments which have adopted these technologies, adding to the risk of the decline of democracy and freedom.

In July 2021 the international investigative journalist collective known as the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, or OCCRP, revealed that governments around the world – mostly autocratic – were using special highly sophisticated software to spy on journalists, human rights activists, diplomats, politicians and even government officials. The investigation, titled the Pegasus Project, analysed a list of 50,000 phone numbers which was attained by Amnesty International.

Russia’s war against Ukraine proved to the world that battles do not happen only on the ground; they are also taking place online. After Russia’s invasion on February 24th, its neighbours, including Moldova, began facing many challenges: an economic crisis, a refugee influx, an energy crisis and even cyber-attacks.

The date of February 24th 2022 completely changed the life of the whole world, and definitely changed Moldova. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is spreading to this neighbouring country, even though direct attacks are not yet happening. The war in Ukraine has affected all processes in Moldova, especially in the economic sphere, and includes: increased inflation, disruption of all supply chains, the energy crisis, disinformation, propaganda, instability in society and above all, challenges to cybersecurity.

Today’s Georgia is a country of contradictions. While most of the population has come out in support of Ukraine, the country has experienced a great amount of migration from Russia since the war. This, combined with a government uncertain of its foreign policy, has made Georgia’s future all the more unclear.

Russian migrants have arrived in Georgia in two waves. The first wave took place in March 2022 right after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The second wave took place in late September 2022, after Vladimir Putin announced “partial” mobilisation. They waited in long lines, often for hours, at the Larsi checkpoint. According to various data, there are between 70,000 to 200,000 Russians living in Georgia right now, some estimate that this figure is even higher.