Friend or foe? The role of social media during Russia’s war in Ukraine

Illustration: Skorzewiak / Shutterstock

The original idea and assumptions which lay at the foundation of social media’s creation obviously did not take into account today’s far-reaching goals. Tools, which are now often used as powerful political and military weapons, were supposed to facilitate people’s communication. In the 1960s, this was the goal set by the creators of the PLATO platform, which allowed for the exchange of information between users of connected terminals. Almost a decade later, Ray Tomlinson sent the first e-mail and the 1980s brought another breakthrough – the birth of chat programmes.

However, it was the era of the mass internet (the 1990s) that truly enabled the development of numerous virtual tools. New platforms and apps not only allowed for the exchange of simple messages, but also the building of specific communities and interest groups. These, in turn, were commonly used to satisfy various higher-order needs: social, esteem, self-actualisation, creativity and entertainment.

Era 5.0

The multitude of emerging portals and applications quickly began to take over further spheres of public life, turning into key tools of marketing, public relations and sales, as well as in the education and public administration sectors. Is this phenomenon surprising? Not at all – but only if we properly understand the tools’ potential and see the opportunities generated by them. Social media helps us to build a brand and shape its desired image, guarantee recognition, reach an almost unlimited audience, reduce promotion costs, and maintain contact with a precisely defined target group. It has also helped us to build relationships, strengthen our commitment, and build an advocacy system. Moreover – which is particularly important in the political context – these realities have a significant, real impact on human behaviour.

The widespread availability and intuitive operation methods of these tools, which are an advantage both for active content creators and content recipients, have resulted in 4.74 billion users around the world today (which translates to 59.3 per cent of the entire global population). This is an enormous group with great importance, able to influence the shape of public life around the world. How many of them, however, use these tools consciously? What percentage of this group is aware of potential threats – not only stemming from hacker attacks or identity theft, but also from the potential scale of disinformation? How many are aware that social media impact translates into real actions and can change the balance of social and political power – not only on a regional, but even a global scale?

These questions become particularly relevant in the context of the current political unrest and war in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, which additionally overlap with the evolution of social trends, referred to as “Era 5.0”. The phrase, originally referring to developments in the marketing industry, means a complete change in the perception of reality by modern man. Human behaviour is now driven by both the widespread development of modern technologies (automation, artificial intelligence, the “Internet of Things” or augmented reality), as well as by the growing reluctance to confide in both mass media and the traditional authorities. Consumers stopped trusting not only advertisements and commercials, but also representatives of previously respected professions. Instead, they have begun to have confidence in people that they believe are similar to themselves, often blindly relying on their judgment in situations where information chaos makes it difficult to make an independent decision.

As a consequence, online influencers received “a powerful weapon”, allowing them to impact the behaviour of the masses on an almost unlimited scale. The number of “social media followers” of such an “opinion leader” is often treated as a sufficient confirmation of his/her credibility. This, together with the common human habit of reacting emotionally and thoughtlessly to encountered content, creates favourable conditions for campaigns using manipulation techniques and propaganda.

e-propaganda?

Russia’s attack on Ukraine started a war on many fronts, among which the information sphere became one of the most important. From the first days of the war, both sides of the conflict started to use online social networks for both information and disinformation activities. And although this is not a new phenomenon (after all, the parties to any contemporary conflict, whether armed, political or social, act in a similar way), it was the war in Ukraine that clearly showed how different social media approaches translate into different results. It would be an exaggeration to say that both parties implement strictly prepared social strategies, but two intentional (and opposing) models of operation can be clearly identified.

The first of the two models – the Russian one – seems to be based on solutions, almost directly transferred from classic disinformation campaigns implemented by the Kremlin in the offline sphere for decades. In the period before the aggression, the Kremlin’s propaganda activities targeted mainly Russian citizens, and the narrative actions taken against them were meant to reinforce social support for the armed forces. The rhetoric of fear, creating a sense of threat, presenting one’s own country as a victim, and clearly identifying “the enemy” have become inseparable elements of Russian media broadcasts.

Proven tools and solutions were used, including state-owned television, for which more than 115 billion roubles were allocated from the state budget in 2022 alone. However, in the context of the phenomena mentioned earlier, it is no longer possible to look at information/disinformation activities only through the prism of the tools that have been used in previous decades. Traditional media – especially television – which until now played a key role in information campaigns, raises less interest (and trust) among populations. Television broadcasts can therefore reach only certain social groups (elderly people and those who are digitally excluded for other reasons), which nowadays turns out to be insufficient. As a result,  social media became an excellent alternative, guaranteeing both a wider reach and the anonymity of the sender, as well as greater efficiency (content published on social media is often perceived as being more authentic and less manipulated than official, state messages).

As expected, Russian social media is regularly flooded with photos and videos, showing the alleged brutality of the regime’s opponents. At the same time, the content – reportedly recorded by so-called”ordinary citizens” – was meant to inspire greater trust and generate emotional reactions.The number of publications increased as the war progressed, keeping the narrative that Russia was successfully carrying out defence and liberation activities in the disputed areas (and that its presence was greeted and welcomed by the local population). Both the form and the content of those messages clearly suggested that their recipients were to be, once again, the citizens of Russia, and this time also the confused citizens of Ukraine, who have less access to independent sources of information.The only messages that seemed to be targeting “the outside world” (i.e., the international community) were aimed at creating an atmosphere of fear and chaos.

Social media content was evidently created to hit the weak spots of specific regional markets, including Poland (where numerous fake news stories have appeared to scare Polish citizens and discourage involvement in the ongoing conflict). The key party vulnerable to such disinformation campaigns largely involved ordinary citizens, almost literally bombarded with misleading messages concerning “the lack of fuel”, “possible energy blackouts” and “social threats resulting from helping Ukrainians”. The Russian social communication model involved almost no factual information, and further target groups (other countries or international organisations) were not taken into account. The narrative was based almost exclusively on the rhetoric of threat and was promoted through the widespread use of “troll farms”. The often incoherent attempt to transfer old propaganda mechanisms to new media (on a 1:1 scale), made it impossible to use the many functionalities of social media. In turn, these were successfully utilised by the Ukrainians.

V is for viral

One indicator of the effectiveness of activities on social media, especially in the era of “marketing 5.0”, is their viral potential, a feature specific to digital tools. Content spontaneously shared by other network users generates gigantic reach and has a much greater impact on recipients than official, one-way and top-down messages. This is due to the aforementioned importance of the argument of advocacy and people’s trust in recommendations generated within a horizontal communication model (based on dialogue where partners in the process are equal in their status; unlike the vertical model, where the sender of the message is superior to the recipient). Of course, for content to become viral, it must meet certain conditions. It should be attractive to the recipient due to its substantive value, real meaning, high emotionality or entertaining character. It seems that the Ukrainians are well aware of this fact, and are therefore basing most of their social media activities on viral content.

In addition to strictly informative messages in the form of reports, addressed to both the state’s citizens and the international community, online communication was dominated by viral content. The recording of the conversation between the defenders of Snake Island and Russian soldiers became a symbol of heroism, and the phrase “Russian warship, idi na khuy” became a popular saying, used to create numerous memes. It is worth noting that nowadays this type of content plays an important informative role, and the meaning of memes has long gone beyond the entertainment dimension. A similar goal was achieved by the publication of recordings showing the theft of Russian military equipment by representatives of the Ukrainian Roma community. The graphics and texts created on the basis of this information, although humorous, achieved a very important goal: they strengthened belief in the invincibility of the Ukrainian army and the complete ineffectiveness of the aggressor’s forces.

Content based on values such as heroism, patriotism, honour and sacrifice also had huge viral potential. Both photos and videos published on social media by the defenders of Ukraine showed ordinary citizens taking up arms, helping those in need, saving animals. All of these messages found fertile ground in society and generated gigantic reach, strengthening the official message. This, in turn, was very clearly and consistently presented by Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who also made perfect use of social media. Unlike Vladimir Putin, he communicated with the public using a horizontal model, which not only helped build his reputation as the head of state in times of war, but also created an image of the “ordinary citizen” who remains close to the people and their problems. Zelenskyy’s personal brand undoubtedly benefited from the publication of motivational recordings and photographs, which – even without additional explanations – were designed to confirm his dedication, steadfastness and strength. It seems that the purpose of such actions was primarily to maintain high morale among the citizens of the occupied regions of Ukraine, but they also helped to gain the support of the international community. Viral and emotional content proved to be successful even in relation to people who do not follow official broadcasts and do not analyse current political events.

Domino effect

Likes, comments and shares, which are closely associated with the use of social media, are often equated with the effectiveness of social content. In fact, measures of the reach of a given publication are meaningless if they fail to take into account real action. A conscious, strategic presence on social media – whether in the sphere of business or politics – should have one fundamental goal: to provoke real engagement. Again, it seems that only the Ukrainian side understands this fact, as it translated into numerous, bottom-up forms of help offered to Ukrainian refugees by citizens of neighbouring countries.

Once again, social media turned out to be a great, independent tool allowing for coordinating activities. The potential of these tools has been proven many times during political and social events (among which it is worth mentioning the most recent ones: the Catalan secession attempt, the Women’s Strike in Poland or the current revolution in Iran). Social media helps us to coordinate activities, to communicate and associate beyond censorship, and develop effective early warning tools. In the initial phase of hostilities in Ukraine, social media allowed for the organisation of help for refugees, facilitated the recognition of the needs of the Ukrainian population, and helped to distribute various forms of support. The power of social media remains undeniable, but it should be noted that the “domino effect” generated by universal access to digital tools can turn out to be a double-edged sword.

Susceptibility to simple arguments and hierarchies of social legitimacy, emotional reactions, and the aforementioned lack of trust in the power of authorities, mean that a significant part of social media users do not have any competence to defend themselves against a wave of disinformation. The enthusiasm with which societies have become involved in helping refugees can very easily transform into a feeling of reluctance (and in extreme situations even active aggression towards a specific group or nation). Lack of awareness of the consequences of online actions can also turn out to be a serious security threat (hence, in the early stages of the war, citizens were asked not to photograph and spontaneously share photos of passing military equipment, which could make it easier to locate these objects).

Friend or foe? An effective channel of communication and social mobilisation or a dangerous propaganda tool? How should we perceive social media in the context of the war in Ukraine? These tools undoubtedly have great potential and an unprecedented social impact. However, they should be assessed not only through the prism of their technical functionality, but also with regards to two other factors: the social realms in which they are used and the competence of the people who use them (both content creators and recipients). Adopting military rhetoric, it is worth recalling that it is not the gun that kills, but the man who pulls the trigger. Similarly, it is not social media that is dangerous – but rather leaders and societies who do not understand its peculiarities and are not competent enough to use them in a conscious way.

Agnieszka Grzechynka is an assistant professor at the Institute of Political and Administrative Sciences of the Jesuit University Ignatianum in Kraków. She researches the use of social media and new technologies in the process of building the image of personal brands, companies, institutions, regions and countries. She is the author of the monograph Lean Social Media. Lean Approach to Brand Management on Social Media.

disinformation, propaganda, social media