The story of violent clashes that broke out in Sibiu in Romania during late December 1989 is one that many have forgotten since the revolution and regime change. Tudor Giurgiu’s latest film Libertate revisits that turbulent event in Romania. The film not only acts as a reminder of the ruthless terror and chaos of the time but also as a chance for Romanians to reassess their own history.

When Nicolae Ceaușescu's brutal regime collapsed in Romania 34 years ago, Tudor Giurgiu was 18 years old, living in his home city of Cluj-Napoca, in central Transylvania. “For many days and weeks, the country was directionless,” the 51-year-old Romanian film director explains from central Sarajevo, Bosnia, where he is showcasing his latest film Libertate. “People were not talking normally, they were going nuts and there was a lot of shouting, paranoia, and violence.”

What makes Poles help Ukrainian refugees yet indifferent to the fate of migrants on the Belarusian border? Is this determined solely by the right-wing propaganda, which portrays the Ukrainians in good terms and those in Belarus in essentially bad ones?

The release of Agnieszka Holland’s film The Green Border (Zielona Granica), which depicts the human drama of people pushed across the Polish-Belarusian border and the helplessness of activists willing to help them – helplessness resulting from the specific political decisions of the Polish authorities – has been met with unprecedented heckling and brutal attacks in Poland. The outrage of the country’s highest-ranking politicians from the United Right coalition was clear.

Decolonisation in Eastern Europe is different from other, especially western, decolonisation experiences. There is no one algorithm that would determine in which way a society or country would pursue the process of decolonisation. In Ukraine’s case, but also that of the whole region of Eastern Europe, the initial stage of decolonisation showed a return to the alternative centre – the West.

“We will regain Odesa and everything will be back in place! Monuments will get removed and street names changed,” reads a comment on the website of Russia’s state-owned information agency Ria Novosti. It was placed under an article describing the removal of the Catharine the Great monument in Odesa. In a nutshell, these two sentences present the discourse that has developed in Eastern Europe around the topic of decolonisation.

The exhibition Kroke. Orthodox Jews in Kraków is the result of a long-term photography project by Agnieszka Traczewska.

The past week marked the worst period for Nagorno-Karabakh, bringing a tragic end to the 30 years of existence of the breakaway state that proclaimed independence in 1991. While not recognised by any other country, Nagorno-Karabakh was backed by Armenia until the government under Nikol Pashinyan recognised it as a part of Azerbaijan after the 2020 war, paving the way for Baku to proceed with its coercive policy of “integration”.

Azerbaijan refers to the 24-hour blitzkrieg as a triumph, which was done quickly and professionally. Having already become crippled and dysfunctional after the 2020 war, the “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic”, which had lost land connection with its long-term patron, Armenia, realised that it had no chance to resist the Azerbaijani advancement and accepted all of Baku’s conditions of surrender.

By accepting and legitimising a deal resulting in net gains for Russia, western countries would not only fail to respect Ukraine’s political sovereignty and territorial integrity, but they would also contradict their own obligations under international law to not legitimise aggression against another state.

The September-October 2023 Issue of New Eastern Europe is now available. Find out what's inside and how to get your copy.

As the Western Balkans mark two decades since the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit, an atmosphere of reflection, rather than celebration, envelops the region. Amidst the initial hopes ignited by the summit's commitment to EU enlargement, the journey towards integration has been mired in complexities and frustrations. A deeper exploration into the underlying causes reveals a surprising factor at the heart of the delay – the state of public administration, an often-overlooked linchpin in the ambitious pursuit of EU integration.

In 2003, the historic Thessaloniki Summit marked a pivotal moment for Europe and its enduring commitment to enlargement and unity. At the heart of this gathering in the timeless Greek city was the visionary idea to bring the Western Balkans into the European family. The summit not only reaffirmed the EU's dedication to the enlargement process but also set into motion the integration pathways for countries emerging from a tumultuous past.

As September 2023 was approaching, the focus of western diplomacy once again gravitated toward the ongoing Kosovo-Serbia conflict, which appears to have no end in sight. Amid mounting tensions and the uncertain trajectory of the EU’s “Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue,” a comprehensive reassessment of mediation efforts becomes imperative to bring a definitive resolution to this enduring conflict.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine stressed the importance of engaging the Western Balkans more closely. The strategy behind the West’s renewed interest was twofold: bring Kosovo and Serbia closer to a deal to normalise relations and simultaneously move Serbia away from the Russian orbit. Despite initial enthusiasm in early 2023, relations quickly soured once again. What will it take to overcome this impasse?

The Kosovo-Serbia dialogue which has been facilitated by the European Union since 2011 has faced challenges in normalising relations between the two countries. However, Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine injected a sense of urgency and provided a renewed impetus to address the dialogue. This led to a new diplomatic offensive that culminated in the finalisation of the second Brussels Agreement and its Implementation Annex in February and March 2023, respectively.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has not significantly changed Belgrade’s foreign policy. Although Serbia is an EU candidate country, it has continued to exploit its ties with China and Russia to increase its bargaining position vis-à-vis the West and raise additional funds for development projects. Despite this ambivalent foreign policy, Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić is still considered by many politicians in the EU and NATO as a very important partner in keeping stability in the region.

It seemed that a strong and unified western reaction to the Russian aggression against Ukraine would prevent Serbia from continuing its policy of balancing between East and West. Belgrade, aspiring (at least declaratively) to membership in the European Union, would subsequently be forced to decrease its cooperation with Russia. Yet Serbia’s leadership has been able to avoid introducing sanctions against Russia and keep its good relations with Moscow, while at the same time fostering an image among western politicians as a guarantor of stability in the region.