What has Europe learnt from Russia's invasion of Ukraine?

On April 25th 2023, New Eastern Europe hosted an expert roundtable discussion on the current lessons learnt from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and to prepare recommendations for NATO and its member countries ahead of the July 2023 summit in Vilnius. The summary of this roundtable, with some important lessons and recommendations, is presented here.

In light of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, NATO has come to a realisation that irrespective of circumstances, the present leadership of Russia will persist in its revisionist approach and become increasingly agitated in the event of a potential loss in the conflict. Consequently, NATO must proactively ready itself for an extended deterrence strategy vis-à-vis Russia, and be prepared to implement a defence strategy if the need arises. These are the key lessons already learnt over the last 15 months.

The upcoming NATO summit in Vilnius will be dominated by discussions on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. While member states have continued to provide all manner of aid to Kyiv, the Alliance has yet to take any concrete steps on Ukraine’s potential membership. Guidelines are now needed more than ever to strengthen both the security of Ukraine and the region.

Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine not only radically changed the security situation for the Euro-Atlantic space, but also affected the global balance of power and the interests of both individual states and the alliances they belong to. NATO, which directly borders Russia, had to respond to a qualitatively new security and political landscape in the region. And this reaction will not be comprehensive without political lessons, which should be drawn from Russia’s full-fledged war against Ukraine.

NATO and western countries have pledged to support Ukraine for as long as it takes. At the same time, the United States and other countries have abstained from giving Ukraine long-range weapons and talk about Ukraine’s victory without aiming for a Russian defeat. This approach leaves Ukraine in a situation where it is expected to win with its hands tied.

One of the key questions facing NATO on the eve of the 2023 Vilnius summit is whether to offer Ukraine security guarantees, while Ukraine insists that it should be given a clear path to membership. In June 2022 the NATO Alliance defined Russia as the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. However, it has been careful to avoid a direct confrontation.

During the upcoming Vilnius summit, NATO will need to form a clear and consistent position and specify its own understanding of how the war will end. The Ukrainian side expects NATO to declare the steps necessary to guarantee its security and achieve the complete restoration of control over all its territories, ultimately leading to Ukraine’s membership in the Alliance.

While it is clear that there are a number of challenges and pending issues, the newly established sense of solidarity with Ukraine and urgency when it comes to territorial defence are driving domestic processes regarding NATO's adaptation and flexible response. Even if it is yet to be seen how quickly NATO states will adapt to the new environment and collectively share new commitments within the bloc, the new mentality is clearly being felt.

In the run up to the NATO Vilnius summit in July 2023, the Alliance is facing new challenges, but at the same time is benefiting from several opportunities stemming from the newly created sense of relevancy. The Russian aggression against Ukraine and the West has helped to revamp and restore the original purpose of NATO dating back to the post-Second World War period, especially in terms of the principle of collective defence.

NATO wants its member states to spend more on their militaries, but governments need public support. While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a pivotal moment for both East and West, threat perceptions continue to differ. For current and future western governments to get public support for increased military spending, they need to explain the new threat environment now.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has brought about a paradigm shift in western security and defence policy. A new kinetic war on the European continent has revived NATO. Its member states are adapting strategies and strengthening the Eastern Flank. We are witnesses to historic changes. Whether allies are willing and able to defend NATO territory depends on capabilities and political willingness. However, preparing for war tomorrow means investing in military capabilities and public awareness today.

The Baltics’ painful historical relationship with Russia and their memory of occupations, along with first-hand experience of Moscow’s interference and aggressive tactics, have increasingly emerged as a precious resource for NATO and the European Union in understanding Putin’s strategies and countering them effectively. The Baltics have moved from being on the margins to the foreground in the collective policy-shaping and decision-making process.

Voices of small states often go generally unnoticed in times of trouble, when grand geopolitics prevails over diplomacy. When the temperature heats up, both observers and decision-makers tend to focus on power dynamics and the imperium of the strong. In the context of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have proven that their small size does not automatically equal irrelevance.

A conversation with Bernard Henri-Lévy, French philosopher and public intellectual. Interviewer: Arkadiusz Szczepański

Russia’s propaganda, which is largely aimed at the so-called “global south”, denigrates the West as degenerate, poor, and being in “satan’s power”; while Vladimir Putin is portrayed as their representative and saviour. Never mind the fact that the Russian onslaught on Ukraine triggered a worldwide food crisis and made automobile transport and education once again unavailable for hundreds of millions in the global south.

Walking directly into the defunct Soviet Union’s ideological worn-out shoes, neo-imperial Russia of today poses itself as a friend of the poor and oppressed masses outside the West. The Kremlin’s top rashists criticise the “golden billion” (золотой миллиард zolotoi milliard), or the West’s inhabitants who enjoy peace and prosperity across the rich global north. On this platform, the Russian government usurps for Moscow the right to speak on behalf of the world’s poor and huddling seven billion, living the so-called global south. But who is Russia’s golden thousand (золотая тысяча zolotaia tysiacha) whom this rhetoric benefits and who literally own Russia?

Despite various sanctions put in place against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, the Russian economy is surprisingly doing much better than expected. It appears for now that at least in the short term, the Russian economy is able to bypass sanctions as long as other countries are willing to pursue business as usual with Russia. Whether or not the sanctions will have a longer-term effect and have any impact on Russian aggression remains to be seen.

When western countries adopted sanctions against Russia in response to Putin's war of aggression against Ukraine, western politicians promised nothing less than the complete breakdown of the Russian economy. The French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire spoke of the “collapse” of the Russian economy, while US President Joe Biden said that “We will keep raising the economic cost and ratchet up the pain for [Vladimir] Putin and further increase Russia's economic isolation.”