How the region struggles to break free from the shadow of conflict. Issue 3/2024 is now available for purchase and download!

The South Caucasus is no stranger to the plight of displaced persons. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, refugees and internally displaced persons have numbered in the hundreds of thousands due to conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Recent geopolitical shifts, such as Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Azerbaijan’s 24-hour military offensive, have reignited concerns about this unresolved issue and the ongoing challenges faced by displaced persons in the region.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 was heralded by many western politicians, academics and others as a largely peaceful event. For many Central Asians and South Caucasians, however, it was far from tranquil. Tajikistan experienced a devastating civil war (1992-97). Georgia fought two wars with Russia over the regions of Abkhazia (1992-93) and South Ossetia (1991-92), while Azerbaijan and Armenia fought a war over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh (1992-94). Both Georgia and Azerbaijan were left with large internally displaced person (IDP) populations, the vast majority of whom are still displaced today.

As Georgia prepares for the 2024 parliamentary elections, it faces challenges that threaten the nation’s already fragile democracy and undermine its pro-European stance. Given the problems of a fragmented opposition, overwhelming public distrust in political parties and the return of the pro-Russian oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili on the political stage, the upcoming elections are expected to be a defining point for Georgia’s democracy and European path.

Georgia, a country whose democratic system has been shaken lately, is now facing a critical test of its democracy as it gears up for the 2024 parliamentary elections. The elections will determine if the Georgian Dream (GD) party stays in power for a fourth term. The upcoming elections have become more important since Georgia received EU candidacy status in 2023. While a significant step towards the country’s Europeanization, candidate status does not formally guarantee EU membership.

After the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, Moscow recognized the independence of the separatist regions of Georgia – Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. After the recognition, Moscow pursued relations with both regions, which Georgia considers to be occupied by Russia, as those with equal states. Moscow took into account the sentiments of the local population and the political elite in the occupied regions, especially in Abkhazia, and refrained from intense pressure. However, after the start of Russia's full-scale military aggression in Ukraine in 2022, Moscow's attitude has changed.

Before the August 2008 war, Moscow formally recognized the territorial integrity of Georgia and refrained from relations with the separatist regions at the official level. It was only after the August war when the situation changed. Russia recognized the independence of both regions, after which Moscow's influence over Sokhumi (the capital of occupied Abkhazia) and Tskhinvali (the capital of the occupied Tskhinvali region) increased in all directions. In particular, the fourth and seventh military bases of the Russian defence ministry and Federal Security Service’s border service were established to ensure the security of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. The budget and economic life of the occupied regions are also completely dependent on Russia.

According to data from 2020, about 225,000 people live in the territory of Abkhazia. Of these, 47,000 are ethnic Georgians and most of them, about 45,000, live in the Gali region. Yet, as of today, no Georgian-language school is functioning in occupied Abkhazia.

Since the beginning of the past school year, teaching in Georgian in Georgian-language schools in Gali (in occupied Abkhazia) has been stopped, and education will now be conducted in Russian. Seventeen-year-old Natia K. is an 11th grade student of one of the schools in the low-lying area of Gali. Since September 1st, she has been taught Georgian as a foreign language at school.

The war in Abkhazia began in August 1992 and lasted for 13 months. By the end of the war, Georgia had 300,000 internally displaced people. Today, Abkhazia is recognized as occupied and the Russian occupation army is stationed there. The people living on both sides of the de facto dividing line are friends and relatives, but now they cannot meet or rarely manage to see each other, as Eliso Shamatava explains through her experiences.

“Eighty-five families live in the village of Khurcha. At least one person from almost each household has emigrated. My son is also gone. He took a gap year at the university and left to work in Poland. We, women living along the dividing line, work. But when we want to sell produce at the Zugdidi market, we are not allowed to take it with us on the municipal bus. We have to hire a taxi. This is how we live here,” says 52-year-old Eliso Shamatava from Khurcha in Georgia, who tells us about the specifics of living along the administrative boundary line.

An interview with Jens Stoltenberg, the Secretary General of NATO. Interviewer: Vazha Tavberidze.

An interview with retired Ambassador Richard Miles, former US ambassador to Georgia. Interviewer: Vazha Tavberidze

VAZHA TAVBERIDZE: Let’s begin with the Rose Revolution as you remember it. From your perspective, what exactly transpired 20 years ago?

RICHARD MILES: Well, it was a very interesting display of – I guess you have to say democracy – because what happened was what the majority of the population wanted. I wouldn't say that it was entirely legal, but I do not think it was exactly illegal either. In fact, the country adapted to the revolutionary changes and the opposition leaders fairly easily. I should point out almost from the start that not all of the opposition leaders were supporting the demonstrations and therefore the Rose Revolution.

It looks likely that Georgia will make a choice between East or West next year. While the government continues to favour stronger links with Russia, the Georgian people still show great support for European integration. The upcoming parliamentary elections will therefore prove pivotal.

Georgia has maintained a policy of neutrality for many years when it comes to the Karabakh conflict. Having acted as a mediator on certain occasions in the past, Tbilisi could now host talks that provide a proper solution to its neighbours’ ongoing dispute.

The latest shift in Georgia's foreign policy, marked by the signing of a strategic agreement with China, raises further concerns about the country’s trajectory towards the European Union and NATO. By engaging more with China, Tbilisi is also helping Russia fulfil its aim to decouple Georgia from the West.

In July 2023, the relationship between Georgia and China grabbed the spotlight of global attention – the two countries decided to elevate their bilateral relations to a strategic partnership and signed a subsequent agreement. Although deepening relations between sovereign states is not out of the ordinary in foreign affairs, critical questions about this particular event are looming over the horizon.

Despite its claims to be willing to implement all the necessary reforms for EU candidacy, the Georgian government’s measures have been slow. Substantial progress has been missing in the areas where strong political will is required. While Georgia is awaiting the European Commission’s recommendation on granting it EU candidate status, much work is yet to be done.

More than a year has passed since Georgia submitted its application to obtain EU candidate status. The announcement followed a similar move by Ukraine in the wake of the Russian aggression, which led to a historic opportunity for other countries which aspired to obtain EU membership. Soon, Moldova demonstrated its interest in applying for candidacy as well.