How Hungary’s Russia connection undermines EU support for Ukraine

Apart from the blocking of sanctions, Orbán also undermined the EU’s credibility and unity in its response to Russia with an anti-sanctions campaign, depicting EU sanctions as missiles. Photo: Raketir/Shutterstock

In light of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Hungary’s relationship with Moscow has presented considerable obstacles to the EU’s support for Ukraine. Since the start of the conflict, Hungary repeatedly demonstrated its readiness to delay crucial aid for Ukraine and block EU sanctions against Russia, thereby undermining the image of Brussels as a strong, unified foreign policy actor vis-á-vis Russia.

A Russian Trojan horse in the EU?

The Hungarian Fidesz government’s relationship with Russia is grounded in a policy known as the Eastern Opening (“Keleti Nyitás”), which was introduced after its election victory in 2010 to increase investments, business and political relations with the East. The deepening of ties with Russia has also created great potential for Moscow to leverage influence via the use of energy dependence, intelligence activities and “corrosive capital”. Some critics even refer to Hungary as a Russian Trojan horse in the EU. Considering Russia’s war in Ukraine, the challenges the Russian-Hungarian relationship and its entanglement through various projects poses to the EU are increasingly evident.

Over the years, Hungary became particularly dependent on Russian energy supplies. Although Russia’s quantifiable economic influence over Hungary is low, there are some projects, such as the nuclear power plant, commonly known as Paks II, which can easily be exploited by the Kremlin. These have the potential to influence the country’s politics and foreign policy as they involve high-level decision-makers.

Paks II, the controversial project to build a second plant as an extension to the 1980s Soviet-era Paks I, was awarded to the Russian state-owned Rosatom in 2014 without a public tender. It is planned to be partially financed through a ten-billion-euro loan from Russia, thus potentially further exacerbating Hungary’s dependencies on the Kremlin. According to Benedek Javor, a former member of the European Parliament, the construction of Paks II should be considered a political project, given that, as regards to energy supplies, there is no need for a second power plant, and if so, there would be plenty of other potential partners. While the EU encouraged its member states to break away from Russian energy dependence in light of Moscow’s war in Ukraine, Hungary continued pursuing the construction of the Russian-financed nuclear plant.

The moving of the Soviet-era International Investment Bank (IIB) to Hungary in 2019 presented another instance that caused unease among EU leaders over possible Russian influence activities in the EU. The diplomatic immunity granted to people working in the bank gave reasons for concern over potential intelligence operations, as well as the possibility of the bank operating as a money laundering hub. While multiple EU members who were part of the IIB announced they would leave it as the Russian war in Ukraine started, Hungary neither left nor expelled the bank from its territory. Almost a year into Russia’s war in Ukraine, the IIB and its employees remain active in Hungary, posing a security threat to Europe and the West as a whole.

Yet, the Hungarian government does not seem too concerned about potential Russian spy activities on its own territory or in the EU. Even in 2021, before the invasion of Ukraine, it was revealed that Russian hackers gained access to the Hungarian foreign ministry’s servers and, according to Direkt36, a Hungarian investigative platform, “completely compromised the foreign ministry’s computer network and internal correspondence” over the past decade. The news sparked concern among western allies, as Russia could also gain classified information on them through Hungary. Even more concerning was the government’s quasi-non-existent reaction and its failure to address this issue with Russia, which demonstrates that it is either unwilling or afraid to offset Moscow and damage the relationship.

Then, just weeks before Russia attacked Ukraine, Orbán travelled to Moscow on a visit the government later called a “peace mission”. Regardless, it was quite clear that the visit was only to benefit Budapest, given that the Hungarian foreign minister announced the issues on the agenda would concern gas purchases, the production of the Sputnik COVID-19 vaccine in Hungary and plans for the construction of Paks II. The visit is said to have alarmed European leaders as it could have potentially undermined the EU’s common position on Ukraine’s sovereignty, which was then already threatened by the increased Russian troop build-up along the border.

Blocking aid and betraying allies

Already at the start of the war, the Fidesz government demonstrated its unwillingness to support Ukraine by refusing to provide weapons or even allow military aid to be transported to its neighbour through Hungary. While this did not seriously harm support to Ukraine as other member states and the US provided aid – and there are numerous ways to get equipment to Kyiv without transiting Hungary – it was still a powerful symbolic act that demonstrated where Hungary stands on this war. As such, the government’s often-recited argument that the country “does not want to get involved” in the conflict and that they are “on the Hungarian side of history” should rather be understood as an effort to avoid alienating Russia. Hungary’s alleged neutrality instead shows that it avoids clearly siding with the EU. Moreover, it also reveals deep divisions in the EU and undermines a common approach to Russia.

In December 2022, Hungary even blocked an 18-billion-euro aid package to Ukraine, stating that aid to the country should be provided on a bilateral basis and “common EU debt is not the solution”. This veto of financial support could be interpreted as an attempt to blackmail the EU, as it came at a time when Hungary itself was fighting for its share of the EU budget, which was threatened to be frozen due to concerns around issues related to the rule of law. In the end, the EU managed to circumvent Hungary’s veto, revealing the sad reality of EU disunity on the importance of supporting Ukraine.

Orbán’s diverging position also revealed a growing rift with his closest allies within the EU. In March 2022 the prime ministers of Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Poland travelled to Ukraine to show their solidarity and support. A month later, the Slovak prime minister visited Kyiv to meet with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Orbán, who usually shares close relationships with these EU member states, decided not to join their trips. Instead, being in the midst of his election campaign and facing a united opposition for the first time, he made use of the rally-around-the-flag-effect and reiterated that he does not want Hungary to get involved in the war.

After winning his fourth consecutive election in April 2022, Orbán singled out Zelenskyy in his victory speech as one of the enemies of the Hungarian people, next to the “international left”, “Brussels bureaucrats” and the “foreign media”. Only in November 2022, the Hungarian president, Katalin Novák, who has only a limited, ceremonial role, finally paid a visit to Ukraine. Poland, arguably Hungary’s closest partner in the EU, expressed disappointment and a lack of understanding regarding Orbán’s position on Ukraine, exhibiting the rift between the two former allies who propped each other up in disputes with the EU.

However, Hungary’s ambiguous stance on the Russian aggression also comes with security implications for other EU member states. The country has significantly delayed Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO by refusing to put the issue up for a vote in the Hungarian parliament, despite publicly saying that it fully supports their membership. Opposition parties have accused Fidesz of deliberately slowing the process and potentially even blackmailing the EU given that the government stated that they still had to pass anti-corruption reforms in relation to the EU funds that were being withheld. And yet, the potentially most damaging act relating to the EU’s support for Ukraine and bloc unity on Russia is Hungary’s repeated blocking of sanctions on Moscow.

Scrambling over sanctions

Sanctions are a crucial tool that the EU has at its disposal to defend its values in its external relations and attempt to change the behaviour of other parties. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, EU sanctions against Russia have been extended every six months. When Russia launched its full-scale war against Ukraine in February 2022, the EU’s response was to expand existing sanctions against the Kremlin. These restrictive measures are crucial to minimising Russia’s gas and oil revenues and subsequently its ability to wage war.

Although the EU was surprisingly swift and united in imposing the first wave of restrictive measures as the war started, Hungary has repeatedly stood in the way of the unified response and delayed several sanctions packages, mostly attempting to water them down and prevent certain individuals from being targeted. Given Hungary’s dependence on Russian oil and gas, the government warned that it would block any sanctions targeting Russian energy exports, calling it a “red line”. So far, Hungary has managed to avert the most potent sanctions on Russian oil delivered by pipelines, and instead, only oil imports by sea were targeted.

In June 2022, Hungary even successfully blocked the blacklisting of Patriarch Kirill, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, who is a key supporter of Putin and the Russian invasion. The reason for vetoing the sanctions against Kirill remains unclear and could thus be considered purely symbolic to appease Moscow. During the most recent sanctions negotiations, arguably producing the weakest package thus far, the Hungarian foreign minister once again insisted on the removal of certain names from the list, as sanctioning them would cut “remaining channels of communication with Russia”.

Apart from the blocking of sanctions, Orbán also undermined the EU’s credibility and unity in its response to Russia with an anti-sanctions campaign, depicting EU sanctions as missiles. With this communication strategy the Hungarian government blamed “Brussels” for the dire economic situation in the country, without mentioning the actual culprit: Putin’s war in Ukraine. Additionally, the Fidesz government conducted another “National Consultation” (nemzetközi konzultáció) between October 2022 and December 2022 regarding sanctions. By failing to mention that Hungary supported all the so far adopted EU sanctions packages, the government acted as if Brussels had single-handedly decided on these measures. The entire consultation may quite literally be considered a mere propaganda campaign by the government, as it is unlikely to translate into any policy effect and is a mere political tool, as previous consultations have shown. The Hungarian government even hoped for sanctions to be dropped by the end of the year. The rhetoric is thus purposefully spreading disinformation by pretending that the sanctions were enforced on Budapest.

Revealing the EU’s weaknesses

Besides the Hungarian government’s outspoken criticism of the sanctions and its unwillingness to support Ukraine in this war, Hungary’s disruption of the common EU approach is also reflected in other actions. In the summer of 2022, Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó went to Moscow to ask for more gas, although the bloc wanted to curb Russian gas deliveries. During the same summer, Orbán, in a speech, stated that the focus should not be on winning the war but rather on peace negotiations. This position also diverges significantly from the general EU and transatlantic consensus that Ukraine must be supported at all costs and that there can be no “peace deal” that grants Russia any concessions.

Although representatives of the Hungarian government reiterated their alignment with the EU and NATO’s stance on the war and its commitment to support Ukraine, its rhetoric in some interviews and actions suggests differently. For example, in an interview to DW given by Orbán’s spokesperson, Zoltán Kovács, when pressed on which side the Hungarian government was on, he suggested that they just want peace and an immediate ceasefire. However, he not once called on Moscow to stop the fighting and made no mention of Russia’s role as the aggressor. Moreover, the spokesperson could not bring himself to say that they want Ukraine to win. Instead, he reiterated that Hungary just wants peace, while ignoring the interviewer’s follow-up on whether Hungary wants peace at any price, even if that meant that Russia would win.

Overall, these instances further exemplify Budapest’s critical stance towards Ukraine and reluctance to acknowledge Russia’s responsibility for the war. Its readiness to block military and financial aid to Kyiv, delay EU sanctions against Russia and its outspoken criticism thereof are creating serious repercussions for the EU’s image as a foreign policy actor vis-á-vis Russia. Moreover, these issues further indicate deep divisions across EU member states and call into question European unity. They also reveal one of the EU’s most discussed weaknesses, namely, its inability to speak with one voice in foreign policy. Most alarmingly, the situation also undermines the EU’s policies and demonstrates the bloc’s weakness of being divided over crucial foreign policy issues – a weakness Russia is ready and happy to exploit.

As the war gets closer to its one-year mark with no end in sight any time soon, the EU needs to continue making Russia’s war as costly as possible. One of the most potent ways to do so remains sanctioning Moscow. This will likely mean that Hungary’s balancing act between the EU’s sanctioning policy and its relationship with Russia will persist. Budapest is thus likely to further undermine support for Kyiv in order to put itself in a better bargaining position with the EU while appeasing Russia. The consequences that this will have for Ukraine and the EU’s reputation as a whole, should not be underestimated.

Gabriela Greilinger is a political scientist from Austria who is currently based in the United States. She is the founder of the youth platform Quo Vademus, a grassroots think tank for youth and public engagement in politics and current affairs.

Hungary, Russia, Ukraine, Viktor Orban