Post-Lukashism. Prospects for change in Belarus after regime collapse

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At the same time, the prolonged and stable existence of the Lukashenka regime will have an extremely negative impact (and this is already evident) on the nature of the functioning of opposition structures located abroad. These structures include Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s Office, the Coordinating Council of the opposition, and the United Transitional Cabinet. These groups were all formed between 2020 and 2022, yet none are politically or financially ready for long-term operations outside the country. The clear dependence on financial support from western partners and a struggle for structural integrity, which is already being challenged by internal conflicts, scandals and splits, will negatively affect the image of the opposition and its support among Belarusian society.

Challenges for democratic transformation

In fact, the opposition structures are now converging inward, succumbing to the emergence of an authoritarian culture. They openly dismiss critical reactions not just from Belarusian society but even from the Belarusian diaspora. The situation will worsen in 2025, when the formal status of the conditional political representation received by Tsikhanouskaya after the 2020 elections expires. Updating this political representation based on the electoral campaign in 2020 will require a number of actions from opposition structures to confirm some kind of legitimacy and Tsikhanouskaya’s political leadership. It will be extremely difficult to do this, due to the growing scepticism and distrust on the part of Belarusian society both inside and outside the country.

Based on the fact that the Lukashenka regime will be able to survive for more than one year, as well as the possible disintegration of the opposition, the democratic forces will most likely cease to be a key factor in political changes in Belarus, even if such occur in connection with the death of the dictator.

Many analysts and experts are trying to determine possible scenarios in Belarus and sketch out certain directions of change in the country. The most common scenarios, which are also promoted by the Belarusian opposition, are ideal and optimistic options. They are based on the conviction of the inevitability of the collapse of the Lukashenka regime and the natural transition to democratic rule with the direct and fundamental participation of existing opposition groups and figures, including Tsikhanouskaya. The most popular possible scenarios are considered to be dialogue/round table, a peaceful revolution or the collapse of the system under external pressure. All these scenarios provide for an active and leading role for the opposition in political changes and in the subsequent change of government in Belarus.

At the same time, the current events inside the country, the general geopolitical situation and crises within the opposition make it necessary to focus on a number of pessimistic scenarios related to the destruction of the Lukashenka-centred regime in Belarus. These include the assertion that political changes in Belarus may begin with the death of Lukashenka or his physical and/or mental inability to govern the country. These circumstances create the prerequisites for power in the country to remain in the hands of the ruling class.

Among the most likely scenarios not conducive to the democratization of the system are: the establishment of external control by Russia (the most negative one); the transfer of power to Lukashenka’s “political successor”, for example, one of his sons; or the establishment of oligarchic rule. All these scenarios (except the Russian political intervention) could lead to the formation of such a political phenomenon as post-Lukashism. Post-Lukashism is a possible state that could exist in society and among political elites (consisting of representatives of the former government) that slows down the process of forming a democratic and stable system. This could ultimately preserve the previous mechanisms and practices of government in order to ensure the interests of the authoritarian ruling group. This scenario may likely be associated with the establishment of oligarchic rule in post-Lukashenka Belarus. Moreover, it does not exclude the controlled participation of the opposition in political processes.

The super-political class

Unlike Russia, Ukraine and other countries of the former Soviet Union, a classic oligarchic regime – when extremely rich people directly participate in the management of the state or determine domestic and foreign policy – has not formed in Belarus. Nevertheless, a fairly representative stratum of wealthy people has emerged in the country. Some of these people were and still remain close to the ruling circles. In 2023, despite sanctions and economic isolation, there were more than 100 millionaires in Belarus.

During the collapse of the USSR, power in almost all the republics ended up in the hands of representatives of the former communist nomenclature and the so-called “red directors”, who ensured the establishment of authoritarian or mixed (hybrid) regimes. Oligarchy began to form after the decline of the communist system. Unlike the USSR, the Belarusian authoritarian regime created conditions for the economic enrichment of a considerable number of people, many of whom also helped ensure the overall financial well-being of the ruling elite. Among the most famous and directly connected with Lukashenka’s family are Aliaxandar Shakutin, Mikalai Varabyou, Aliaxandar Aleksin, Aliaxandar Zaycau, Aliaxandar Mashensky and Pavel Tapuzidis. It is clear that by the time of political changes in Belarus, the structure of the group of the most influential businessmen may look different.

As in the period of the Soviet collapse, part of the top management nomenclature, the power apparatus (siloviki), as well as large businesses close to power will strive to ensure that the country is under their control. By the time the current authoritarian regime collapses, these three political groups will possess key resources: state management, information (kompromat) and finance. In fact, these three groups will constitute the oligarchic essence of the new government. Moreover, big business will play a significant role in the process of transformation and the structuring of the new government.

Even revolutionary changes, as the events in Ukraine in 2004 and 2014 showed, do not lead to a situation where political power completely passes into the hands of the democratic opposition. Big business, fearing the loss of its assets, will be more motivated to ensure that democratic rule is not established in Belarus. Autocracy or oligarchy will not only contribute to the preservation and protection of capital, but also provide an opportunity for the additional redistribution of the republic’s economic assets.

It must also be kept in mind that after several years of repression, the complete destruction of civil society institutions, independent media and the expulsion of the most active representatives of society from the country, there simply will be no other political actors capable of coming to power. The political initiative at a critical moment will be in the hands of the oligarchy, since all democratic structures will still be abroad by that time, unless they have completely disintegrated by then. Thus, a weakened and disintegrated democratic community will be limited in resources in resisting the influence of a new, sufficiently consolidated political class and will be forced to play by their rules.

Legitimization and controlling the opposition

The crisis of 2020 and the post-crisis period in Belarus have shown that Belarusian business will play a significant role in the political transformation and governance of the country in post-Lukashenka Belarus. Probably, for the first time in the history of the confrontation between civil society and the Lukashenka regime, financial groups and individual businessmen will play a direct role in the ideological and financial support of the opposition. Examples include the actions of the IT company EPAM and the Russian oligarch of Belarusian origin, the owner of Uralchim, Dmitry Mazepin. During the 2020 protests, he proposed the creation of a National Salvation Committee, saying that “Lukashenka needs to stop violence against civilians, recognize the obvious facts of protest tension and sit down at the negotiating table with the opposition. This opportunity may soon become the only one, so it should not be missed.”

The events of 2020 and the conviction that the fall of the Lukashenka regime is inevitable have prompted a number of businessmen to actively participate in political processes in Belarus. This can serve as a basis for the assertion that in the event of the destruction (destabilization) of the authoritarian regime, business groups will play an extremely important role in shaping a new way of life and will be able to easily use the opposition for this.

Of course, the oligarchic class will strive to ensure the legal conditions for its rule, using democratic procedures and democratic opposition, but maintaining full control over the functioning of the system. The key mechanism of legitimization will remain elections, which, in conditions of maintaining power in the hands of the oligarchy, will remain a tool for manipulation.

With the necessary resources (information and finances), the oligarchic class will strive to blackmail opposition representatives through compromising materials, and thus put them under direct control. They will directly test the integrity of opposition leaders in order to provide support for their own actions, interests and political positions. This process could be initiated long before the moment of any political changes and, if necessary, provide financing for the oligarchs’ own new parties and movements during election campaigns to bring parliament under their control. Oligarchs could also finance opposition parties in order to extend their influence over different political actors.  

The business class is waiting and ready

In conditions that encourage material insecurity and a weak political culture among representatives of opposition structures, it will not be difficult to implement such manipulations. An example would be the recent scandal involving Volga Kavalkova, a member of the opposition Coordinating Council and once a close associate of Tsikhanouskaya. She was offered 500,000 US dollars on behalf of some Russian oligarch in order to start her own political activity and push Tsikhanouskaya out. As it turned out, it was a provocation by Lukashenka’s secret services. Nevertheless, it demonstrates how easily members of the Belarusian opposition could be corrupted.

It is also necessary to take into account that a number of figures who joined the opposition in 2020 have been in Lukashenka’s system for a long time. Apparently, they had and probably continue to have contacts with business representatives. In the case of changes in Belarus, it will be easy (if necessary) to co-opt such people from the opposition into a new political order to create the illusion of democratic transformation.

All said, during the years of Lukashenka’s rule, a political and financial class has developed in Belarus. This group has significant material resources that can be quickly transformed into political capital during the destruction of the authoritarian system. The existence of this class and its active participation in the struggle for power and its retention may become one of the most important challenges for the democratic transformation of Belarus.

Pavel Usau is a Belarusian political analyst and expert specialising in the study of authoritarian regimes, as well as their modification and transformation. He is the author of the book The forming, consolidation and functioning of the neo-authoritarian regime in Belarus. He is a member of the Analytical Group “BELARUS-UKRAINE-REGION” established by the Centre for East European Studies of the University of Warsaw.

Alyaksandr Lukashenka, belarus, Belarusian elite, elite