Recent unrest in Kazakhstan naturally attracted the attention of a Kremlin administration eager to bolster its position as regional hegemon. Despite this, the event also further revealed Yerevan’s increasing reliance on Moscow.

Whilst Armenia has suffered from many problems since the end of its recent war with Azerbaijan, its experiences with COVID-19 have seemingly been better than many countries. This is despite the fact that various social and institutional factors should have resulted in the opposite outcome.

Connections between the Kremlin and Europe’s far right have become a topic of great debate in recent years. Despite this, the far right’s extensive support for Armenia in last year’s conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh largely went unnoticed by the continent’s media.

Recent clashes along a contested road between Armenia and Azerbaijan have only further revealed the weaknesses of last year’s ceasefire agreement between the two states. Despite this, talks regarding this issue may present a path towards a more durable peace.

Events over the past few weeks have seen relations between Baku and Yerevan once again hit a low point. Now focused on recent military clashes, both sides continue to hold very different perspectives on the Karabakh conflict and its future.

The agreement that ended the 2020 Karabakh War called for transportation links to be put on the geopolitical agenda of the South Caucasus. According to the statement, Armenia should guarantee the security of transport connections between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. However, recent tensions in the Syunik region will likely impact the success of these developments.

The 2020 Karabakh War has caused a significant shift in the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan naturally strengthened its position, while Armenia was plunged into an acute political crisis without any clear solutions. Even the victory of Nikol Pashinyan’s “Civic Contract” party in the June 2021 early Parliamentary elections did not put an end to the domestic instability. Russia and Turkey have also increased their influence in the region. Moscow achieved its crucial goal of deploying troops in Karabakh, while Ankara has sent a clear message that it is now a leading regional powerbroker.

The CSTO has been promoted as a regional counterpart to NATO ever since its creation in 1992. Despite this, the purpose of the organisation remains unclear, with official talk of mutual defence often giving way to unilateral action in a region still dominated by Russia and its military.

Almost two decades after its establishment, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) remains a difficult entity to define. Although often described as a vehicle for Russian foreign policy and a security guarantee for member states, it is anything but clear how the CSTO serves these purposes. Indeed, Moscow has always preferred to act unilaterally in the face of tensions in the vast Eurasian region, while member states repeatedly invoking the organisation's support have never obtained it. Furthermore, the limitations of the CSTO and the lack of clarity about its actual objectives have made it incapable of attracting new member states. Now that NATO's dramatic withdrawal from Afghanistan has been completed, new challenges await Russia and its partners. Is the CSTO ready?

The presence of Russian peacekeepers in the Armenian inhabited part of the Karabakh region and along the Lachin corridor connecting Karabakh Armenians with Armenia remains a contentious issue. Officially tasked with normalising the situation on the frontier after last year’s war, this group has been accused of not supporting the finalising of peace accords between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Journalists in Armenia continue to face a number of challenges. Ranging from high-profile court cases to international tensions, these issues have continued to shape a media landscape that remains fraught with problems.

Azerbaijan’s decade-long balanced foreign policy between Russia and the West took a decisive turn after last year’s war in Nagorno-Karabakh, highlighted by a greater emphasis on military alignment with an increasingly assertive Turkey. Ankara and Baku also came together to shape a nucleus for tripartite configurations with countries in different parts of the globe – Pakistan being an essential one to build a solid international base for supporting Azerbaijan’s cause on the Karabakh issue.

There is no doubt that Nikol Pashinyan was able to connect emotionally with a section of Armenian society. The repetitive use of the slogans “you are all prime ministers”, “you decide your own future”, “it is all the previous regime's fault” has enabled Pashinyan to quickly win the hearts and minds of the Armenian public. While all these tactics certainly helped Pashinyan to win this snap election, his real achievement was to make Armenians forget about the recent war.

In 1945, Winston Churchill showed the world that winning the Second World War was not enough to get re-elected. More than 70 years later, Armenia has taught another lesson. In June 2021 Nikol Pashinyan, who came to power after the 2018 Velvet Revolution, despite a heavy defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh, managed to win in the snap elections and was confirmed as prime minister. With this victory, Pashinyan was able to falsify the long-standing assumption that losing Karabakh means losing power. How was this possible?

Armenia is using the Russia-backed 'self-determination' of Crimea to argue in favour of a similar process for Nagorno-Karabakh. In effect, it strays further away from a peaceful settlement, but draws nearer to its main ally.