Moldova is being forced to adapt to hybrid warfare

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Economic and energy crisis in numbers

In terms of numbers Moldova now faces inflation above 30 per cent. Gas is particularly important here, which has a 56 per cent share in the total energy supply and was 100 per cent imported from Russia via Ukraine, until the war. Since the war started, Russia’s Gazprom (holding also 50 per cent of the shares in the Moldovagaz company), cut supplies to Moldova by 57 per cent, while raising the price of supply. For a regular consumer the price has increased on average by 600 per cent, while the gas provided by Russia is only enough to cover the needs of Transnistria, the Russian-supported breakaway republic. Now the government is buying gas from the European market, albeit at much higher prices, to ensure the gas needs of the country, as well as for state reserves.

Electricity generation in Moldova is also highly dependent on gas. About 70 per cent of electricity is produced by the Transnistria-based MGRES power plant. Thirty per cent of Moldovan electricity was bought from Ukraine, for clear reasons that is not happening anymore. Due to the emergency synchronisation with ENTSO-E on March 16th, Moldova is now able to import electricity not only from Ukraine, but also from Romania, which has increased the stability of the system.

In order to ensure the country’s supply of electricity the government has decided to give all the gas received from Gazprom to Transnistria (which does not pay anything for it), while the rest of the country basically receives the gas purchased from other sources, yet at a higher price. The electricity price has stabilised a bit now after doubling for consumers early in autumn, but Moldova faces energy shutdowns when Ukrainian power plants are attacked. Even if the emergency synchronisation was completed successfully, Moldova is still linked to Ukraine’s electricity system. The missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure put Moldova’s electricity system in danger as well. In the end, due to the energy crisis the economy and the population are facing a lot of struggles, whereas Russia is using gas supplies as an instrument of blackmail and pressure on the Moldovan government. However, it is important to understand this pressure and how it can be used to disinform the population and increase instability.

Disinformation and fake news

The economic crisis is already causing a lot of pressure in the society, but another important issue remains – disinformation. According to local experts, mass media in Moldova is currently facing internal and external disinformation, related also to the concentration of media ownership in the country. The relationship between the concentration of media ownership and disinformation is relevant because the public is manipulated and misinformed according to the interests of those in control of mass media. Under these conditions, misinformation has the power to influence the decisions of the audience and can change the opinion of a citizen regarding a particular subject.

According to a report prepared by the Baltic Centre for Media Excellence, two types of media were found in Moldova and they both have distinct approaches. The first category includes the press, which, as soon as Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine began, covered the events non-stop, in detail, based on official information and the broadcasting of footage from the battlefield. They are mainly considered independent sources of information. The second includes media institutions which, in the first phase of the war (February-March 2022), almost completely avoided covering the events in Ukraine, as if nothing was happening, and later (April-June) started to discuss the subject by presenting Russia in a positive light. These are the pro-Russian media outlets that directly or indirectly broadcast Moscow’s narratives.

However, the growth of fake news and disinformation remains a significant risk. The authorities in Chișinău have taken some measures in this regard – they have adopted laws to combat disinformation and they have blocked some online platforms that spread fake news and disinformation. Yet, these actions have been reactive rather than strategic or proactive, and according to some experts have often circumvented laws and regulations on access to information and democratic principles during these exceptional circumstances.

A historic decision for the country’s mass media was made last December. Six television stations had their broadcast licences suspended because they reflected the events in Moldova and the war in Ukraine in a tendentious and manipulative manner. The decision was taken by the Commission for Exceptional Situations and is valid during the state of emergency (60 days, however, most probably it will be extended). A similar measure was adopted at the level of the European Union, targeting four Russian TV stations.

The latest developments in Chișinău suggest that Moldova seems to have become the target of a hybrid war. According to the Intelligence and Security Service’s (SIS) Director Musteață Alexandru, “a good part” of Russia’s agents of influence are responsible for the hybrid war taking place in the Republic of Moldova. The informational war is extraordinarily aggressive and widely seen in manipulation and forgery. At the same time, there are people from the socio-political sector, so-called agents of influence who try to influence public opinion by using fake news and manipulations. “From what we already know, we see how all things are coordinated from one centre, from Moscow,” Musteață declared.

According to other media experts Moscow regularly draws up special instructions for the media it controls, indicating how the war in Ukraine and related events should be covered. The instructions are sent to officials, public figures, pro-Kremlin bloggers and contain the messages they must use in their public appearances. In some instructions analysed by journalists with Meduza, among the lines sent to the propagandists is one about the “New World Order”, and the press must convey to the audience the idea that the countries of the former USSR would do well to “avoid the example of Ukraine” and not damage their relations with Russia. Moldova and its President Maia Sandu are also shown as a negative example. Other sources suggest that the government should negotiate with Russia for better prices for gas and electricity and never fight back.

In Moldova, fake news and propaganda do not stop at TV channels, radio, or online media. They are spread also on social media and other sources, like Telegram channels. While the authorities can suspend licences for television stations and block web sites, there are not many instruments against disinformation on social media.

Cybersecurity in Moldova

The war proved to the world that battles do not happen only on the ground; they are now also happening online. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, neighbouring countries started to face many challenges, such as an economic crisis, a refugee influx, an energy crisis and surprisingly even cyber-attacks.

Cybersecurity has definitely become a huge topic of interest in Moldova in the last year. Public and private organisations in various sectors worldwide now openly acknowledge that cyber-attacks are one of the most prevalent and high impact risks they face. In May and August Moldova suffered several attempted cyber-attacks. According to tech experts almost all DDoS attacks come from Russia. On August 25th the Information Technology and Cyber Security Service (STISC) noted several attempted cyber-attacks on information systems of state importance.

The target of the attacks focused on around 80 IT systems, platforms and public portals. The nature of the attacks is usually complex, focusing on various vectors and having a continuous adaptive character to the response measures undertaken. All attempts to compromise any systems have been reported to law enforcement and generally the impact on the operation of the IT systems was limited. The attacks have continued sporadically throughout the year. These cyber-attack attempts are aimed at causing the unavailability of the state’s information resources by sending a large number of connection requests or a large volume of data. This subsequently overloads the processing resources of the information systems.

According to preliminary analysis, the attacks are carried out from outside of Moldova, from IP addresses located in different countries, from compromised equipment and networks – a typical situation for such cyber incidents. The STISC, together with the targeted authorities and law enforcement institutions, work to counter such attacks and minimise their impact on the functioning of government information systems. They also try to uncover the identities of the people involved. Moldova as a country has been able to withstand the cyberattacks. No leaks were announced, services remain available for citizens and the teams both in the private and public sector are doing an incredible job overall.

In response to the cyber-attacks the government at the end of December published a draft law for public consultations regarding the EU’s Network and Systems Directive 2 for Moldova. Discussions concerning cybersecurity policies have been taking place for a while, probably for more than two years. Therefore, the idea of transposing the NIS Directive in Moldova is not new and was a long-standing goal of the government. The draft law provides details on a new body specialised in cybersecurity, a list of sectors and activities subject to cybersecurity obligations, reporting obligations and other transposition details.

In cybersecurity the thirst for tech skills is growing both in the private and public sectors. The biggest challenge remains human resources. The war continues to make Moldovans flee the country for a more secure place for their families. Other Moldovans look for more flexible, reliable or better paid jobs in light of the economic crisis. Among the people leaving the country we can find journalists, former governmental officials and even tech specialists. On the bright side, the diaspora is engaging with the needs of the country more than ever along with other development partners. The aim is to help Moldova move towards a more secure future. However, a lot of work and risks still lie ahead.

Marina Bzovîi is the executive director of the Moldovan National Association of ICT Companies. An umbrella association established in 2006 and uniting 94 companies, it has become a major player in Moldova’s associative sector representing the voice of the ICT industry.

cybersecurity, Moldova, Russia, Russia-Ukraine war, Ukraine, War