Will China’s facemask diplomacy pay off?

A ceremonial welcome of protective gear (purchased, not granted) from China was organised at Warsaw airport in April. The arrival of the Ukrainian Antonov An-225 was greeted by Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki in a widely publicised symbolic ceremony. Photo: Office of the Prime Minister of Poland’s Flickr page (CC) https://www.flickr.com/photos/premierrp/

Grand shift

Today’s shape and functioning of the world order in general, including Central and Eastern Europe, are determined by a process that can be described as “progressive polycentricity”. This suggests that the unipolar moment – by the phrase in which the late Charles Krauthammer once used to describe the post-Cold War reality that started in the 1990s and was dominated by western powers – is on its way out. It is being replaced by new political and economic arrangements where China, now more powerful than before, plays a major role. As expected, this geopolitical shift has also led to a change in American foreign policy, which dominated world affairs since the end of the Second World War and which has now redirected attention to East and Southeast Asia. This new trajectory was initiated by the Obama Administration, which formulated the US pivot to Asia policy and initiated the Group of Two (China and US). The latter might have been lesser known but it gained widespread currency and scope from experts near the start of the Obama presidency.

The consequences of these two shifts (i.e. China becoming a global player and the US’s recognition of that fact) have affected Central and Eastern Europe directly. First was the sheathing of American military might in Europe – a trend that was only reversed after Russia’s activities against Ukraine and in reaction to the development of Russia’s military power near NATO borders, which led to a greater expansion of Alliance’s activities on its eastern borders. Second, the new order brought the risk of reinstituting a check and roll back mechanism in the region known during the Cold War. The difference between the bilateral post-war world and today is that Russia (and not China, like it was the case before) can now get “rolled back” by the US and China, in exchange for strategic concessions – potentially made at the cost of Central and Eastern European countries.

In the last 30 years China’s potential has changed dramatically, including its relations with both the United States and Russia. The IMF calculated that between 1989 and 2019, China increased its GDP (measured by purchasing power parity) from around one billion US dollars to almost 28 billion US dollars (including Hong Kong). For comparison, the US’s GDP (also measured by the PPP) increased from five billion US dollars to nearly 21.5 billion. In 2019 the nominal GDP of China (together with Hong Kong) was estimated at slightly less than 14.7 billion US dollars, which was around over two-third of the US’s nominal GDP. COVID-19 might make this trend more dynamic. China’s surpassing of Russia has been even more spectacular. In 2019 China’s GDP (measured by the PPP) was more than six times larger than Russia’s. Remarkably, GDP, as good as it is as an indicator, is only one of many determinants of the current American-Chinese rivalry. Other factors include the US trade deficit, China’s purchases of US bonds and foreign direct investments and many others.

Global aspirations

China’s global aspirations were first openly articulated at the time of the Fifth Generation of Chinese Leadership (the current one). These political leaders, who came to power in 2012, also re-oriented China towards Central and Eastern Europe – an unprecedented move. China in the past would only sporadically be involved in the region, limiting its activity mainly to observations – like when Mao Zedong was carefully analysing political changes that took place in Poland and Hungary in 1956. In his interpretation both upheavals were aimed at contesting Soviet domination in the region and fit into the wider context of the then growing split between the People’s Republic of China and the USSR. His successor, Deng Xiaoping, focused his attention on the moderate modifications of the central planning system that were taking place in Central and Eastern Europe. He also got some experience from work of economists from the region. He wanted to use these foreign experiences for reforms at home. The year 1999 drew the attention of the Chinese leadership to Belgrade where the US, as part of the Allied Force operations, bombed the Chinese embassy.

It was in the last couple of decades that an economically reformed China, part of the international trade exchange system, has undergone a deep transformation in the context of its geopolitical engagement. First and foremost, it has changed from the host of foreign investments to becoming a direct investor. This evolution can be presented in sectoral and geographic terms. Chinese companies have moved from investment in infrastructure to investment in the high-tech sector, where they are acquiring or merging with foreign companies. Similarly, the initial engagement in Africa, Asia and Latin America expanded by Chinese presence in European markets, including those in Central and Eastern European states.

17+1

Chinese initiatives in Central and Eastern Europe suggest that the region is of geopolitical and economic importance to the leadership in Beijing. Yet it is treated as a conglomerate, as evidenced by the name 16+1, which was chosen by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the initiative it launched in 2012 to promote Chinese investments in the region. The name of the format was changed to 17+1 after it was joined by Greece. The latter owns Piraeus Harbour, a strategic location of large-scale investments made by the Chinese company COSCO in recent years. Beijing’s goal is to turn the harbour into its gateway to European markets. Indicatively, the 17+1 format does not include Belarus, Moldova or Ukraine. China also does not work with Kosovo which it does not recognise as an independent state.

From the Chinese perspective, this part of Europe is a very distinct area – located on the frontlines and in the context of the EU is on the route used for China’s Belt and Road Initiative, announced by Xi Jinping in 2013. It is important to note, however, that there is an alternative route for Chinese goods reaching European markets which would include combined transport and the use of seaports in Germany and Russia.

Regardless, the US is the main point of reference for China’s foreign policy. Thus it should be seen why it is important for China that some states in Central and Eastern Europe are members of NATO, and that the US is militarily and economically engaged in most of the region. Consequently, it is becoming a potential area of rivalry between China and the US, which could further generate some tension within Euro-Atlantic structures.

The limitation of China in the region is its relatively low potential for power projection. Notably, the first Chinese military vessels only came to the Baltic Sea in 2015 when a Chinese missile destroyer and a missile frigate arrived in Gdynia (Poland). The second time Chinese ships operated on the Baltic was during Russian-Chinese naval exercises called Joint Sea 2017 which overlapped with Donald Trump’s visit to Poland and the G20 Summit in Berlin.

The lack of an alternative to American security guarantees for some NATO states, which feel the threat coming from Russia, force Chinese initiatives, no matter how attractive economically, to always give way to the US-ensured security provision. Thus, it is not surprising that China locates its greatest projects in countries affected by serious internal problems (for example, Greece in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial crisis), those who do not feel threatened by Russia and want to diversify their economic portfolio (for example, Hungary and its “Eastern Wind” doctrine) and those who are contesting US foreign policy (Serbia) or remain in the so-called grey security area (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine).

The history of post-Cold War crises allows us to see two phenomena in regards to China. First, Chinese leadership draws the right conclusions from crises which has allowed them to avoid the mistakes others make. Think of China’s thorough lessons learnt from Soviet reforms and the final collapse of the Soviet Union. Second, China has showed that the experience of downfalls only makes it stronger, as was the case with the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis. Today, the question is how will China come out of the current COVID-19 crisis which is relevant for both its position in the world and engagement in Central and Eastern Europe.

The impact of COVID-19 on Chinese engagement in Eastern and Central Europe was seen in the decision to postpone the 17+1 summit, which was planned for April. The high-level nature of this event was to be ensured by President Xi Jinping being its host, and not the Premier of the State Council – Li Keqiang – as was previously the case. By this gesture, the Chinese leadership wanted to stress that it treats the region as a priority. It was also a meaningful symbol for some countries in the region where earlier enthusiasm towards co-operation with China had faded away. Such was the case in Romania which cancelled a deal it had with China General Nuclear Power Corporation to build nuclear reactors at Cernavodă. The same can be said about Poland or the Baltic states and their attempts to limit the role of Chinese companies in developing the 5G network. The cancelling of the summit does not mean that China has given up on the 17+1 initiative. In May of this year a videoconference was held gathering the national coordinators who co-operate within this framework.

COVID diplomacy

The activities of Chinese diplomats during the pandemic, which is often called “face mask diplomacy” or “corona-diplomacy,” have focused on creating the image of China as a state that is effectively tackling the pandemic and is willing to provide assistance (in the form of expert knowledge and material goods) to other countries. This is true regardless of the fact that, in many cases, foreign states were purchasing supplies to counteract the pandemic, while Chinese humanitarian aid was limited to supplementing them. At the same time, this strategy is also aimed at questioning the ability of the EU and the US to effectively manage the crisis. Zhao Lijian, spokesman for the Chinese foreign ministry, stated already in April that the People’s Republic of China provided medical equipment to 127 countries and that Chinese authorities and firms donated protective gear to more than 100 states, regions and international organisations. In a special report that was published in June by the Information Bureau of the State Council, titled “Fighting COVID-19. China in Action”, it stated that, prior to May 31st, China sent 29 medical expert missions to 27 countries, exported over 700 billion masks, 340 million pieces of protective gear and 225 million test kits. The report, however, did not mention what shipments were commercial supplies and which ones were humanitarian. An important development for Central and Eastern Europe was the organisation of an online expert conference in the 17+1 format which served as a platform for an exchange of experience and ideas in the fight against the pandemic.

Corona-diplomacy has also become an element of a wider strategy for building connections between Chinese and Central and Eastern European expert and academic communities. With this aim in mind, the China-CEEC Think Tanks Network, established by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, organised a closed webinar for experts and academics which focused on co-operation in the 17+1 framework. The China-CEE Institute, an NGO headquartered in Budapest, set up a system of mini-grants (with a maximum budget of 12,000 euro per project). The aim of the programme is “to analyse the 17+1 co-operation framework’s potentials and challenges in the changing international context, especially after COVID-19”.

Symbolism during this period has become an important expression of co-operation. During a ceremony welcoming the arrival of Chinese doctors and medical equipment at Belgrade airport in March, Aleksandar Vučič, the Serbian president, kissed the Chinese national flag. A ceremonial welcome of protective gear (even though purchased, not granted) from China was also organised at Warsaw airport in April. The arrival of the Ukrainian Antonov An-225 was greeted by Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki in a widely publicised symbolic ceremony. Similarly, a plane with Chinese medical goods was awaited by Czech Prime Minister, Andrej Babiš, and Minister of Internal Affairs, Jan Hamáček, in Prague; and President Igor Dodon in Chișinău. Even though the ceremonial nature of the welcoming event at Warsaw airport was more of a reflection of Poland’s internal politics, the positive impact the moment had on China’s image on the country should not be ignored.

Battle for hearts and minds

It is interesting to observe the extent to which global powers engaged in the region tried to use the pandemic to promote their own narratives. The most visible is the conflict of narratives occurring between US/EU and China. Put simply, the Chinese narrative is aimed at building an image of China as a country willing and capable of helping others, one that is effectively fighting against the pandemic. The West is mainly focused on criticising China and blaming it as the cause of the pandemic. The EU’s ineffective communication during this period has become one reason why it was accused of being passive.

A completely different strategy was adopted by Russia which, through its channels, tried to use the pandemic to undermine the credibility of European countries and weaken the trust of their citizens in public institutions. The authors of a report on COVID-19 disinformation, published by the European External Actions Service, pointed to a symbiosis of Russian and Chinese activities and stressed that Russia-controlled communication channels were clearly supporting the Chinese narrative. Admittedly, the COVID-19 pandemic started the process of EU’s antagonising of China, which is something that had not been so clearly visible before. Such a situation is favourable to the US which, unquestionably, wants to have the EU as an ally in its rivalry with an ever more powerful China.

According to a special report, COVID-19 and Europe-China Relations. A country-level analysis, published by the European Think-Tank Network on China, Beijing has been making huge public diplomatic efforts primarily through its network of embassies, to inform Central and Eastern European societies about China’s engagement in fighting COVID-19. This often brings the desired result of more friendly attitudes of local authorities towards Beijing.

The case of the Czech Republic is a special one, however, mainly because of the scandals that were caused by a massive purchase of masks and respirators by the Chinese Embassy in Prague, or the attempts to sell Chinese virus-protection products to the Czech government. Due to the fact that in part they were designated to go to Italy as humanitarian aid, the effect of this action brought the opposite of the desired result. These cases, in combination with reports openly critical of China by Czech intelligence services, have significantly limited the effectiveness of Chinese corona-diplomacy in the country.

Referring to the conflict of narratives, it is worth pointing out to some direct “duels” between American and Chinese ambassadors which took place in the region. For example, the US Ambassador to Romania, Adrian Zuckerman, while commenting for Radio Free Europe on China’s communication strategy, accused the Beijing leadership of spreading disinformation which was immediately countered by the spokesperson of the Chinese Embassy. The latter questioned the thesis that COVID-19 originated in China, pointing to Chinese engagement in fighting the pandemic and expressing his overall disagreement with the position of the US ambassador. Mutual accusations, in the context of the COVID-19, were also the leitmotif of a dispute that took place between the US Ambassador to Poland, Georgette Mosbacher, and her Chinese counterpart, Liu Guangyuan. Similar messages critical of China, can be easily found on social media of other American embassies in the region.

It is still too early to draw any proper conclusions from China’s engagement in Central and Eastern Europe at this moment or predict any future outcomes. Certainly it will be very interesting to see opinion polling which are planned to take place in the next number months. Undoubtedly the more intense efforts undertaken by China during this period prove that the region remains a special interest to Beijing. Therefore, it is reasonable to express some fear in regards to the economic consequences as a result the pandemic, and more Chinese investment and influence in European markets.

If European companies come out of this crisis much weaker, they will become an easy target for Chinese takeovers and mergers. This can be prevented by the European Commission whose competence lies in the functioning of the EU’s internal market. However if it does not undertake, together with EU member states and perspective candidate countries to the community, any attempts to counteract the post-COVID Chinese economic expansion, then the pandemic might prove an important demarcation line in the history of Chinese engagement in Central and Eastern Europe.

Translated by Iwona Reichardt

Jakub Bornio is an assistant professor at the Department of European Studies at the University of Wrocław.

China, coronavirus, COVID-19, geopolitics