The past week marked the worst period for Nagorno-Karabakh, bringing a tragic end to the 30 years of existence of the breakaway state that proclaimed independence in 1991. While not recognised by any other country, Nagorno-Karabakh was backed by Armenia until the government under Nikol Pashinyan recognised it as a part of Azerbaijan after the 2020 war, paving the way for Baku to proceed with its coercive policy of “integration”.

Azerbaijan refers to the 24-hour blitzkrieg as a triumph, which was done quickly and professionally. Having already become crippled and dysfunctional after the 2020 war, the “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic”, which had lost land connection with its long-term patron, Armenia, realised that it had no chance to resist the Azerbaijani advancement and accepted all of Baku’s conditions of surrender.

The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh still remains uncertain three years after the 2020 war. While Azerbaijan has enforced a blockade of the disputed territory, Armenia increasingly fears a renewed conflict. The international community must now act to bring both sides back to the negotiating table.

Azerbaijan’s victory in the 2020 war over Nagorno-Karabakh has not led to any long-term solution to the dispute. This is in part due to the official narratives of Baku, which continue to promote the idea of a total victory on its terms alone.

Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War two and a half years ago created a new security situation in the South Caucasus that raised concerns in certain states. This is particularly true in the case of Iran, which continues to pressure Baku through various means.

An interview with Thomas de Waal, a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe. Interviewers: Adam Reichardt and Agnieszka Widłaszewska

The earthquakes that took place in Turkey on February 6th 2023 caused a massive amount of death and injury. In response, Azerbaijan has made moves to help the Turkish people by supporting them in every way possible. The Azerbaijani assistance has only encouraged greater cooperation, and relations between the two countries have now been taken to the next level.

February 7th 2023 is a day that will forever be etched in the memory of the people of Kahramanmaraş and Hatay in Turkey’s Anatolia region. This was the day when two tragic 7.7 magnitude earthquakes struck the region, causing massive destruction and loss of life. The world watched in horror as images of the devastation and despair filled our screens. At the time of writing, the earthquake has claimed the lives of half a million people in the affected cities. Yet, in the midst of this tragedy, something remarkable happened.

The war in Ukraine has all but turbocharged the inevitable coalescing of both the Russian and Iranian rogue states, which are bound solely by their blatant disregard for the rules-based international order. This reality is of particular relevance to the security of the South Caucasus.

Azerbaijan’s fight to regain control of the disputed Karabakh region has included more than fighting on the frontline. Throughout the three decades between the main Karabakh conflicts, Baku has attempted to use various cultural elements to promote its cause both at home and abroad.

Recent months have seen Azerbaijani protesters appear on the Lachin road leading to the parts of Karabakh controlled by Armenian separatists. While such actions may appear inconsequential at first glance, they are emblematic of a wider standoff that could impact regional peace.

While the world remains focused on the war in Ukraine, an important political game is being played in the South Caucasus. The local states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia now find themselves in rather different positions as external powers attempt to jostle for position in this fractious region.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has destabilised not only Europe but also its neighbourhood and inevitably the South Caucasus. This region already has a complicated geopolitical milieu even without any external triggers. Regardless of the outcome, the war will result in a resentful spillover effect in the three countries of the South Caucasus, as they are connected to Russia through trade, remittances and tourism. The economic sanctions, imposed by the West, have enormously affected the rouble, decreasing the remittances sent from Russia by the Azerbaijani, Armenian and Georgian diasporas. Russia is and will be isolated and this will create difficulties for the nationals of the three countries living there.

Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine in 2022 triggered a reshaping of the entire security architecture in the Black Sea region and the whole of Europe. How does the expert community perceive the changes to regional security? What are the lessons learned for the international and regional actors? What could be done to restore and maintain security in the Black Sea region?