Interview with Polina Zherebtsova, a Chechen Russian writer and human rights activist. Interviewer: Karolina Zub-Lewińska.

The Russian Orthodox Church has played a key role in justifying Moscow’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Its close links with the state have a long history, with Lucy Ash’s latest book exposing a relationship that now holds up the Kremlin’s ultra-conservative ideology.

Russia’s alliance with other authoritarian regimes has grown to the extent that it is now attempting to challenge the current world order. This is seen most clearly in the battlefields of Ukraine, where technological cooperation has produced new weapons like the Oreshnik missile.

Among its Central Asian neighbours, Tajikistan’s history textbooks still most closely resemble official accounts from the Soviet era. They stress the evils of the Russian Empire’s expansion to the region. At the same time, they also remain fairly positive about Tajikistan’s Soviet experience, underlining the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic’s contribution to the Soviet state. Perhaps as a result, they have been caught in Russia’s crosshairs.

School textbooks are telling examples of official interpretations of history. They exemplify the narratives that are taught to children as part of their civic socialization controlled by governments. In countries that gained independence after the Soviet collapse, the shifts in historical narratives have been intrinsically linked to the reimagining of these countries’ Soviet past by attributing them with new meanings through the prism of post-Soviet nation-building processes. With Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the debates about history textbooks gained a new momentum, and a new meaning.

The growing alignment between Moscow and Tehran represents an extraordinary development in the history of their relations, which for centuries have been characterized by intense conflicts and profound rivalry. While it is reasonable to assume that Russia and Iran may grow even closer in the short term, the uncertain nature of their relationship means that their ties could still follow unexpected or unpredictable trajectories.

In recent years, relations between the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran have deepened significantly, indicating an apparent shift from mere tactical alignment to a broader strategic convergence. Specifically, since the late 2010s, the two countries strengthened their economic and political ties, transforming mutual diplomatic support from sporadic to systematic. In this respect, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked a significant qualitative leap in bilateral relations.

Nearly three years since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, the Kaliningrad Oblast has been fully incorporated into Russian’s belligerent and quasi-imperial rhetoric. The Kremlin has used its exclave’s past to portray Kaliningrad as a battleground of civilizations and a special place for Russian collective memory.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, the hopes were high for the Kaliningrad Oblast’s future: foreign investments, the creation of a free trade zone and even a certain degree of autonomy were all on the table. Most of them, however, remained unfulfilled as Moscow was never ready to give up its dominating authority over the region even in the face of deep economic and political crisis.

Sanctions are always a kind of double-edged sword. In order to be effective and prevent bypassing, they have to be comprehensive and include as many countries as possible. Changing elite behaviour depends on increasing the kind of pressure that pushes parties off the battlefield and to the negotiating table. Sanctions can therefore help to tip the balance.

Sanctions regimes aim to change elite behaviour by raising the costs and stakes of their choices, both directly in terms of diminishing their personal comfort including travel and access to finance, and indirectly by increasing popular pressure against their rule through economic hardship. This highlights one of several problems with sanctions. These elites are usually uninterested in popular welfare, explaining their attitude towards democracy and its wider benefits.

Democratic politics has a key responsibility to prevent extreme societal polarization and divisive culture wars, which create fertile ground for malicious interference and deception. While Russia and China actively spread disinformation to undermine open societies, what should a European response to the deadly threat of disinformation look like?

For one evening in London last November, audiences left behind the weight of geopolitics to reconnect with two iconic figures, Vladimir Pozner and Ivan Urgant, whose humour and nostalgia offer a glimpse of life before 2022. Yet beneath the laughter and stories lies a deeper reflection on Russia’s society today, its divided sentiments and the struggles of cultural figures navigating a war-torn world.

Could a prominent Russian act or theatre troupe no longer dream of filling a 3,000-seat London theatre? In a word, yes. Several Russian performers, shows, and acts have, in fact, sold out theatres up and down the United Kingdom since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Slava’s SnowShow will be touring Britain this year after remarkable success in Russia’s regional theatre scene. Ahead of this, in 2024, were two of Russian television’s most recognizable faces: veteran journalist Vladimir Pozner and TV personality Ivan Urgant.  

Having profited hand over fist from Russia’s unprovoked aggression, it is in neither Saudi Arabia nor the United Arab Emirates’ interest to help administer a just and lasting negotiated settlement in Ukraine.

Interview with Gabrielius Landsbergis, the former foreign minister of Lithuania. Interviewer: Vazha Tavberidze.

Alexei Navalny is still remembered best for his pro-democracy activities in Russia. Despite this, the activist also maintained a troubling loyalty to many aspects of Russian imperialism. A democratic future for the country will only be possible when such issues are confronted head on.