A triumphant referendum?

Photo: IvanA (CC) commons.wikimedia.org

Such a high margin of support for the amendments inspired many Russian officials and experts to claim that the Russian people have, once again, given Putin the power to fulfil his role as president (even though there was a whole package of amendments, it was nevertheless obvious, from the beginning, that the key amendment was the resetting of term limits for Putin, or “zeroing” as we call it in Russia). Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s spokesman, did not hesitate to call the result “a triumphant referendum of trust in President Putin”. The chair of the Federation Council’s Committee on Constitutional Legislation and State Building, Andrey Klishas, ​​claimed the Russian Constitution of 2020 was more legitimate than the previous referendum in 1993 when fewer than 33 million people voted for the constitution – this time around it was 57.7 million.

Falling approval

Yet it became obvious that this “triumph” exists only in the speeches of Russian politicians and journalists, aimed at legitimising the current regime in the eyes of Russians and the world. From the beginning, the Russian authorities took all necessary steps to ensure the correct result, including: an information blockade on opponents of the amendments (they were not provided with free air time, while the website of the campaign against the amendments was blocked by Roskomnadzor, the Russian state communications regulator); a ban on mass events adopted amid the coronavirus pandemic; coercion of workers from state and state-affiliated companies; new restrictions for observers and media workers willing to observe procedures in polling stations; massive propaganda in favour for amendments; and, most importantly, the expansion of opportunities for early elections, which opened up even more opportunities for fraud. According to Stanislav Andreychuk, a member of the “Golos” Movement for the Defence of Voters’ Rights: “Almost 60 million people had already taken part in the referendum by the time the main voting day arrived (four-fifths of all those who allegedly put their ballots into the box)”.

All this happened against the backdrop of falling government approval ratings and growing public discontent with the socio-economic situation in the country, aggravated by the coronavirus pandemic, and the actions of the authorities. Discontent is especially noticeable among the Russian youth. According to the Levada Center, Russia’s leading independent polling organisation, 59 per cent of young Russians (under 30) believe the country is heading in the wrong direction. It is noteworthy that in Russia, unlike other countries, the coronavirus did not lead to any “rallying round the flag” effect. In fact, support for authorities decreased in the wake of the pandemic.

The vote on the constitutional amendments also highlighted – and which can hardly be called a triumph – the expansion of socio-demographic groups critical of the Kremlin’s current policy. In previous elections those with higher education levels, higher income and those from larger cities were more inclined to resort to protest voting. Yet in this referendum another unexpected group joined them: the military. Pavel Luzin, an expert on the Russian Armed Forces, found that at a number of polling stations linked to military bases, the percentage of those who voted “no” exceeded not only the nationwide result, but the result of the region where these polling stations were located. But it may not have been the military which is so dissatisfied with the regime. As Luzin notes, “direct vote-rigging at the level of precinct or territorial election commissions in garrisons and closed towns is limited if not absent … so the chances are that the higher percentage of ‘no’ votes (compared to the official national average) among some garrisons and closed towns is not an anomaly. Rather, it could be the result of real voting in the absence of coercion and falsification. Hypothetically speaking, voting at such polling stations can be treated as an indicator of real attitudes towards the constitutional amendments”.

In any case, there is a growing dissatisfaction with the authorities and an increase in protest moods – especially among younger people and in particular regions (e.g. Khabarovsk). Authorities are well aware of these trends. After the new constitutional amendments were passed, a law was adopted which enables elections of any scale to be held within three days. This will open the door for even greater fraud, further complicating public control over the implementation of electoral procedures.

“Another Russia” – Russians living outside Russia

The voting trends of Russians living abroad have always been followed closely. Some observers are trying to find a confirmation that there is “another Russia” that is much more critical of the current government, while others seek confirmation that the Russian diaspora support the power of a “strong hand”. As usual, the truth can be found somewhere in between, but the devil is in the details. On the one hand, if we compare voting on constitutional amendments with voting in the 2018 presidential election, we see that the share of protest voting has increased significantly. In 2018 Putin lost only one polling station abroad, while this time around 69 polling stations abroad have voted against the constitutional changes. At the same time, fewer polling stations were opened abroad – 254 vs 394 in 2018 – due to the coronavirus pandemic. Russians were not allowed to freely travel abroad during the pandemic, so it is safe to assume that these were predominantly Russian citizens residing in foreign countries who voted abroad. Therefore, it is not surprising that significantly fewer people voted at foreign polling stations this year. Yet, given that voters this time were not Russian tourists but Russian residents in foreign countries, this year’s result might be more representative in terms of the electoral preferences of “another Russia”.

On the other hand, the amendments were still supported by the majority of Russians who voted abroad – 68.07 per cent. Polling stations located in post-Soviet countries unsurprisingly showed a high percentage of those voting “yes”, which is largely due to the widespread presence of Russian media there and the supposedly low degree of integration of Russians into the societies of these countries. In Kyiv, for example, the amendments were supported by 67.02 per cent of Russians, in Lviv by 77.42 per cent, in Odesa by 80.99 per cent, and in Kharkiv by 76.19 per cent.

By contrast, many Russians living within the European Union voted against the amendments: 82.04 per cent in Prague, 83.4 per cent in Kraków, 80.49 per cent in London, 77.32 per cent in The Hague, 66.45 per cent in Paris, 67.6 per cent in Berlin. However, there were other polling stations located within the EU where the number of Russians voting in favour of the amendments exceeded the Russian national result. Russians residing in Baltic countries, in particular, showed one of the highest support for the current regime. In the 2018 presidential election, Putin received 85 per cent of Russians voting in Lithuania, 95 per cent in Latvia, and 94 per cent in Estonia. Amendments to the constitution were supported by 92.7 per cent of Russians in Latvia (while the result in polling stations in Daugavpils and Liepāja exceeded 96 per cent); 89.65 per cent in Estonia and by 79 per cent in Lithuania. Russian propagandists use these figures to confirm the thesis that Russians living in the Baltic states allegedly experience oppression in these countries, and therefore can easily be mobilised to support Putin, who is eager to protect them (this narrative of Putin as a defender of compatriots is widespread in Russian media aimed at a Russian speaking audiences outside of Russia).

Diverse community

It is common to portray Russian communities in the Baltic states as a united group, however these communities differ significantly – in terms of numbers (in Latvia and Estonia, Russians make up a significant part of society, while in Lithuania this group is less numerous), in structure (for example, in recent years, Russians, persecuted for political reasons or fearing such persecution, tended to move to Lithuania more often than to Latvia or Estonia), and in attitudes to what is happening in Russia (the main differences we see is not between countries but between different waves of migration – among those who moved from Russia in 21st century, we can find more active opposition to Russia’s authoritarian system).

Vytis Jurkonis, a project director with the Lithuanian branch of Freedom House, emphasises that “there is a desire [in Russia] to show that Baltic countries are quite similar in terms of their policy towards ethnic minorities and the Russian-speaking population in particular. But if you know that the share of Russian speaking people in Estonia and Latvia is about 25 per cent and just five per cent in Lithuania, then it becomes strange to equate them.” Jurkonis also notes that “the degree of integration of Russians in all these countries is different, and this is not only because in the 1990s Lithuania had the luxury of granting citizenship to all people living in the territory of the country. In any case, one should not exaggerate the influence of Russia’s policy towards compatriots – especially in Lithuania”. According to Jurkonis, most Russians living in the Baltic countries are migrants. In Tsarist times quite a few Old Believers moved to Lithuania and neighbouring countries; in Soviet times it was mostly workers who were relocated here. Now we see that journalists and political activists persecuted in Russia move to Lithuania, while in Latvia, for example, the headquarters of the Russian independent media, Meduza, is based there.

While we see that Russian communities in these countries are diverse, the largest diaspora is from Soviet times. Stanislav Andreychuk, a member of the “Golos” movement believes that “some of these people [relocated in Soviet times] failed to properly integrate into the new society and thus may feel nostalgic for Soviet times”. Russian propaganda – both TV (for example, First Baltic Channel, NTV Mir-Baltia, etc.) and numerous online media outlets (like Sputnik) – targets this group directly. The authorities of the Baltic states are well aware of this problem, taking various steps to solve it – such as supporting their own media in Russian language, developing strategies to combat disinformation, and blocking propaganda resources. Lithuania and Latvia recently banned the broadcasts of the state-controlled Russian television network, RT.

It is noteworthy that many of the Russian media outlets operating in these countries during the referendum campaign focused mainly on the social amendments and kept silent on everything related to the redistribution of power and the zeroing of presidential terms. Pro-Kremlin media focused on the amendment of Article 69 of the constitution, which introduces a norm on supporting compatriots abroad and was framed as having the aim to improve the lives of Russians living in the Baltic states. This resonates with the sentiments of some Russians living in the Baltics, particularly those who have failed to integrate.

There is another category that presumably could have supported the amendments: Russians who have benefited economically from the Putin regime. Andreychuk notes that “there are quite a large number of wealthy Russians in these countries. For example, those who have invested in these countries to obtain a residence permit in the EU or simply bought real estate. These people are also more likely to support the regime that gave them an opportunity to earn money – they are in favour of maintaining the status quo.”

Mood of Russians abroad?

It is impossible to assess the real contribution of “newcomers” to the distribution of voting results. Julia Krivonosova, a junior research fellow at Ragnar Nurkse Department of Innovation and Governance with the Tallinn University of Technology, notes that “in recent years, the outflow of specialists from Russia to the Baltic states has increased 3-4 times. In order to understand how this new wave affects the distribution of votes, one could look at a snapshot of the voting results at each polling station over several years. However, voter lists at polling stations abroad are not formed in advance, but during voting day, so there is no way to establish whether newcomers participate in the elections or not.”

At the same time, there is data that indirectly suggest that those who have recently moved outside of Russia do not seek to actively participate in elections. It is known that since 2013, 120,000-150,000 people leave Russia annually, but the number of those who voted abroad did not change that drastically – just 24,300 more Russians voted in 2018 abroad compared to 2012.The practice of voting abroad without prior notice theoretically opens up opportunities for the same person to vote several times in different polling stations. This year a Russian resident of Israel was able to vote three times. First, she voted online, then voted at the Russian Embassy in Tel Aviv, and then at the consulate in Haifa. This leaves some imprint of mistrust on the voting results abroad, although a number of experts believe the elections abroad are held with less falsification than in Russia. Yet according to Andreychuk, “a lot depends on a particular country. For example, in [the breakaway republics of] Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdniestria, a high level of manipulation can be expected. In the Baltic states this is probably a less significant problem.”

All of this raises a question: Are the results from the polling stations in the Baltic states indicative of the mood of Russians living there? The short answer is no. First of all, it is obvious that despite all the statements about a high turnout, this is not entirely true. For example, only 1,221 Russians voted in Lithuania this year, while the Russian Ambassador to Lithuania, Alexander Udaltsov, himself estimated the turnout at nine per cent (at the same time, it should be kept in mind that Russians residing abroad with national/work visas are unlikely to be counted in these statistics, so in reality the turnout may be even lower). Secondly, the results obtained in polling stations in Baltic states show one simple thing – it is easier for the Russian authorities to mobilise supporters abroad than for the opposition, which even inside Russia was split into those who called for voting against amendments and those who called for boycotting the vote. Yet for Kremlin propagandists, who have managed to mobilise some of the Russians living in the Baltics, it is much more fruitful to ignore all the nuances and report on the unconditional support of Russians living abroad.

Olga Irisova is a political analyst and co-founder and editor-in-chief of Riddle (Ridl.io) – an analytical journal on Russian affairs.

constitutional changes, politics, Putin, Russia