The interdependence between Russia and Germany has also created geopolitical and security concerns for the EU. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Germany needs to now understand that domestic and European energy security are intertwined. There are several measures that Germany can adopt in order to address this energy security dilemma in the short and long term, taking into account geopolitical circumstances at the EU level.

Three days into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a Zeitenwende – a turning point in the history of East-West relations. His speech in the Bundestag was meant to mark a generational change in German foreign policy towards Russia. When Chancellor Scholz declared that Germany would, in a gradual process, dramatically reduce its dependence on Russian energy supplies, it launched a debate among German policymakers that has reverberated across Europe. While the goal is apparent, to extricate Germany from Russian energy dependence with minimal economic trauma, there is still no consensus on how to achieve this.

In the Asia-Pacific region, political and diplomatic actions to isolate Russia by the West are complicated. This is because it is unclear what the United States and the European Union can offer to the many troubled countries in search of cheap raw materials, foreign investments and technology. Washington and Brussels need to realise that the Ukrainian game is played on a global level and requires a much greater effort.

The invasion of Ukraine is generating global consequences that will have a long-term impact on the regional order and the geoeconomics of the Asia-Pacific. In particular, the protracted conflict is causing a deterioration in the economic situation of many South and Southeast Asian countries, which are still trying to recover after two years of the pandemic. The rising cost of raw materials, especially energy commodities, coupled with the blocking of exports of Ukrainian and Russian products, has fostered the emergence of huge trade deficits and soaring inflation throughout the region. The shock was so severe that it even triggered a series of economic crises that quickly turned into political ones undermining regional stability.

An interview with Andrey Makarychev, a visiting professor at the Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies at the University of Tartu in Estonia. Interviewer: Maciej Makulski

MACIEJ MAKULSKI: Would you agree that the region has lost a sort of stability and predictability that it has enjoyed for over 30 years (with significant turbulence though in 2008 and 2014)? Or was it only an illusion of stability in which people wanted to believe?

ANDREY MAKARYCHEV: Of course, the security landscape in this part of Europe has drastically and dramatically changed. I think the changes are very much related to the fact that we, in Europe, have lost many of the illusions that were inherited from a relatively peaceful and very liberal mindset from the beginning of the 1990s. First of all, this relates to the way we understand security. There were many expectations that security would transform from its military version into something softer and more related to issues such as people’s well-being, environmental protection and climate change, etc.

The story of Liuba and Anzhela, two young Russian activists, shows that causes mobilising young people in Germany, Italy or Finland are just as much a concern to some young Russians. Yet as Russians, they are also fighting on several other fronts. The most important is the imperialism that their country is forcing on the world.

On a sunny May 8th in Berlin, the day before a highly contested Victory Day march, pro-Ukrainian activists set up stands and a small stage opposite the city’s Soviet war memorial. There is Ukrainian music playing and people walk around dressed in yellow and blue. A political activist speaks in Russian before the assembled crowd and a woman next to her translates into German.

An interview with Liliya Vezhevatova, a coordinator of the Feminist Anti-War Resistance in Russia. Interviewer: Anna Efimova

ANNA EFIMOVA: According to recent research by the Russian human rights project OVD-Info, more than half of Russian protesters are women. How have feminists, who have never been a leading public and social force in Russia, managed to unite against the war in Ukraine?

LILIYA VEZHEVATOVA: Feminist organisations have been burgeoning in Russia over the last two decades. Activists have been deeply involved in internal and external discussions. However, we were not treated seriously during this time. We subsequently remained intact as the war started, while prominent Russian political activists were either in prison or in exile. We mobilised fast at the right time – our movement started on February 25th.

Given the systemic difficulties of the Russian army, the mobilisation announced by Vladimir Putin on September 21st may not change the situation on the front very much at all. And when considering the economic and social costs of the war for Russia internally, which are growing at an alarming rate, Putin may have gained some time, but he has not solved the problem.

Fifty-three Ukrainian POWs were killed as a result of an explosion in the internment camp in Olenivka on July 29th 2022. A war crime the Kremlin offered to Russian public opinion which demanded a show of force against the members of Azov instead of a prisoner exchange.

To the West, Gorbachev was a man one could do business with. To Russians he was the one who destroyed the USSR.

The Russian Federation is home to a large number of ethnic republics that briefly attempted to declare their sovereignty during the collapse of the Soviet Union. A similar series of crises now facing the country should encourage debate on what should be done if such areas once again push for more autonomy.

The West would be wise not to ignore Russia’s escalating domestic challenges. The Soviet Union was also conducting special military operations and disinformation campaigns abroad in the years preceding its collapse.

The fight for Ukraine’s survival is happening in more ways than just on the front. The rich heritage of the country’s language and culture is now under attack from a genocidal Kremlin administration determined to consign it to history. Moscow’s war goal of “denazification” is none other than Russification.

The outcome of the war in Ukraine will be determined by three key actors – Ukraine, Russia and the West. However, all three operate as if they are in different time dimensions. One of the features of this “totally new era” is that clocks are ticking on all sides, but the speed seems different.

Since February 24th, Ukraine has been at the forefront of global media and we have been inundated with both short and long-term predictions about the war as it progresses. It has led to endless analysis, some profound, some superficial, some objective, some ideological, some partisan and much contradictory. We all want to know how this tragic conflict will end, whether Ukraine prevails and remains free or Vladimir Putin’s Russia conquers its neighbour. What would either development mean for the future of the West? What would be the status of the external and internal enemies of liberal democracy that have grown during the last decade and have been somewhat muted since February?