In a vote marred by irregularities, manipulation and fraud, the Georgian Dream party recently secured its fourth consecutive term in power. The election was quickly dubbed a Russian “special operation” by the opposition. However, the autocratic ways of Georgian Dream are long in the making and a homegrown phenomenon.

After a weekend of turbulent elections, tens of thousands of Georgians flooded the streets of Tbilisi. Opposition leader and President Salomé Zourabichvili claims her country is “the victim of a special operation by Putin”.

EU leaders’ decision to start accession negotiations with Moldova and Ukraine has put the final nail in the coffin of the Eastern Partnership which was never designed to handle enlargement. The time is therefore ripe for a geopolitically more assertive EU to geographically reimagine and thematically widen its Eastern policy. Substituting the obsolete Eastern Partnership for a new Trans-Caspian Partnership could be the solution. In the South Caucasus and Central Asia, the desire to forge closer ties with the EU has increased following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The ruling party in Georgia has continued to pursue policies that threaten both the country’s democracy and westward orientation. This will become a key issue during the upcoming elections, with citizens faced with a choice that will involve more than just rival political parties.

It is clear that Turkey is very keen to be increasingly involved in the South Caucasus region. Its interests in this region are inextricably linked to cooperation with Azerbaijan and numerous transport projects, particularly those that allow for the transportation of energy resources. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the importance of supplying energy from the Caspian Sea to Europe has only become more crucial.

Much has been written about the Turkish involvement in the South Caucasus in 2020, when the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh re-ignited after a period of calming. As expected, Turkey supported Azerbaijan, its close ally. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called on the Armenian government to withdraw from Nagorno-Karabakh and gave assurances that Ankara would support Baku militarily if necessary. There were even rumours that a Turkish F-16 fighter jet shot down an Armenian plane, which was denied by Ankara.

Georgia’s ongoing protests have only further exposed the political divides between state and society. While the Georgian population overwhelmingly backs a European future, citizens will have to chose their next moves carefully during a particularly tense time in wider international affairs.

Last year, Georgia’s government proposed a controversial “foreign agents” law similar to that in Russia. While protests forced the authorities to back down at the time, a renewed attempt has resulted in more demonstrations demanding a European future for the country.

Following the end of the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, it is clear that Armenia is embracing the possibility of Euro-Atlantic integration. While the country still faces many internal and external problems, a desire for closer links is clear at the levels of both state and society.

As Western elections unfold in a politically fragmented environment in 2024, there is a looming risk of the EU overlooking significant political shifts leading up to Georgia’s crucial parliamentary elections on October 26th. Ignoring these developments and omitting the provision of necessary support beyond the soft-power toolbox to the Georgian people could jeopardize Georgia’s hard-fought EU integration process.

A decade after the times of “Caviar Diplomacy” when Azerbaijan would buy up support from the delegates of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), the mood among European politicians has turned a full 180 degrees. The Azerbaijani delegation was excluded from the sessions for a year by a clear majority of the votes for the “persistent violation of norms and standards of the institution” and a lack of cooperation with PACE. Is this the beginning of the end of Baku’s participation in the Council of Europe?

How the region struggles to break free from the shadow of conflict. Issue 3/2024 is now available for purchase and download!

The South Caucasus is no stranger to the plight of displaced persons. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, refugees and internally displaced persons have numbered in the hundreds of thousands due to conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Recent geopolitical shifts, such as Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Azerbaijan’s 24-hour military offensive, have reignited concerns about this unresolved issue and the ongoing challenges faced by displaced persons in the region.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 was heralded by many western politicians, academics and others as a largely peaceful event. For many Central Asians and South Caucasians, however, it was far from tranquil. Tajikistan experienced a devastating civil war (1992-97). Georgia fought two wars with Russia over the regions of Abkhazia (1992-93) and South Ossetia (1991-92), while Azerbaijan and Armenia fought a war over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh (1992-94). Both Georgia and Azerbaijan were left with large internally displaced person (IDP) populations, the vast majority of whom are still displaced today.