The new dualism of Belarusian politics

Government house of the Republic of Belarus and Lenin monument on Independence square in Minsk. Photo: Larysa Talkachova/Shutterstock

The first level is the more prevalent view within the international community, looking at Belarus from the perspective of 2020. This involves considering the politicians and the structures that emerged during the wave of protests, which mobilized a significant part of society and forced many to leave the country. This approach still dominates in western research circles. The second dimension is the functioning of politics within the country itself, within the changing system. Although these systemic changes increasingly exhibit authoritarian or even totalitarian characteristics, whether we like it or not, the second dimension is more important in terms of the real, tangible political agenda for Belarusian society within the country, as well as the social, economic and cultural agendas.

Opposition approach

At the beginning of this year, the stance of the new Belarusian opposition towards “parliamentary elections” is quite clear and specific – they should be boycotted and not recognized. This is a logical and strategic approach. Since 2020, there has been no legitimate authority, and thus, elections cannot be recognized. Added to this is the complete monopolization of the political space within Belarus, where even the declaration of intent to participate by independent candidates can lead to political repression. It is important to note that most structures of this opposition are recognized by the Belarusian state as extremist organizations, increasing the risk of political persecution.

Crucial for the new opposition is the institutionalization achieved over the last three years – the establishment of structures which serve as alternative reflections of political bodies. This includes Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s Office (bureau of the national leader), the United Transitional Cabinet as an alternative government, and the Coordination Council as an alternative parliament. Without sugar-coating reality, serious debates and political misunderstandings occur within these structures, not all representatives of the Belarusian democratic community are satisfied with their functioning, and there is significant internal criticism. However, what distinguishes them primarily from official state bodies is that they operate or strive to operate on democratic principles.

In this dimension of Belarusian politics, the electoral agenda has taken on a clear international dimension, primarily targeting Belarusian migration and the diaspora worldwide. This is unsurprising, especially considering the lack of any possibilities for action within the country. However, it raises questions about the ability to influence the political agenda within Belarus itself.

The second dimension of the Belarusian political concept is the politics within the country. Here, similarly, whether we like it or not, the real power is held by the old ruling elite. Over the past three years, acting as a besieged fortress, they have strengthened their power and eliminated any potential political opponents. Authorities have learned lessons from 2020, making the 2024 campaign the beginning of an important electoral cycle for them.

“Elections” without opposition

In the run-up to voting day, the official Belarusian political system operates under the conditions of three fundamental changes that have affected this dimension. Firstly, the system now operates based on an amended constitution. The top-down amendment of the constitution in 2022 changed the power structure, announced changes in the party system, and, through constitutional amendments, limited the possibilities for potential opponents of the regime to participate in the electoral campaign. An example of this is the effective deprivation of tens of thousands of Belarusians of their passive and active voting rights. Secondly, the Belarusian authorities are conducting this campaign after changes in the electoral law. It is not surprising that the electoral law favours the current authorities. This is evident, for example, in the fact that Belarusian citizens cannot vote from abroad, or there is no minimum voter turnout threshold to validate the “elections”.

Thirdly – and this is the most interesting element of this dimension of Belarusian politics – there has been a promised new registration of political parties. The number of parties has decreased from over ten to just four. Importantly, all current legally operating political parties are pro-government parties, and their programmes merely compete in expressing support for Alyaksandr Lukashenka and his governance system. In this puzzle, the question arises again: will the new “Belaya Rus” party finally become a party of power? Interestingly, no nominal party or structure has been created or registered to even create the image of the so-called “constructive opposition”. In other words, the system itself officially declared that there is no political opposition in Belarus.

Attempting to analyse the course of the electoral campaign in February 2024, it is reasonable to assume that the dualism of Belarusian politics will become even more pronounced and strengthened in the coming months. Regarding the election results, there seems to be little doubt.

According to plan?

For the new Belarusian opposition, this campaign essentially does not constitute a crucial point of operation because it cannot participate in any way. Therefore, efforts will be directed outwardly to keep the Belarusian question on the international agenda. Simultaneously, there will be a focus on the development and strengthening of the aforementioned “proto” structures. Among other things, elections to the Coordination Council are scheduled to take place around the same time. Despite the non-recognition of parliamentary elections, all democratic leaders will increasingly feel the importance of the issue of influencing the real political agenda in the country.

For the ruling elite in the country, this campaign is very significant, as evident from the intensified propaganda which has been promoted at an unprecedented rate compared to any other parliamentary campaign. Primarily, it will be the first nationwide electoral campaign since 2020. For the authorities, this is a crucial moment to internally demonstrate to both society and themselves that everything is proceeding according to plan and that the current government fully controls the situation. In this dimension, the number of deputies from “new” parties is not essential, as the goal is not only to assert the establishment’s monopoly on the state but also to conclusively close the chapter related to 2020. It is important to remember that the parliamentary campaign has structural significance since soon after, a new electoral body, the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly, is expected to be constituted.

However, above all, the “elections” of 2024 open a new important electoral cycle for the authorities, and the upcoming combined parliamentary and local campaign is a dress rehearsal for the most crucial campaign planned for next year. In 2025, another presidential election will take place.

Maxim Rust is a researcher and assistant professor at the Centre for East European Studies at the University of Warsaw (SEW UW) and a contributing editor with New Eastern Europe. He has a PhD in political science and is an analyst and managing editor of the Analytical Group “BELARUS-UKRAINE-REGION”.

2024 parliamentary elections, belarus, elections, political system