Belarusian political elites: new, imagined, lost?

One of the greatest hopes of 2020 was that the Belarusian system and its ruling elite would begin to crumble from within. At that time, we were pointing to all the scratches appearing on the system’s foundation, stating that they would soon become cracks and that the regime would fall apart. Photo: Dmitriy Drozd / Shutterstock

Assessing the situation from today’s perspective, I would argue now that neither the public opinion nor the expert circles in the West have accurately estimated the change that has taken place in Belarusian politics, which in fact took place as a result of networked mobilisation and the digitalisation of communication.

Little did we know

In hindsight, this wrong estimation by foreign analysts, as we can see it today, can be explained in several ways. First, it was rather naive to put all bets on one person, namely Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, even though she indeed was the main face and symbol of the protests. Second, there was an assumption, popular indeed, which suggested that the protests had shown that the authoritarian Belarusian regime was weak and in its dying days. Unfortunately, in this regard the analysts were wrong again. In 2022, Belarus is still ruled by exactly the same elite that was there in 2020.  

For the sake of honesty and academic rigour, we should now admit that in many of our observations and conclusions about the protests we were taken by the revolutionary mood and as a result underestimated the adaptability and flexibility of the Belarusian authorities. This was not the first time that such a thing has happened either. Third, it is quite clear that until this year most analysts, or the general public, did not think that anything worse than what we have seen in Belarus since 2020 could happen in our region. Little did we know. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine not only proved us wrong, it also redirected everybody’s attention, overshadowing the already decreasing coverage of Belarus in international media, day by day.

Enriched by today’s perspective, we should again take a look at Belarus, its main political actors and the overall social and political framework which – for analytical reasons – we decided to call “Belarus-2020”. Only then will we see that those who now constitute the Belarusian political elite can be divided into three groups: 1) representatives of the old opposition (the old counter elite), 2) the authorities (the ruling elite), and 3) the new opposition (the new elite). For proper understanding of the situation as well as the formulating of any hypothesis about future developments, these three groups should be analysed from an empirical position, without succumbing to the temptation of normative “wishful thinking” or an attempt to revive the social energy from 2020.

And the reality that we have today is that of decreased enthusiasm and social mobilisation. The ruling elite of the Lukashenka regime is still wielding power, and a large part of the society that was active during the protests is now living abroad or imprisoned. In addition, the Russian aggression in Ukraine has created great uncertainty regarding the future of all these actors. Therefore, an analysis of each of these groups and the change they have undergone in the last two years may bring us some new conclusions.

Unmet great expectations

As stated before, the first group is that of the old counter-elite. It includes representatives of the oldest Belarusian opposition movements and parties. With regards to this group, I do not see anything that in some way would surprise me. Already back in 2019 and 2020 I was predicting that these two years would be decisive for their existence as a full-fledged actor on the political scene. And indeed today, two years later, we can see that the old counter elite is more of a historical phenomenon than today’s reality. Its representatives either disappeared from the political scene (for all kinds of reasons) or joined the new elite. Some yet, like the prominent Zianon Pazniak, the icon of the Belarusian national movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s, have been strongly and harshly criticising both the ruling elite and the new opposition leaders. This fact, despite being discussed in public debate, did not yet lead to any significant change.

The second group is the current ruling elite. Or to put it simply – the power elite. This group is not limited to Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s closest circle, that is the government and the heads of ministries. Such an interpretation would be too narrow and simplistic. This group also includes a vast array of officials. Not only do they form the Belarusian establishment but they also heavily depend on the current system of power. In fact, everything that they have has been provided to them by Lukashenka’s regime. Thus, any system change could shake their positions and threaten their stability. Both their own and that of their families. Whether they follow their conscience or not is a secondary issue; of primary concern is their official and demonstrative loyalty to the system. There is a quite popular opinion, both in the West and in Belarus, that representatives of this group are not legitimate holders of power. Regardless of the validity of this viewpoint, it does not change the fact that this group does wield political power in Belarus.

One of the greatest hopes of 2020 was that the Belarusian system and its ruling elite would begin to crumble from within. At that time, we were pointing to all the scratches appearing on the system’s foundation, stating that they would soon become cracks and that the regime would fall apart. It was also hoped that some officials and representatives of the security forces (siloviki) would move to the protesters’ side and form a new critical mass which in the end would change Belarus. Today, we know that such a course of events did not take place.

The power elite, although clearly weakened after 2020, had nonetheless learned their lesson and carried on. Not only did this group not collapse, but in many ways it consolidated its power. In this consolidation we see a greater role played by the military, which is increasingly more active in political and decision-making processes, as well as more authoritarian tendencies in government decisions and activities than before. As a result, the Belarusian state has turned into a “besieged fortress”, while members of its ruling elite have been continuously showing that they would not give a single inch. Hence, they have used massive and brutal repressions against their opponents, as well as a complete purge of the political and media field. These tactics deprived the opposition which remains in the country of the tools that would allow it to reach its audience and operate. The tightening of freedoms by the power elite will still be observed for a long time to come.

As stated before, the power elite has also learned lessons from the 2020 protests and has responded to them in a their own way. The best example here is the “constitutional referendum”, which was held in late February of this year. It allowed for yet another system change in Belarus (referenda with an aim to change the political system have been organised by Lukashenka since 1995). It empowered the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly, an extra-parliamentary body dominated by government supporters, by turning it into the highest representative body. As a result, we will quite likely see a rearrangement of Belarus’s political scene in favour of those who are in power. Expected amendments to the legislation on political parties will most likely mean the possibility of forming a wide, pro-government, quasi-opposition. The aim of this change will be to give the impression of a multiparty system.

Lastly, it should also be noted that in the last two years the Belarusian authorities have finally recognised the power of digital and social media and have started using them to their advantage. As a result, the quality of state propaganda has significantly improved, following the example of Russian propaganda.

How not to repeat mistakes?

The third group I choose to call the new elite, which is, of course, not an objective term. Looking at this group as a whole, we can say that although it is still a very “young” player, its influence is considerable. Most importantly, the great expectations that were expressed regarding Belarusian political developments in 2020 were precisely related to the emergence of this new elite. As a group, it is made up of the representatives of democratic forces consolidated around one leader – Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. However, it should also be admitted that this group does not only have one face, even that of Tsikhanouskaya. It is made up of many politicians and organisations that were formed in 2020. They include the Office of Tsikhanouskaya, the National Anti-Crisis Management, the Coordination Council and many other initiatives. All these organisations generated huge public enthusiasm, however all of their leaders had to opt for working from abroad. In Belarus, they were doomed to lose their freedom.

From the perspective of the last two years, we can see that the activity of this group, although impressive and respectable, did not bring much-expected change within Belarus. Instead, we see a certain disconnect in the activity of the new elite, who operate mainly in the realm of international relations and, very importantly, in the digital sphere given the deterioration of political activities inside Belarus. This situation resulted in a decrease in protests, as well as brought on a wave of despair regarding the new leaders. Objectively speaking, such a course of events was unavoidable and resulted in the “internal migration” of many who were active in 2020. Not to mention those who were arrested or had to flee the country. 

Unfortunately, we can also see emerging new conflicts within the new elite. They most often take place between Warsaw and Vilnius, which are the largest centres of the Belarusian political diaspora now. What is most worrisome, however, it that because of these conflicts some people have already started to believe that the new democratic elite may soon cease to exist. The risk of such a scenario is stressed now even more when everybody is more focused on Ukraine than Belarus.

Fortunately, the scenario of divided and marginalised new democratic forces did not come true. This is something worth noting. The aforementioned leaders and organisations, understanding the situation, decided to return to the conceptual assumptions of the common goals agreed in 2020. In August of this year, they established the United Transitional Cabinet with an aim to bring together various democratic organisations that share a common goal. The main question that evidently arises with regards to this body is whether it was formed too late? The answer of course can always be that it is better late than never. The leaders of the new elite have also repeatedly said that they are glad that constructive criticism has emerged within the opposition, that there is an “opposition to the opposition” that acts as a normal mechanism in democratic systems. While it is impossible to disagree with such a statement, we should also keep in mind that these forces do not operate in a democratic and competitive system. Therefore, the new elite is faced with the challenge of not repeating the “mistakes of the old opposition” by marginalising its potential inside the country and becoming simply another Belarusian organisation in exile, operating from abroad.

An uncertain future

These issues offer a general outlook of the Belarusian elite from today’s perspective. They show that at the moment the two most active and important actors are the ruling elite and the new elite. While making this statement, I try to refrain from the trap that analysts often fall into when analysing the situation in Belarus. This trap is simply a mismatch between our perceptions and the reality on the ground. And that reality means a country where the status quo of the political system has been preserved.

Keeping this in mind, I  distinguish three major factors that will affect the Belarusian elite in the near future. First, brutal as it may sound, we have to admit that life in Belarus goes on. As stated before, we underestimated the flexibility and adaptability of the ruling elite. Whether we like it or not, it is the group with the most influence in the domestic scene in Belarus, and it is the power elite that still holds all the cards. Second, it is important to keep in mind that political developments, after all, do not take place in a vacuum. For Belarus this means parliamentary and presidential elections in the next few years. No one doubts that the power elite is preparing for them and will do whatever it takes to maintain authority. That is why the new elite cannot ignore these “elections” and must prepare for them accordingly.

Third, we need to think about political life in the post-“constitutional referendum” Belarus. The “referendum” indeed passed somewhat unnoticed, mainly because it was held in February this year when everybody’s attention was on the war in Ukraine. This does not mean that we should no longer follow political developments in Belarus, especially once the stipulations of the “new” constitution take force. In this regard, it is important to pay attention to whether or not this new legal arrangement will indeed lead to the formation of a “controlled” opposition, with the old political parties gradually abolished. Such a scenario would clearly further narrow the possibility of their legal operations. Evidently, the system is moving in this direction. However, earlier speculation that the regime, through constitutional engineering, is preparing the ground for a planned transition of power, is rather unlikely to come true.

The war in Ukraine will be crucial for further developments and the actors that play key roles in them. The future of both the power elite and the new elite may depend on how Belarus manoeuvres between Russia and Ukraine, and especially whether it officially enters the war or not. Given what took place in February 2022, this last question points to great uncertainty indeed.

Maxim Rust is a researcher and assistant professor at the Centre for East European Studies at the University of Warsaw (SEW UW) and a contributing editor with New Eastern Europe. He has a PhD in political science and is an analyst and managing editor of the Analytical Group “BELARUS-UKRAINE-REGION”. Follow him on  Twitter: @maxim_rust.

Alyaksandr Lukashenka, belarus, Belarusian elite, political system