In spite of their shared desires to challenge the status quo, the Belarusian and Russian oppositions do not always see eye to eye. This is largely the result of a continued assumption that Belarus is uniquely tied to its larger neighbour. The status of Belarusian exiles in the EU today subsequently depends on the recognition of these differences.

The ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine has influenced the economies of the three countries engaged in the conflict. While the similarities in the institutional setups of these economies have resulted in some resemblances regarding the results of this impact, there are also notable differences in what has happened in them.

Building upon the ongoing analysis of the research group "BELARUS-UKRAINE-REGION", which was established at the Centre for East European Studies at the University of Warsaw in autumn 2020, and in cooperation with New Eastern Europe, we present a series of sketches depicting the situation in Belarus during the latter half of 2023.

On February 25th 2024, Belarus will hold its first elections since August 2020, which resulted in mass protests for several months. How are the Belarusian authorities preparing for this event and what will be the likely outcome?

In the years that followed the controversial 2020 election – a resounding Lukashenka “victory” of over 80 per cent which bore little relation to the popular support for the challenger Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya – the ruling regime has undergone several serious trials to which it has responded ever more harshly. Its recent measures have included the elimination of the opposition’s media sites, the shutdown of hundreds of civil society organisations and the dissolution of all opposition and several official political parties.

In February 2024, Belarus will hold a parliamentary election, the first contest since the rigged presidential election of 2020. The democratic opposition is barred from participating and has called for a boycott. While the outcome of the election itself is pre-determined, the process is an illustration of the development of a new dualism in the Belarusian political system.

More than three years after the events which initiated a new dynamic in Belarusian political history and significantly impacted changes within the system, the first electoral campaign awaits us in February of this year. While rightfully labelled “elections without choice” by many researchers, it does not mean that they will be devoid of significance. In attempting to analyse and study the Belarusian case, we must agree that the term “Belarusian politics” itself has become dualistic. When discussing it, we often refer to two clearly different dimensions, or at the very least, two different levels.

Parliamentary elections in Belarus have always been a mere formality. Low voter turnout and minimal public attention during parliamentary elections make them safer in terms of legitimizing the system through the electoral model. For the Belarusian regime, the parliament and the elections to it are a kind of initiation ritual in the system’s personnel policy.

Why are parliamentary elections being held in Belarus? Despite risks for the regime, elections persist in a country where one person has been president since 1994, and the process of electing members to parliament and local councils seems more like appointments. The next elections will take place on February 25th 2024 and will see members chosen for the lower house of parliament alongside local council deputies. Then on April 4th, elections will be held for the upper house and the All-Belarusian People's Assembly. For the Belarusian regime, it is particularly important to hold elections at all levels, even in such challenging geopolitical conditions. This is a crucial element in the legitimation and initiation of people in power.

The events of 2020 and the conviction that the fall of the Lukashenka regime is inevitable have prompted a number of businessmen to actively participate in the political processes in Belarus. This can serve as a basis for the assertion that in the event of the destruction or destabilization of the authoritarian regime, business groups will play an extremely important role in shaping a new way of life.

At the moment, it is obvious that the prospects for political change in Belarus are postponed indefinitely. At the same time, the probability of a rapid transition from authoritarianism to democracy is still uncertain. The protracted war in Ukraine and the systemic stability of Putin’s regime in Russia will contribute to the internal stabilization and consolidation of the authoritarian system of government in Belarus. This process will also be facilitated by relentless repression and political purges, which will suppress any dangerous activities in society, as well as increase the atmosphere of fear and terror. To date, there are no acute systemic internal threats and challenges to Alyaksandr Lukashenka's regime.

The onset of dialogue between the Ukrainian authorities and the Belarusian democratic forces began in autumn 2022. However, it did not continue so strongly in 2023. This can be partly explained by the difficult situation on the battlefield in the Russian war against Ukraine, which is naturally the priority for the authorities in Kyiv. At the same time, Ukraine has maintained its diplomatic relations with the authorities in Minsk.

In February of 2022, Russian tanks used Belarusian territory to invade Ukraine through the north to try and install a puppet government in Kyiv. After Alyaksandr Lukashenka recognized Crimea as Russian at the end of autumn 2021, the question of warming relations between Kyiv and the Belarusian dictator was finally eliminated. Nevertheless, diplomatic relations remained between Ukraine and Belarus. They were not torn apart even after the outbreak of the full-scale Russian aggression with the participation of Belarus, so a certain official level of dialogue was still ongoing.

The number of Belarusians in exile continues to grow following the crackdowns and repressions after the falsified elections in 2020. Most of those who leave cannot return until a major change in Belarus. As seen in the experiences of three young Belarusian activists, the emotional toll can sometimes be a high price to pay following the decision to escape.

It has been more than three years since the 2020 election in Belarus and the subsequent protests following the falsified victory of Alyaksandr Lukashenka. During this period, thousands of people have faced political persecution and currently there are nearly 1,500 political prisoners in Belarus. People continue to be arrested for disagreeing with the regime, and since February 2022 for supporting Ukraine.

One of the “Righteous among the Nations” is the Japanese diplomat Chiune Sugihara. At the beginning of the Second World War, he saved the lives of thousands of Polish Jewish citizens, among whom were people from present-day Belarus.

A recent study sought to design and investigate possible alternative (and mutually exclusive) futures for Belarus. The scenarios from that study presented here can act as a compass to help observers make sense of Belarus’s future direction. This is in spite of the dense fog of regional geopolitics and Lukashenka’s often unreadable black box of repression.

The LGBTQ+ community faces discrimination and stigmatisation in most countries in Europe. Belarus is no exception. Recent research by the “It’s OK” initiative, however, shows that the scale of the threat faced by the LGBTQ+ community is much greater in Belarus than other countries in the region. This is also related to Russian state policies against sexual and gender minorities.

According to the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, more than 50 per cent of LGBTQ+ people in European countries have faced discrimination based on their sexual orientation or gender identity. This includes such forms of discrimination as insults, bans on employment or career advancement, denial of accommodation and access to health care, and physical and psychological violence.