Lukashenka’s non-reforms

The most significant thing to come out of the proposed amendments to the Belarusian constitution is the fact that they would allow Lukashenka to further secure his grip on power. Photo: Girts Ragelis / Shutterstock

The most significant thing to come out of these proposed amendments is the fact that they would allow Lukashenka to further secure his grip on power. The changes have specified that an individual can only serve two terms as president, each for five years. However, these restrictions would only apply going forward. This means that Lukashenka could rule until 2035 (when he would be 81 years old). The amendments also suggest legal immunity for the former president.

Peculiar institution

The proposed changes also appear to weaken the parliament – an institution already often referred to as the government’s “fifth wheel”. They also call for a stronger role for the All-Belarus People’s Assembly, which consists of a periodic gathering of loyalists that currently has no legal status. With wide-ranging powers to approve foreign, security and economic policy, the assembly would function as a parallel structure next to the parliament. It would also be given the power to propose changes to the constitution, draft laws and select top court judges and members of the country’s Central Election Commission. A sitting president would automatically become a delegate of the 1200-seat assembly and may act as chair if elected by the other delegates.

The All-Belarus People’s Assembly is a peculiar institution formed not by a simple popular vote, but by the authorities (legislative, executive and judicial branches) and “proper” public organisations. Made up of 1200 people, members will participate in the country’s decision-making processes only very occasionally. Their primary responsibilities will face little disruption. Yet, the assembly will have significant influence with regards to decision-making. It reserves the right to impeach the president, to impose a state of emergency and even to determine the legitimacy of elections. It would also determine the direction of domestic and foreign policy, develop the concept of national security and propose changes to the constitution.

For Lukashenka, these amendments open two possibilities for him to stay in power. He can either be re-elected as president until 2035, or at some point become the chair of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly. In case he decides to leave his current post, his successor’s power will be very tightly controlled by the assembly and, more importantly, its chairman. However, Lukashenka has reserved his decision until 2025. In the meantime, he could use this ambiguity to his advantage during negotiations with Moscow.

For those willing to run for the presidency, the requirements have been tightened in the updated constitution. The minimum age has risen from 35 to 40. The person must have lived in Belarus before the elections for at least 20 years (it used to be ten) and must not have had citizenship, or even a residence permit, of any other country. It also states that a person must not own any other document of a foreign state giving certain benefits. Under this definition, Poland’s Karta Polaka (Pole’s card) – a document confirming a person’s Polish nationality – would also prevent someone from running in Belarusian elections. These changes appear to be aimed directly at opposition members, many of whom were forced into exile to avoid political persecution.

Presidential powers

According to the proposed amendments, the president’s powers have been noticeably thinned out. The head of state will be deprived of the right to appoint six members of the Central Election Commission, the head of the State Control Committee, and the chairmen and members of the country’s highest courts. The president can be impeached not only by the All-Belarus People’s Assembly but also by the electorate, given they collect 150,000 signatures. However, whether or not the president has committed a “serious offence” to warrant such a move will be decided by the country’s Constitutional Court. The assembly will only be able to confirm this decision.

Despite the assembly’s power to reject any of the president’s decisions based on national security concerns, the president’s influence will remain substantial. The president would continue to control the security forces and the executive branch, making it hypothetically possible for the leader to withstand the “checks and balances” of the All-Belarus People’s Assembly.

Some of the amendments seem to be vague and cosmetic in nature. One clause mentions “the preservation of national identity and sovereignty”, as well as “cultural and spiritual traditions”.

Another clause provides that “everyone should show social responsibility, make a feasible contribution to the development of society and the state.” Meanwhile, Minsk must ensure “the preservation of the historical truth and memory of the heroic deed of the Belarusian people during the Great Patriotic War”. The changes also note that “the manifestation of patriotism and the preservation of the historical memory of the heroic past of the Belarusian people are the duty of every citizen.” The proposed amendments specifically clarify marriage as “a union of a woman and a man” and suggest that “family, motherhood, fatherhood and childhood are under the protection of the state.”

The new constitution would also omit the clause that bans Belarusian servicemen from participating in missions abroad. This law has proven to be very useful for Lukashenka. In 2019, the Belarusian president refused to send troops to Syria by referring to the constitution. The new amendments, however, state that military operations abroad “to participate in ensuring collective security and activities to maintain international peace and security” can be initiated at the president’s suggestion.

Where once documents talked of Belarus being a “nuclear-free” and “neutral” state, the new draft of the constitution simply states that the country “excludes military aggression from its territory against other states”. The removal of the old clause is especially worrying, as Lukashenka recently expressed his readiness to host Russian nuclear weapons if NATO moves US bombs from Germany to Eastern Europe. At the same time, this might have been done to simply get on Moscow’s good side.

A new referendum

The issue of a future constitutional referendum in Belarus was likely an important point of discussion during negotiations between Vladimir Putin and Lukashenka in St Petersburg on December 29th 2021 – just two days after the publication of the draft amendments. Belarusian political analyst Valery Karbalevich believes that the constitutional referendum project was started following pressure from the Kremlin. In September 2020, Lukashenka promised Putin that he would begin a transition of power. This happened after Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov gave Belarus an ultimatum: Russia’s support can only continue if Lukashenka resigns.

Instead, Lukashenka has been trying to find ways to maintain power. Certainly, a lot has changed since the country faced widespread unrest in 2020. Firstly, Lukashenka now has the domestic situation under control and protests have been fully suppressed. Secondly, Russia’s own relations with the West have greatly deteriorated. Lukashenka’s readiness to support Putin and provoke the European Union and the United States only plays into the hands of Moscow. Karbalevich believes that Russia is keen to see the referendum in Belarus happen given the current conditions.

The amendments were criticised by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, whose team also proposed draft constitutional amendments at the beginning of 2021. “The regime’s draft constitution doesn’t give Belarusians a real choice. It will let the dictator secure power, control the situation through the artificial All-Belarusian People’s Assembly and avoid prosecution. A new presidential election is the only solution to the crisis,” she wrote on Twitter. She also wrote on her Telegram channel that Belarusians are being given “a choice between Lukashenka or Lukashenka”.

Belarus’s democratic parties refused to entertain the idea of conducting a joint campaign to observe the constitutional referendum. A key issue driving this decision was the persecution of observers and party members during the 2020 presidential elections. The EU has “taken note” of the published draft amendments. However, a European Commission representative recently stated that “national dialogue and fair presidential elections” remain the organisation’s key priorities.

During his 27-year rule, Lukashenka has held three referenda. These involved abolishing limits on presidential terms, amending the constitution, and bringing back Soviet-style state symbols. Last year, he passed a package of repressive laws to further restrict civil rights and the free flow of information in the country.

What is next?

The amendments will be subject to a referendum that is scheduled to take place on February 27th 2022. They will be approved if more than 50 per cent of voters support them. It should be noted that there is also a turnout threshold of 50 per cent. Tsikhanouskaya’s office, as well as Pavel Latushko’s National Anti-Crisis Management organisation, are urging Belarusians to boycott the referendum by crossing out all the answers on their ballots.

History has shown that even controlled “power transitions” can easily get out of hand. The recent mass unrest in Kazakhstan is a prime example. Whilst people might have seemingly taken to the streets to protest against a drastic fuel price hike, the true reasons are much deeper. Indeed, the protesters were responding to larger issues such as inequality and the country’s political system. Chanting “Old man out”, many Kazakhs were furious with the 81-year-old former president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who continued to exert significant influence as “leader of the nation” and head of the country’s security council. The current president of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, forced Nazarbayev to give up his supposedly life-long position within this organisation.

For Lukashenka, these developments might now be encouraging him to think again about any “power transition” in Belarus. Fearing a fate similar to Nazarbayev, Lukashenka might simply want to hold onto the president’s chair. Even now, there is no reason to believe that he will yield even a share of his powers to a successor. A failed “tandemocracy” in Kazakhstan serves as a strong motivation for Belarus’s authoritarian leader to further cement his grip on power.

The significance of Belarus’s proposed constitutional reforms must not be overestimated. This is especially true as the rule of law in Belarusian society faces a great number of challenges. While any kind of structural change can bring an element of shock to the system, the proposed amendments scarcely offer any hope for a real transition of presidential power.

Kathrin Yaromich is a freelance journalist focusing on social issues, human rights, politics and investigative reporting. Her work has appeared in RFE/RL, Bellingcat and Transitions Online.

belarus, Constitutional reform, lukashenka