The paradox of Belarusian authoritarianism

Since coming to power in 1994, Belarusian stongman Alyaksandr Lukashenka has developed a strategy to use elections as the main lever of legitimizing his power. Photo: kremlin.ru (CC) wikimedia.commons.org

Democratic elections came to Belarus, as in all countries of the former USSR, in the early 1990s. However, were the first elections in Belarus genuinely democratic? Despite international recognition, labelling them as democratic is challenging. The challenge lies within the society, and more specifically Soviet society. The first three years of the country’s independence were a challenging transitional period from Soviet norms to independence. It is difficult to claim that the society was Belarusian during this time. Speaking about a society understanding the basic principles of democracy after 70 years under a totalitarian state is impossible. Prior to that, the Belarusian lands were a part of the Russian Empire, which did not particularly distinguish itself with the development of democracy.

Essentially, Belarusians never had the experience of free choice. The society in the early 1990s was more Belarusian-Soviet, with an old set of values and understanding of power. This explains the victory of the Soviet populist Alyaksandr Lukashenka over Stanislav Shushkevich  (who was accused of bringing about the USSR’s collapse) and the national-populist Zianon Pazniak. Overall, it is clear that Pazniak served as a kind of nemesis for the old nomenklatura, as he said that he would put every single communist in jail and make everyone speak Belarusian.

Soviet fundamentalism

Lukashenka’s Soviet fundamentalism succeeded. Certainly, society chose the person who communicated in the style of a Soviet kolkhoz chairman. However, it should be noted that among all the candidates, he was the one who used the right, nostalgic language to communicate with a traumatized society, for whom the collapse of the empire was a shock.

Lukashenka’s Soviet fundamentalism was a success. On the other hand, how were people supposed to know how elections worked at all? How could there be a democratic political culture in a society that had lived behind the Iron Curtain for the last 70 years? Soviet elections were not even a formality. They were a kind of extravaganza organized by the authorities. Subsequently, Belarusian elections became a sort of relic of the Soviet electoral ritual.

There was a need to make a choice. But how? How to understand who is a good candidate and who is not? Post-Soviet people mostly did not vote according to their own free will. The choice was based on the politician’s authority, their involvement in power even in Soviet times, and engagement in the system. New faces and political forces were viewed with scepticism and mistrust. Some were seen as those who had ruined the country, others would sell it to America, the third were bandits, and the fourth were nationalists. A complete set of enemies from Soviet times. In most post-Soviet countries, societies chose former party leaders and representatives of the nomenklatura. While in Georgia Shevardnadze (the former Soviet foreign minister) rose to power, there were also local party leaders like Kravchuk, Akaev, Niyazov, Karimov, Aliyev and Nazarbayev. Lukashenka, Rahmon and later Putin all represented other Soviet leaders of different ranks. All these Soviet party figures knew how to say what people wanted to hear and what they were accustomed to hearing from the Soviet authorities: avoid war, pursue stability, salaries and jobs, and do not sell the country to the West.

The first elections in 1994 brought, as it turned out, disastrous results for the entire society. The choice of Lukashenka proved to be a mistake. After the crackdown on the Supreme Council of Belarus in 1996 and the parliamentary elections that were only partially recognized, the system we know now in Belarus began to take shape. The rest of the story is well known. This involved the physical elimination of all significant competitors, subjugation of the parliament, repression and censorship. In the end, a country bordering the European Union became, as some wrote after 2010, the last dictatorship in Europe. Yet everything is much more complex, and the system itself requires a pseudo-electoral process.

Pseudo-democratic independence

Lukashenka did not abandon elections, although there were and still are many possibilities to do so. For him, elections, especially presidential ones, became the main lever of legitimizing his power. Belarus, much like other examples in the region, embodies an electorally authoritarian regime. In such regimes, as pointed out by the German researcher Petra Stykow, several candidates or parties participate in elections held regularly, but those in power never lose. The old Soviet methods step in to help: intimidation, falsifications, repression, killings and censorship. In the context of pseudo-democratic independence, a political regime of this sort systematically discriminates and represses anyone opposing it.

This occurs at all levels and in public and private settings. Consequently, elections cease to function as genuine choices and the population simply approves who has been chosen to rule. If you wish to avoid trouble, stay quiet and vote for those in power. And even if you abstain from voting, we will falsify the results.

In general, falsifications are the cornerstone of success for electoral autocrats. The Central Election Commission, for example, is a fundamental institution for the Belarusian authorities. Organizing elections, overseeing and orchestrating the victory process for those in power, securing the victory of the desired individuals in parliamentary elections – it is no easy task.

However, as Stykow points out, elections are the Achilles’ heel of electoral authoritarian regimes. The legitimacy of the president to wield power is based on their popularity among the people. Thus, presidential elections always serve as a kind of referendum. Even though the numbers may be manipulated and dissenters suppressed, the level of trust must be publicly acknowledged. Displaying the final figures is a ritual of legitimation. If there are few dissenters, no protests, or if dissent can be quickly and bloodlessly quashed, then legitimacy remains intact. However, if the elections are lost or the victory is not credible, it can lead to mass protests and revolutions.

The example of Belarus in 2020 illustrates this perfectly. Until 2020, even during critical moments, the regime remained stable during elections. During the times of the “colour revolutions” and the potentially dangerous year of 2010 for the regime, internal support for Lukashenka still remained at a fairly high level, and elections played into the hands of the regime. Lukashenka’s patrimonial nationalism, in which he defeated all enemies and defended the motherland every five years, helped secure yet another electoral cycle for the system. The ritual always succeeded. But August 2020 disrupted the existing system.

The legitimacy of the system faltered inside the country as never before and cost Lukashenka and the entire regime international recognition. The status quo and dialogue with the dictator were interrupted. The regime’s defensive reaction was aggression and the complete dismantling of Belarus’s socio-political development model. After the protests of 2020, a complete dependence on Russia ensued and the regime became complicit in the war in Ukraine. Minsk also accepted thousands of armed militants into the country from Wagner Group and initiated a migration crisis in the eastern part of the EU. This all represents a huge price to pay for another attempt to keep the country in the dark.

Initiation ritual

After 2020 Lukashenka, following in the footsteps of his ally Putin, transformed into an information autocrat. His grip on power now relies heavily on a sophisticated web of disinformation, propaganda and stringent censorship. While these tools were part of his arsenal before 2020, it was rather at the analogue level. The post-protest era witnessed a marked escalation in repression and a more refined manipulation of narratives. Presently, Lukashenka clings to power not by winning over a non-existent societal trust but by asserting his legitimacy to a regime increasingly fragmented after the tumultuous events of 2020. His need to navigate and validate this power has led to an intensified and more insidious use of propaganda, marking a significant shift in his regime’s tactics.

Most likely, presidential elections in Belarus will disappear in the form we currently know them. The current elective model of autocracy has proven too perilous for the regime. It  is looking increasingly necessary to elect a new “president”. The scenario for transferring presidential power through the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly is a step towards a more totalitarian system. Minsk is fragmenting democratic instruments to make it easier to control society. The choice will be made by a limited number of people loyal to the regime, who will be selected in a safer manner, alongside members of parliament.

In turn, parliamentary elections in Belarus have always been a mere formality. Low voter turnout and minimal public attention during parliamentary elections make them safer in terms of legitimizing the system through the electoral model. For the Belarusian regime, the parliament and the elections to it are a kind of initiation ritual in the system’s personnel policy. It serves as a personnel filter, a source of loyalty and political configuration. Being elected to parliament can also be a way of acknowledging someone’s merits in relation to the regime.

After 1996, the electoral process in the country ceased to function as a democratic lever but simultaneously became the primary format for legitimizing the system. This gave rise to a distinct understanding within society of western-style democracy, geopolitical orientations and the formation of a unique political culture of dichotomy. A person cannot simultaneously embody ethno-national identity, democratic values and vote for Lukashenka, just as supporting the opposition and identifying with the system are incompatible. The electoral foundation of the regime consists of individuals who reject any choice other than Lukashenka.

Over the past 30 years, the authorities’ de-politicization of society through repression and restrictions on civil freedoms has led to national-democratic discourse becoming extremely amorphous. Essentially, political and civic activity outside the political framework of the authorities has been limited or suppressed as non-normative in the public consciousness. It manifested itself most clearly in the form of civil protests at the end of each electoral cycle from 2001 to 2020. After 2020, the regime now feels compelled to hold elections in order to strengthen its legitimacy. However, by conducting such a purge of the public in the social and political space, it is not reasonable to expect that the 2024 elections will lead to a new attempt to overthrow Belarusian autocracy.

The parliamentary elections in 2024 are an attempt to reboot the political model, introduce new people and make personnel changes. If, however, things do not go according to plan, the army and the security apparatus, having demonstrated their influence and loyalty, will undoubtedly repeat the events of 2020 if necessary to defend the system. Minsk’s direct dependence on Russia makes any protest essentially impossible at this stage in Belarus.

Anton Saifullayeu is an adjunct professor at the Centre for East European Studies of the University of Warsaw and the editor in chief of the “BY UA” online portal.

2024 parliamentary elections, belarus, elections