The year 2017 marked the 200th anniversary since the first German settlers (mainly Wurttemberg Swabs) showed up in Georgia. A number of factors contributed to this migration. However, Wurttemberg’s internal affairs, such as constant warring conditions, increased taxes and economic hardship, played major roles. Moreover, the increased discontent towards the Lutheran church strengthened religious protests that sent the population searching for new homes. Even though, the Swab presence ended by the hands of those who had originally invited them, and much of its historical remains have been conquered by nature, their legacy continues to capture people’s hearts and minds in Georgia.

Responding to outside criticism, Georgian Dream has blamed the opposition adding to the tension ahead of October's parliamentary election.

Like much of the world, Georgia has experienced the first half of 2020 in a way that could not have been predicted. The ruling Georgian Dream party faced the difficult choice of sparing economic losses or imposing strict regulations to maintain public health. The COVID-19 virus, while largely curtailed in Georgia by decisive action, has left many economic woes in a country that will only be intensified by an imminent election.

This year is shaping up to be unlike anything that could have been anticipated. This was a year that many expected to see dominated by Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union, the Summer Olympics in Tokyo and a highly-contested US presidential election in the autumn. Instead, the first six months saw a global shutdown and subsequent economic and health crisis caused by COVID-19. The country of Georgia, which anticipated ten months of mud-slinging and campaign promises in the run up to its October parliamentary elections, quickly found itself as pre-occupied as the rest of the world with mitigating the effects of the virus.

The Eastern Partnership can boast a list of accomplishments for Georgia and Georgian society. Yet, it seems clear that the Eastern Partnership was never really considered as a path of membership to the European Union. Georgia’s government and civil society now need to focus on what the next steps in European integration should be.

“Georgia has one of the highest EU support in the world,” said EU Ambassador Carl Hartzell in interview for Georgian TV Formula’s “Droeba” programme. The ambassador added that: “About 250 million euros have been allocated for Georgia in the form of grants. These are new grants and new funding. If we talk about rough numbers, the European Union will allocate about 1.5 billion Georgian lari [nearly 415,000 euros] for Georgia”. It has been eleven years since the Eastern Partnership Programme, suggested by Poland and Sweden, was launched. Georgia, as one of the beneficiaries and one of the leaders of the Eastern Partnership programme, showcases more ambition and put great effort towards its European integration. Today, the Eastern Partnership faces new challenges: What will its future be and what will be the new steps in the process of EU integration for these countries? Any decision regarding future challenges remain very important for Georgia.

The Georgian parliament has adopted constitutional changes that have been applauded by their international partners. As a result, the Georgian Dream government might struggle with an even more alienated opposition.

Georgia is in the midst of a hybrid war with Russia. Among the various tools used by the Kremlin, economic pressure has been arguably the most effective strategy that has been directed at Georgia since the 1990s.

Georgia-Russia relations give great insight into the currently fashionable subject of hybrid warfare. Similar to the idea of “fourth generation warfare”, which focuses on blurring the fronts between opposing sides and waging war by means other than head-on military confrontation, hybrid warfare is a more sophisticated way of using all of a country’s available resources to achieve a specific set of geopolitical aims.

Russian disinformation activities in Georgia, a front-runner in the Eastern Partnership, illustrates how Russian propaganda works on a variety of levels. Understanding the Georgian case may provide an insight into how to counter such hybrid activities in the country and elsewhere in the West.

Today, no one argues with the fact that Russian propaganda is a global challenge. Over the past few years we have witnessed how well-structured disinformation campaigns can be used as a tool for achieving certain strategic goals: to shape public opinion, increase political polarisation, influence elections, demonise opponents, undermine state security, boost nihilism and cripple democracy. As the Soviet-born British journalist, author and TV producer Peter Pomerantsev wrote: “The Kremlin weaponises information!”

Twelve years since the August 2008 Russian-Georgian War – when Russia’s aggressive policies divided neighbouring Georgia into different parts – the Kremlin still permanently reminds Georgians of this reality with barbed wire, border-signs, kidnappings and creeping annexation.

In order to describe the occupation lines which separate Georgia from the territories occupied by the Kremlin (Tskhinvali /Abkhazia), we first have to define the very concept of “borderisation”. This is because, just like the “little green men” in Crimea, the process of “borderisation” in Georgia has been managed by the secretive FSB (formerly the KGB), in recent years. Borderisation is the process of installing equipment (fences and barbed wires) on the line of occupation between territory controlled by Tbilisi and the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia (known to Georgia as the Tskhinvali Region), which are de facto controlled by Russian security forces.

Russia’s principal aim towards Georgia is to reverse its Euro-Atlantic integration strategy and return Tbilisi to the Kremlin’s political orbit. One of the main tools to achieve this aim is the use of the Orthodox Church, with the main narrative being that Russia is the last bastion of Christianity and conservative values in the world.

The conflict between Russia and Georgia dates back to 1801 when the Russian Empire annexed the eastern part of Georgia. The country was under the direct rule of the Tsarist regime until May 26th 1918 when Georgia regained its long-awaited independence as a consequence of Russia’s ongoing civil war. Yet Georgia’s democratic republic was short-lived. When the civil war ended in Russia, the Bolsheviks once again subdued the South Caucasus region, including Georgia.

To quell the impact of pro-Kremlin disinformation campaigns ahead of the milestone October parliamentary elections, the government, Facebook and civil society organisations will need to take more proactive measures.

Georgia has been particularly affected by Russian information operations, especially in light of its troubled political relations with Moscow and the country’s generally unabated pro-western course. Over the last few years, large numbers of Kremlin-funded and domestic news websites and social media pages have carried out a massive information offensive against the country, undermining societal trust towards the West, public institutions and civil society organisations. They have been particularly active in the electoral periods, campaigning extensively against liberal values and liberal-minded politicians.

The growth of the far-right in Georgia is a dangerous development and it especially threatens the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Russian soft power appears to have played a role in this process. The question remains whether Georgian authorities have enough power and desire to reverse this worrying trend.

Radicalisation, and in particular far-right radicalisation, is one of the most pressing issues in Georgia today. Recent developments, such as the mobilisation of far-right and conservative groups, have demonstrated the need to strengthen efforts to prevent radicalisation and to raise public awareness of the issue. The rise of the radical right threatens the country's democratic development, its peace and the operation of state institutions.

It is important to understand the philosophy behind Russia’s cyber capabilities since eastern and western actors have a different outlook. Cyber operations conducted from the West are government and military affiliated, while in the East they are mostly non-state players. The point is to have no proven link to a governmental entity allowing for plausible deniability.

I have been researching Russian cyber warfare and intelligence capabilities for more than a decade, and for all that time its significance and soft power was underestimated in Georgia. In order to assess the nature of ongoing Russian cyber operations against Georgia, we should start with the basics to better understand the role of cyber-security in today's global security environment. For decades, the world’s most harmful threats were radical groups, terrorists and criminal organisations, intelligence agencies and military regimes.