The game of influence in the South Caucasus

Photo: Kober (CC) commons.wikimedia.org

Furthermore, according to predictions by the World Food Programme, the world is facing an incoming global food crisis. Due to the war, Russia might further limit wheat exports as a means of countering sanctions and for its own food security reasons. In that case, the South Caucasus will also be affected as Russia is the main exporter of wheat to those countries, supplying 94 per cent of the total needs of Georgia, 96 per cent of Azerbaijan, and 98 per cent of Armenia.

The war in Ukraine has also affected the foreign policies of the three countries, which are widely influenced by external players․ Although Russia’s main focus is on the war in Ukraine, it does not forget its presence in the South Caucasus, especially at a time when other international actors are trying to strengthen their positions in the region. The geopolitical game in the South Caucasus varies in each country based on relations with Russia.

Is Russia getting Georgia back?

Once a pioneer of successful democratisation reforms among the countries of the Eastern Partnership, today’s Georgia has found itself in a more difficult situation. Indeed, in Georgia at the moment there is an institutional split regarding the position to be adopted on the war in Ukraine. This exists between the government led by the Georgian Dream party and President Salome Zourabichvili. Georgia’s prime minister, Irakli Gharibashvili, decided that the country would not join the sanctions regime against Russia, justifying this through reference to the country’s national interests. This caused significant criticism in Ukraine and Europe and also among Georgian society. Fearing the country’s international isolation, Zourabichvili flew to Europe to try to calm the situation.

This clash takes place in a society that is familiar with Russian aggression and where public opinion largely fears that Georgia could be the next Ukraine. This sentiment is shown in the opinion polls carried out by the Caucasus Research Resource Centre Georgia. These show that the majority of society supports Ukraine (61 per cent) and is in favour of joining the sanctions (66 per cent). A part of Georgian society even demands the resignation of the government as its actions are not in line with the real Georgian dream: Euro-Atlantic integration.

Interestingly, the Georgian government is now walking a tightrope, trying to balance between Russia and the West. On the one hand, Georgia decided to maintain a neutral stance by not joining the sanctions in order not to infuriate Russia and avoid military action. Russian troops, in fact, are still located in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali (South Ossetia). Of course, this poses a threat to the country, which is not militarily ready. Moreover, having seen what happened to Ukraine, Georgia may fear that the timing and type of military support provided by the West may not be enough to save the country from destruction and suffering. On the other hand, Tbilisi showed its willingness to work with the West by joining the vote to expel Russia from the Council of Europe, the UN resolution to condemn Russia, and the International Criminal Court’s investigation of alleged Russian war crimes.

However, it is not an easy game, not least because the European Union has dusted off its so-called “negative conditionality” and denied Georgia candidate status. This denial is not only due to Tbilisi’s decision to maintain a neutral stance but also the leading party’s normalisation process with Moscow. It should be noted that Georgian Dream does possess ties with the Russian leadership. In the end, this normalisation led to more economic connections, which may eventually decide the political course of a developing country like Georgia that needs foreign investments. 

The EU’s decision is naturally a political one: European integration implies certain rules to follow, reforms to implement, and, most importantly, a coherent foreign policy to make. If the assignments are not complete, the EU has a legitimate right to put the integration process on hold. Notwithstanding, the policy of even temporarily “punishing” Georgia is fraught with its own dangers because Tbilisi may gradually become more economically dependent on Russia as data is proving. Indeed, according to Transparency International, in 2022 Georgia’s economic dependence on Russia has increased. Notably, the number of Russian companies registered in Georgia increased to 6,400. In addition, imports from Russia increased by 51 per cent in the first six months of the year. This was driven by oil, which increased by 280 per cent, while exports to Russia decreased by 2.8 per cent. 

Azerbaijani gas matters

Until recently, Russia was using the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as leverage to exert influence over Azerbaijan and Armenia. This situation changed after the war unleashed by Azerbaijan during the pandemic in autumn 2020. During the war, Turkey openly supported Baku and this opened the door to the region for Ankara. With their recent partnership declaration, Azerbaijan and Turkey accepted that they must coordinate their foreign policies. And now Turkey, sometimes through Azerbaijan, is playing “geopolitical chess” with Russia in the South Caucasus, where they may sacrifice some pawns to move into a more advantageous position.

One of the examples of this chess match is that Russia openly shared its position with Turkey in the region, in return acquiring a peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh. Moscow had been seeking this for years against Baku’s opposition. Azerbaijan, backed by Turkey, regularly violates the November 2020 ceasefire in the territories under the mandate of the Russian peacekeepers. This is done to discredit the peacekeeping mission and/or gain an advantage. Remarkably, Russia tries to solve the issue in a diplomatic way, preferring not to have an open confrontation with Turkey. In turn, Turkey is often reciprocal. Ankara is the only NATO member not to join the sanctions and not to close its airspace to Russia. Thus, through the old strategy of bargaining with others’ territories and lives, Russia serves its own interests. Being a strategic partner of Armenia, Russia has halted the war when it found necessary as there was more to gain by sacrificing its partner than supporting it. This includes trade and gas and oil cooperation with Azerbaijan, and avoiding confrontation with Turkey.

Hence, it is not surprising that the headlines about the new EU deal with Azerbaijan did not cause a great stir in the Kremlin. After all, there was an allied declaration signed between Putin and Azerbaijan’s Ilham Aliyev on the eve of the invasion of Ukraine. The declaration implies that the parties will refrain from carrying out any economic activities that will cause “direct or indirect” damage to the other. Indeed, as the British Petroleum (BP) in Azerbaijan website shows, the Russian giant Lukoil possesses a considerable stake in the Azerbaijani energy industry. It currently holds a 25 per cent stake in the Shallow Water Absheron Peninsula exploration project and 19.9 per cent in the main Azerbaijani gas field of Shah Deniz. Thus, both parties are too dependent on the energy industry to openly confront each other.

This might be the reason behind Aliyev’s neutral stance related to the war in Ukraine. He also did not join the sanctions and was even absent from voting in the UN resolutions against Russia. Interestingly, these positions are in line with the fourth clause of the Allied Declaration, according to which Russia and Azerbaijan must maintain equal or similar positions on international issues. In addition, it is worth noting that the actual deal between the EU and Azerbaijan is so small that there is no real competition between Russia and Azerbaijan. According to the EU deal, by 2027 the gas supply should be doubled – reaching 20 billion cubic metres. This is only about six per cent of the supplied gas from Russia in 2021 and only three per cent of the total amount of Europe’s needs.

At the time of the war in Ukraine, the EU has also become more vocal in the South Caucasus. In particular, European Council President Charles Michel tried to mediate between the parties on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict without much success. In search of alternative energy suppliers to replace an authoritarian state like Russia, the EU signed a deal with Azerbaijan, which has even worse indexes of human rights. With this deal, the EU only strengthens the position of autocratic power and its own dependency on authoritarianism.

Is there a real alternative for Armenia?

Armenia is the most vulnerable of the three countries in the region. More war could also greatly affect the country due to its strong economic, energy and military dependence on Russia. This situation only worsened after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the placement of peacekeepers to guarantee the security of Armenians living there. Additional servicemen were also brought into the territory of Armenia to support border protection in its north and south. Turkey and Azerbaijan, taking advantage of the fact that the world’s attention is focused on Ukraine, are trying to make the most of the situation. They are putting pressure on Armenia both to surrender in the struggle for the rights of Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh and to implement the ceasefire clauses according to their interpretation.

In particular, the implementation of the ninth point of the November 2020 ceasefire statement stipulates that transportation channels should be opened between Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Region, thus connecting Azerbaijan and Turkey. The road that is supposed to connect Turkey and Azerbaijan is part of Armenian territory, but both Ankara and Baku are demanding an end to border inspections, going well beyond what was agreed in the 2020 statement.

Meanwhile, Russia proposes deployment of its servicemen on the border officially to protect Armenians. Most probably, however, this is meant to establish its control over the road. In this context, Armenia, although always in favour of unblocking regional channels, cannot accept a proposal that represents a violation of its sovereignty.

Remarkably, Iran has also been active on this issue, categorically opposing the project to create a transportation link between Turkey and Azerbaijan in the strategic border that connects the Islamic Republic with Armenia. The Iranians also fear that if the Erdogan-Aliyev project succeeds, the next target of the ambitious plan to connect all the Turkic peoples will include the northern regions of the Islamic Republic, where 20 million ethnic Azerbaijanis live. That is why, over the months, Tehran has increasingly flexed its muscles, bringing troops to the border and publicly reminding the leaders of Turkey and Russia about its red line: any violation of its direct border with Armenia. In addition, to secure its positions, Tehran has recently expressed its intention to open a consulate in Syunik, an Armenian region bordering both Iran and Azerbaijan. 

The tense situation in Syunik has also attracted the interest of the West and, in particular, of the United States. Notably, US Ambassador to Armenia Lynne Tracy has visited the region several times, sending a clear signal to all parties involved that Washington is closely monitoring the situation. Tracy’s actions follow the visit of CIA Director William Burns to Yerevan on July 15th this year, to understand the state of relations between Yerevan and Moscow after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. He also hoped to get to know Yerevan’s view on recent developments in the region.

The geopolitical turmoil surrounding Armenia poses a dangerous dilemma for the country: to continue to be loyal to Moscow, a strategic partner that often proves inadequate to serve Armenia’s national interests, or to develop alternative relations, at the risk of ending up like Ukraine. Surprisingly, Armenia has recently moved closer to the EU and is also deepening its military partnership with India. This is a big step, considering that Yerevan’s room for manoeuvre is very small. But a real change in foreign policy would require external guarantees. The same ones that, at the moment, no one seems to be willing to offer to Yerevan or Tbilisi. 

Tatevik Hovhannisyan is a political scientist specialising in political communications and civil society affairs. She is a graduate of the College of Europe in Natolin and Yerevan State University. Her areas of interest include EU-Neighbourhood relations, civic participation in developing countries and advocacy.

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia, South Caucasus