Prospects and challenges for Central Asian states against the backdrop of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

The capital of the Republic of Kazakhstan - the city of Astana. Photo: MaxZolotukhin/Shutterstock

Hence, Russia does not remain indifferent to the reaction of Central Asian states to the aggression against Ukraine. In the first months after the Russian invasion the expectations of CSTO member states to engage were high, but ultimately did not pan out.

However, Russia now intends to use the Central Asian states to bypass EU and US-imposed sanctions. These intentions are corroborated by the ongoing rapid relocation of Russian businesses to that region and attempts to find workarounds for conducting activities, such as re-exporting goods. For example, there have been US-imposed sanctions placed on Uzbekistan-based “Promcomplektlogistic Private Company” for supplying electronic components such as microcircuits, and “Radioavtomatika”, a Russia-based company which procures items for the Russian defence industry. Moreover, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were identified in a suspicious activity report issued by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network as trans-shipment points, through which restricted or controlled exports have been known to pass before reaching destinations in Russia or Belarus.

Prospects and risks of regional cooperation for Central Asian states

The Russian invasion of Ukraine created numerous challenges for Central Asian states. These challenges vary from operating in conditions of an economic downturn in the Russian Federation and its possible military weakening, to dealing with complications caused by excessive economic and security dependence on Russia, not to mention the need to diversify supply chains.

Under these conditions, a chance for closer regional cooperation between the five countries of the region is likely to emerge. The fourth Consultative Meeting of the Central Asian heads, which was held in Cholpon-Ata in Kyrgyzstan on July 21st last year, became an important platform for discussing urgent regional issues and challenges, such as border conflicts, the diversification of supply chains and water management. The council took place against the backdrop of social unrest in the region, such as the January 2022 Kazakh unrest, anti-government demonstrations in the Tajik Badakhshan Mountainous Autonomous Region, and the Karakalpak protests in Uzbekistan.

The internal issues of the region are exacerbated by an external threat from Taliban-led Afghanistan. An international conference on security and economic development in Afghanistan was held in Tashkent, to which a Taliban delegation was invited. The conference marks an attempt by Central Asian states to build relations with Afghanistan and advance their own interests, thus mitigating the threat to the region.

However, it is important to keep in mind that issues in Central Asia are not solely limited to security factors. The dependence of Central Asian economies on Russian imports, as well as labour migration from Central Asia to Russia, add to the spectrum of challenges. The gap created by the weakening of Russian influence in the region would likely be filled by the Chinese. The People’s Republic of China is the most significant and vital rival to Russian influence in the region. Yet, China’s reputation as an alternative economic and security partner in Central Asia is threatened by regional anti-Chinese sentiment, which is driven by China’s debt-trap policy and establishment of re-education camps for Uyghur, Kazakh and Kyrgyz Muslims in Xinjiang.

As a result, a desire among Central Asian political elites to strengthen regional cooperation may arise. Such an approach could contribute to the economic development of the region, as well as reduce vulnerability to external challenges and internal conflicts. Yet, the abovementioned meeting of Central Asian states demonstrated a severe lack of adherence to any forms of regional integration. The states’ foreign policies would likely be focused on manoeuvring between Russia and China, rather than on the creation of a strong regional community. The signing of the “Agreement on Friendship, Good-Neighbourliness and Cooperation for the Development of Central Asia in the 21st Century” in Cholpon-Ata forms the initial basis for building mutual trust in a region not devoid of inter-ethnic and border disputes. Nevertheless, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan refrained from signing the document under the pretext of the need for “domestic consultations”.

Kazakhstan: facing a challenge from the north

Unlike other Central Asian states whose security threats stem from their southern borders, in Kazakhstan the risks are emanating from the north. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has exposed tensions in relations between the two long-time allies. Territorial threats, which occasionally come from Russian officials and state media, are perceived in Astana not as hypothetical, but as real. During his speech at the St. Petersburg Economic Summit, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev noted that his country will not recognise the quasi-state entities in Donbas. Shortly after Tokayev’s speech, on July 6th, the Novorossiysk district court ruled for the suspension of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), a pipeline which pumps two-thirds of Kazakhstan’s oil exports via Russian territory to the EU.

The suspension of the consortium took place the day after Tokayev discussed with EU representatives the possibility of using Kazakhstan’s hydrocarbon potential to stabilise the situation in the European and global markets. According to Central Asia expert Bruce Pannier, the decision to suspend the CPC is evidence of worsening relations between Russia and Kazakhstan following the outbreak of war in Ukraine. The suspension of the major oil pipeline urged Kazakhstan to take measures in response. On July 7th Tokayev held a meeting on the development of the country’s transport and transit potential, during which he stressed the need to work out alternative routes for communication and delivery of goods by railway, as well as the diversification of oil supplies via the Trans-Caspian route. On July 11th, the Krasnodar court considered an appeal against the decision of the Novorossiysk court to suspend the work of the CPC and changed it, replacing the suspension with a fine.

Kyrgyzstan: balancing on a tightrope

Considering Kyrgyz-Russian relations, it should be noted that they are overall a mixed bag. Kyrgyzstan is probably one of the most Russia-dependent states in the region. Kyrgyzstan is a member of the Russian-led international CSTO and EAEU blocs. The Kremlin has effectively patronised Kyrgyzstan by writing off Kyrgyz debts and allocating ten million US dollars to support the Kyrgyz budget. A majority of Kyrgyz view Russia as a destination for work migration. The accession of Kyrgyzstan to the EAEU in 2015 only stimulated this trend. It is estimated that as of October 2022 around 830,000 to one million Kyrgyz citizens are working on the territory of the Russian Federation. It is expected that Kyrgyzstan will support Russia and further deepen relations with the country.

However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine was met with a backlash from the Kyrgyz authorities. Kyrgyzstan demonstrated its disapproval of Russian foreign policy by cancelling CSTO military exercises which were to take place in the country in October 2022, as well as suspending the service for bank cards of the Russian payment system Mir. This followed similar actions by banks in neighbouring countries such as Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. At the same time, Kyrgyzstan has expressed greater interest in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. At the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the president of Kyrgyzstan held a meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, during which cooperation on the construction of a China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan rail project was discussed. Xi also named several priority tasks facing the two states within the framework of bilateral cooperation. In particular, these involved the implementation of the programme for medium and long-term development of trade and economic cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and China, and the increase in trade between the two states.

Nevertheless, while it seems that Kyrgyzstan envisions Russia as its largest trading partner and investor, as well as a top priority country for work migration, most major infrastructural projects in Kyrgyzstan are financed and constructed by China. This balancing, however, is challenged by recent domestic and external factors, such as a return to the presidential form of government in 2021 and last year’s clashes on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. China might view the changing form of governance in Kyrgyzstan and the frequent border conflicts as undermining its reputation as a reliable and stable country worthy of foreign investments.

Tajikistan: Russia as the security guarantor

The situation in the region is becoming even more complicated against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine because Moscow has positioned itself as the main guarantor of security against terrorism, extremism and separatism in Central Asia. Tajikistan, for example, where the Russian 201st military base is located with the goal of protecting Tajik independence and constitutional order, faces the question of whether Moscow would be able to fulfil its obligations. In light of claims that Russia withdrew some of its military personnel from the territory of Tajikistan to participate in the invasion of Ukraine, the Tajik authorities decided to develop economic and security cooperation with Iran as a new potential security guarantor. In January 2022 Tehran hosted a forum titled “Prospects for relations between Tajikistan and Iran”, which was dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The forum served as a precursor for strengthening cooperation between both states. In June 2022 a joint meeting of Tajik and Iranian military forces was held in Dushanbe, during which the Iranian side expressed its readiness to provide support of any kind in the security sphere. Tajikistan also pledged to strengthen cooperation in combatting terrorism, organised crime and contraband during this event. The establishment of a new security partnership did not receive any backlash from Russia and China, on which Tajikistan depends financially and economically. This is likely due to the fact that Iran is under sanctions imposed by the US and EU and therefore any rapprochement between Tajikistan and Iran is not considered by Beijing and Moscow as a drift towards the West.

Turkmenistan: in search of a customer for natural resources

Russia-Turkmenistan relations present particular interest due to Turkmenistan’s declaration of neutral status. Turkmenistan abstains from joining major international organisations in Central Asia, such as the SCO or the EAEU, instead signing bilateral treaties with other states. In 2017 Russia and Turkmenistan signed an agreement on a strategic partnership. The first official foreign visit by the new Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedow was made to Russia, during which a declaration on deepening the strategic partnership between the two countries was signed. The major points of the declaration include greater cooperation in the field of countering terrorist and extremist ideology and propaganda, as well as money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The exploration and development of oil and gas fields was also discussed.

Despite profitable cooperation with Russia, Turkmenistan also established close economic ties with China. At the 2022 SCO summit, where Turkmenistan participated as a guest attendee, the Chinese and Turkmen presidents held a meeting. During this event, Xi Jinping stressed the need to increase the volume and scale of gas supply cooperation, as well as stimulate the links of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative with the Turkmen “Revival of the Great Silk Road” strategy. Turkmenistan-China relations further developed during negotiations between heads of both states in January 2023. After the negotiations, documents on cooperation between Turkmenistan and the People’s Republic of China within the framework of the One Belt and One Road initiative in the fields of green development, digital economy, healthcare, culture, sports, information and media, as well as gas cooperation, were signed.

Both Russia and China are interested in Turkmen gas supplies and therefore continue cooperation in the economic and security spheres. This state of affairs may change due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The concentration of Russia on the invasion provides an opportunity for China to become a major trading partner with Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan can also decrease its dependence on China by completing the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India Pipeline, which would allow Turkmenistan to bypass China and Russia. The possibility of constructing the Trans-Caspian Pipeline, which aims to transfer gas from Turkmenistan across the bottom of the Caspian Sea to the pipeline network in Azerbaijan and eventually to Europe, would also provide an opportunity for Turkmenistan to deliver natural gas to the continent, bypassing Russian territory. This would challenge Russia’s influence and help build the country’s position as an independent player in the region.

Uzbekistan: Playing its own game

Uzbekistan, a double landlocked country located in the heart of Central Asia, possesses relatively powerful economic, demographic and military potential. However, Uzbekistan-Russia relations present a mixed bag. On the one hand, Uzbekistan was distancing itself from economic and political unions with Russia. In 2008, Uzbekistan suspended its partnership in the Eurasian Economic Community, refusing to participate in the EAEU and, in 2012, in the CSTO. According to Frederick Starr, these withdrawals were based on the assumption that Russia would dominate the newly formed EAEU and use the CSTO as a tool for installing a military base in the Kyrgyz sector of the Ferghana Valley, therefore making the true goal of both organisations political instead of economic.

At the same time, Uzbekistan is interested in the development of economic cooperation with other post-Soviet countries. In 2013 the president of Uzbekistan signed a law to join a free trade zone with other members of the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), signifying the more active involvement of Uzbekistan in trade between CIS member states. The rapprochement between Russia and Uzbekistan was renewed under the leadership of Shavkat Mirziyoyev. In June 2019 Mirziyoyev stated at the 20th plenary session of the senate of the Oliy Majlis that 70 per cent of Uzbek trade is tied to Russia and the EAEU and that Uzbekistan needs new markets, hinting at the need to develop trade relations with other countries in Central Asia. In 2020 Uzbekistan was granted observer status in the Eurasian Economic Union. In 2021 Uzbekistan participated in the council for industrial policy of the EAEU, thus demonstrating interest in economic cooperation with other member states.

China also plays a significant role in the Uzbek economy. China sees Uzbekistan as a cornerstone logistics hub in the Central Asian part of the Belt and Road initiative. A portion of the China-Central Asia Gas Pipeline passes through Uzbek territory and China also invests in the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway project. The implementation of the railway would give Uzbekistan access to sea and international trade routes which, according to Zilola Yunusova, an expert at the Information and Analytical Centre for International Relations in Tashkent, is one of the priorities of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy.

China is also investing in Uzbek energy and telecommunications. China’s Eximbank offered Uzbekistan a 65 million US dollar loan to build new hydroelectric plants as well as  renovate several existing ones. Huawei, the largest telecom provider in Uzbekistan, also signed a 150 million US dollar loan agreement to upgrade the country’s existing cellular networks to 3G/4G country-wide and to 5G in select regions by 2023.

The current Uzbek government is actively working on the improvement of the business environment and investment attractiveness of the state. In order to achieve this quite ambitious goal, Uzbekistan needs to develop economic relations not only with Russia and China but also with other Central Asian states. Due to its geographical isolation and lack of direct access to the sea, Uzbekistan is interested in the development of road transport infrastructure and the diversification of international transport routes.

Geopolitical challenges and changes

Central Asia has been known as a region that was for a long period of time incorporated into the Soviet Union and therefore influenced by Russia after the collapse of the USSR. Central Asian states even after their declarations of independence were led by former first secretaries in the local communist party. And for the most part, Central Asia remained part of Moscow’s sphere of influence. Russia built its reputation as a protector from the forces of terrorism, extremism and separatism, as well as a reliable trade partner and major buyer of oil and gas in the region.

Today, this region witnesses major geopolitical changes that are causing a profound impact on the future of the economies, societies and security of Central Asia. A new generation of Central Asian leaders and elites have come to power who are interested in the diversification of markets. Central Asian states now attempt to establish trade and economic relations not exclusively with Russia but with other regions as well, such as South Asia, East Asia, the Middle East and Europe.

In order to successfully enter these markets, Central Asian states require the formation of new supply chains, which should be accompanied by modern infrastructure, sustainable energy sources and proper security. In this case, China is eager to satisfy the interests of Central Asian states, since they are considered to be a vital part of the Belt and Road initiative, opening the pathway for Chinese goods to European markets. Therefore, China invests in Central Asia by providing loans for the construction of new railway routes in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and pipelines in Turkmenistan. Another portion of Chinese investments is aimed at the development of the renewable energy sector in Central Asia. As a result, China is increasing its presence in Central Asia and becoming an influential player in the region, ousting Russia.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused dramatic changes in Moscow’s image as an influential and patronising player in Central Asia. The prolonged invasion forced Russia to decrease its military presence in the region, leaving it susceptible to terrorist, extremist and separatist movements. At the same time, the partial mobilisation declared by Russia caused an influx of Russians who wanted to escape the military draft, thus further exacerbating Russia’s relations with these states. The non-recognition of the Russian-created Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics by Kazakhstan, the refusal of Kyrgyzstan to participate in CSTO-organised joint military exercises, and the appeal of the Tajik president for Russia not to pursue a policy towards the countries of Central Asia like the former Soviet Union during the 2022 Central Asia-Russia summit, serve as key signs of regional disagreement with Russian policy. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan consider Russia as a potential market for their goods but refrain from joint initiatives due to the risk of Russian influence in the security and economy of the region, as well as the potential dependency of Central Asian states on Russia.

While the prolonged Russian invasion of Ukraine undermines Moscow’s reputation and presence in Central Asia, the emerging gap in trade and security is slowly being filled by China. China prioritises Central Asia as a vital link in the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative. Yet despite the potential benefits stemming from cooperation between Central Asian states and China, this partnership is prone to security, social, economic and political challenges that are likely to increase. Niklas Swanström and Pär Nyrén identify four challenges and pitfalls in China’s engagement with Central Asia: an inefficient international commitment to bolster security in the region and to assist in state-building; Beijing’s engagement only with the central governments of Central Asia; China’s style of management regarding its state-owned enterprises; and challenges in policy coordination between China’s central governance structures and the periphery. These potential challenges reflect China’s lack of  engagement with the region and its capacity to provide security. The aforementioned gaps in China’s Central Asian policy open a window of opportunity for Russia to restore its decreasing presence in the region by promoting the image of regional patron and security guarantor.

Yet, Russia’s decline and the impact of EU and US-imposed sanctions are major factors that have also contributed to the rise of China’s influence in Central Asia. The presence of China in the region will increase as China intensifies the Belt and Road Initiative. However, China will not solely dominate the Central Asian states. Russia will remain an influential actor in the region as a major market for oil and gas from Central Asia and a destination of labour migration, albeit not a primary one. Membership in the SCO and CSTO groups remains a pillar of infrastructural development and security stability in Central Asia. Central Asian states themselves have started to act independently on the international arena by developing relations not only with each other but also with Turkey and Iran in the Middle East, as well as with Pakistan and India in South Asia.

The meeting of the Organisation of Turkic States in Samarkand and the consultative meeting of the Central Asian heads in Cholpon-Ata signify the first steps towards cooperation in the economic and security spheres and coordinated efforts to counter modern challenges and threats. The development of Central Asia will help to mitigate risks connected with China’s debt trap policy and Russia’s political pressure on the region. In order to solidify the position of Central Asia as a powerful and stable region in the international arena, there has to be an internal harmonisation of interests between the states within the region, a maintenance of relations with Russia and China and an implementation of domestic reforms, which are crucial for establishing peace, security and freedom in Central Asia.

Danylo Stonis is a PhD student at the Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, Slovakia. His research is primarily focused on Central Asia and its relations with Russia and China.

Central Asia, China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan