A regional player?

Robert Golob, Slovenia's prime minister, arrives to the European Political Community summit in Prague 2022. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis / Shutterstock

Regardless of their perception as attractive (or not), these two countries are often unjustifiably treated together and labelled as “former Yugoslavia”. Yet, there is nothing more erroneous than this definition. Slovenia and Croatia are more different than they are similar and this is true not only with regards to their touristic offers or positions on Europe’s vacation map. While explaining the differences between the two states, the Slovenian editor and historian Luka Lisjak Gabrijelčič suggested that their origins date back to the 19th century, when they started to pursue two different development models. These tendencies were further reinforced in the 20th century, mainly because of the different experiences these societies faced during the Second World War and its aftermath, as well as the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Balkan wars in the 1990s.

Green. Active. Healthy

Croatia joined both the Schengen and euro zones on January 1st 2023. As a result, we can say it has eliminated the last tangible differences (border and currency) that distinguished it from Slovenia. On a side note, Slovenia was the first country from the group of states that joined the European Union in 2004 to introduce the euro currency. It also joined the Schengen Zone quite early, in 2007. Thus, when asked about the role of the Croat-Slovenian border in the shaping of relations between the two states, Gabrijelčič points to some similarity with the border that exists between Spain and Portugal.

“It also splits two similar, yet different, nations which have their own languages and cultures, and which historically built two separate societies that have developed in parallel, but separate from one another nonetheless,” he explains. As the tourist season is not fully over at the time of the writing of this article, I will attempt a short analysis also of the different approaches that Slovenia and Croatia have adopted with regards to their tourism development strategies and the large gap that has emerged between them as a result.

There is no doubt that with the largest share of income obtained from tourism among all EU states, Croatia really profits from foreign tourism. In 2019 tourism generated 11 per cent of the country’s GDP, which exceeds other popular tourist destinations like Portugal, Spain or Greece. Slovenia, on the other hand, is in this regard below the EU average: only 4.5 per cent of its GDP is generated by tourism, which is much less than Germany and only slightly more than France. Interestingly, Slovenians make up the largest tourist group visiting Croatia, especially when counted in the number of nights and money spent.

More importantly, Slovenia and Croatia have two very different strategies of tourism development. Thus, while we can say that the Croat approach, represented by the works of its national agency, Hrvatska Turistička Zajednica, has been focused on “quantity” (i.e. the number of tourists), its Slovenian counterpart, Slovenska Turistična Organizacija, has opted for “quality”. Its vision of development is based on the concept of a “boutique country”, which is contrary to the “supermarket” (come and go) tourism model. Slovenia has thus started to focus on attracting tourists who seek something more than “sun and sea”. It now tries to sell its offer through three words: “Green. Active. Healthy”.

A visit to Zagreb

Following the elections in April 2022 the Slovenian political party Svoboda formed a new coalition government and has been ruling the country since. The time it has been in power has shown that the ambition of the authorities is to make Slovenia an active regional player and an intermediary between the Western Balkan states and Central Europe. This means that Slovenia aims at developing closer and deeper cooperation with its southern neighbours, including Croatia. This is not something that is very obvious and relations between the two states have seen both better and worse days, depending on who was in power in either capital.

Slovenian Prime Minister Robert Golob’s first official visit to Croatia took place on July 14th 2023. As expected, his talks with his Croatian counterpart, Prime Minister Andrej Plenković, focused mainly on energy cooperation, illegal migration and the overall situation in the Western Balkans. The topics for discussion also included the nuclear power plant in Krško and the LNG terminal in Krk. In Slovenia it is hoped that the modernisation of the terminal will make it a transit hub for all of Central Europe. Both countries also support the construction of the second Slovenian unit at the electric power plant in Krško, which is located around 20 kilometres from the Croat border and which could provide electric energy also to Croatia, a country that was more dependent on Russian energy sources than Slovenia.

Although it marked Golob’s first official visit to Croatia, the meeting was in fact the third one between the two prime ministers, and as such a continuation of earlier talks which took place in Brdo pri Kranju in late March 2023. The very first meeting of both prime ministers was held much earlier, in August 2022. This took place at the Strategic Forum in Bled, shortly after the swearing in of the new Slovenian government.

Slovenia sees increased cooperation with Croatia as an important method for the better management of migration, which has significantly increased since Croatia joined the Schengen Zone this year. During his visit to Zagreb, Golob reiterated Slovenia’s expectation for the EU’s border agency, Frontex, to help control the border between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is something that Croatia has been refusing to do. Another issue discussed was trans-border cooperation. Its development could, for example, allow residents of Croatian Istria access to emergency medical assistance and hospital care in neighbouring Slovenia.

Most importantly, it seems that the long-time dispute over the borderline along the Dragonja river could finally come to an end. Golob voiced this by saying, “Slovenia and Croatia will remove the arbitration issue from their political agenda to prevent the further worsening of relations between both states.” He was joined in this commitment by the Croat prime minister, however no time framework to achieve this goal has been established yet.

The issue in question is the so-called Hague arbitration of June 29th 2017, which granted Slovenia three quarters of the Gulf of Piran and access to open sea, as well as part of the village of Brezovec by the Mura river and the territories with land ownership split between Croats and Slovenians. In these final areas, Slovenia was more active in developing its power and consequently national economic activity. The arbitration was meant to end the land dispute that was as old as both countries’ independence, which was actually declared on the same day – June 25th 1991. However, while Slovenia has recognised the arbitration decision, Croatia continued to express some reservations towards it.

And a visit to Vienna

Golob’s visit to Zagreb was preceded by another important official trip, namely to Vienna. This trip made in 2022 was in fact the prime minister’s very first visit to Austria. During his stay in Austria’s capital, the Slovenian prime minister did not refrain from publicly criticising the continued controls that the Austrian border guards have been implementing at the border with Slovenia. In his view, these measures were unjustified and non-effective. Thus, Golob’s meeting with the Austrian chancellor, Karl Nehammer, which in the end was described as friendly, concentrated mainly on migration and the interstate border. However, it also involved the topics of energy and the EU integration of the Western Balkans.

On the Austrian side, Nehammer made it clear that the issue of illegal migration was high on his government’s agenda and border controls were seen as a key policy for the country’s security. Since their introduction during the 2015 migration crisis, all subsequent Austrian governments have used rhetoric referring to the need to “stop the Balkan migration trail”. However, even though Austria has indeed been extending the requirement for these controls every six months, it is now ready to consider a different form of oversight, once the number of asylum seekers decreases.

“Should the number of asylum application go down, we can start talking about next steps. We could then decrease border controls, but only if the system works well,” Nehammer said, pointing to an increased pressure that is felt on the Schengen Zone’s external borders.

This statement was criticised by Golob, who rhetorically asked: “Can someone imagine that Slovenia would introduce controls at its borders within the Schengen Zone and apply them to, for example, Austrian tourists who are travelling through Slovenia on route to their vacation destination in Croatia? This is the rationality behind these controls.” With these words uttered at a press conference, Golob questioned the point of border controls. He argued that available data clearly show that these measures do not stop migration. To back his arguments, he said that Slovenia has seen an increase in the number of illegal immigrants since Croatia entered the Schengen zone in 2023. Yet, to reassure the Austrians, he also stated that his country was not planning to suspend the Schengen Agreement but wants to manage migration in other ways. Neighbourly cooperation was mentioned as one of them. Thus, instead of classic border controls, Slovenia now opts for controls over its whole territory.

As stated above, the talks also focused on Austro-Slovenian cooperation in the energy sector, and especially alternative energy sources like the gas obtained from the LNG terminal at Krk island in Croatia. It was planned that this gas would be sent through Slovenia to Austria and Bavaria. Golob warned that such an initiative would require an intervention into the existing gas network. However, it would also reduce Austria’s dependence on Russian gas. For this reason, it was well-received in Vienna.

As Golob also put it in Vienna, Austria and Slovenia are “natural allies in supporting the Western Balkans”. The two countries share the same view on the future of the region and support its EU integration. This may come as somewhat of a surprise given Austria’s record with blocking Bulgaria and Romania from becoming members of the Schengen Zone. Slovenia’s position is different in this regard, which could be interpreted from Golob’s statement about the current state of the EU enlargement process, which he bluntly described as not working. For the Slovenian prime minister, the integration of the Western Balkans with the EU should take place as soon as possible, even though it does not need to mean their full membership.

Another important topic that found its place on the agenda prepared for the meeting with the Austrian chancellor was the Slovenian minority in the Austrian Carinthia region. The situation of this group has entered public debate as a controversial issue, especially after the Austrian youth group affiliated with the right-wing Freedom Party started publishing Facebook posts with calls to “stop Carinthia’s Slovenianisation”. Despite many years of political commitments, the issue of Slovenian-language education in Austrian Carinthia remains inadequately addressed, which is especially true for bilingual kindergarten education as it practically does not work. This situation contrasts sharply with the reality of the Slovenian minority in the neighbouring Italian autonomous province of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, as well as the situations faced by the Hungarian and Italian minorities in Slovenian Prekmurje and Primorska. The rights of these groups are guaranteed by the Slovenian constitution. Thus, before his meeting with Nehammer, the Slovenian prime minister held talks with representatives of the Slovenian minority in Austria and ensured them of his government’s commitment to support their rights in Austria.

All said, Golob’s visit to Zagreb, which took place following his earlier trip to Vienna, was thus interpreted as a natural step in Slovenia’s policy to become an important regional player and power broker between Austria (but also Germany) and other countries in the region, especially Croatia.

Challenges of migration

Slovenia’s aspirations are quite justified, especially economically. Seen from a regional but also European perspective, the Slovenian economy exceeds not only other countries of the former Yugoslavia but also some states in Central and Eastern Europe, which joined the European Union in 2004, 2007 or 2011. In terms of GDP per capita, Slovenia remains the wealthiest country in the group of all “new EU” states and shows higher economic growth than some “older” EU members, including Spain, Portugal and Greece. It is also one of the only states in this group which shows positive demographic trends.

At the same time, to continue its growth Slovenia has started to increasingly rely on a foreign labour force. And while this trend has been present since the beginning of Slovenia’s independence, the composition of this group of workers has changed overtime. While in the beginning foreign workers employed in Slovenia were mostly people from other states of former Yugoslavia, now this group is much more diverse. Data from 2022 show that Slovenia had over 48,000 foreign workers come from at least 43 countries. The majority of them indeed came from the states of former Yugoslavia: almost half of them were from Bosnia and Herzegovina, followed by Kosovo (almost 15,000) and Serbia (over 5,000). In addition, work permits were also granted to (Northern) Macedonians, Turks, Russians, Montenegrins and Chinese, as well as migrants from India, Albania, Bangladesh, Belarus, Nepal and Ukraine.

This new migration clearly has an effect on Slovenia’s public services and especially its education system, which has not been entirely prepared for it. Until recently it was actually believed that the foreigners who live in Slovenia have, at least to some extent, some command of the Slovenian language (even if passive) because it resembles other South Slavic languages. This approach has been outdated for quite some time now, and especially since the fastest growing group of migrants in Slovenia is now constituted by workers from Kosovo and the Albanian minority in North Macedonia. Research shows that these people usually only speak their own native language and have limited knowledge of Serbian or Macedonian, which does not make it much easier to learn the Slovenian language.

War in Ukraine and NATO

On top of everything, Slovenians are now seeing another wave of migrants who are coming to their country from Ukraine and, surprisingly, Russia. These are now the fastest growing groups of migrants, especially when we take into account the number of children signed up for Slovenian public schools (both primary and secondary). For Russians, Slovenia was an attractive and safe location for capital even before the outbreak of the full-scale invasion in Ukraine, but since February 2022 this tendency has only grown.

When it comes to the war in Ukraine, Slovenian society is split. While the majority indeed support Ukraine’s fight against Russia and condemn the wrongdoings of the Putin regime, a not so small part of the society perceives the war as one that is being waged between the West and Russia. As such, it is a conflict that is better avoided. In fact, the outbreak of the full-scale invasion in Ukraine served almost as a spark for anti-American sentiment that emerged from below the surface in almost all states of former Yugoslavia. Yet, while in Serbia these sentiments are known and in a way understandable, in Slovenia (and even more in Croatia) they are not so easily explainable, although increasingly growing in popularity. They are especially seen among the anti-vaccine and extreme left movements.

A good illustration of this mood is found in opinion polls which show the level of NATO support in Slovenia. Before the last NATO summit in Vilnius, the country’s support was the lowest among all NATO members. One opinion poll carried out in April and May this year and published before the July summit showed that Slovenians were more sceptical than any other nation when it comes to different aspects of their NATO membership or NATO policy towards the war in Ukraine. While in all member states over half of respondents confirmed that they would vote for membership in the Alliance should there be a repeated referendum in their country, Slovenia recorded the second lowest percentage of such responses (56 per cent). This was only higher than Bulgaria. Also, when compared to the 2022 opinion poll on the same subject, the share of Slovenian respondents who expressed support towards NATO membership has gone down by six per cent, while the number of respondents who wanted to leave the Alliance remains steady at 30 per cent. At the same time, the number of people who did not answer this question has increased by five per cent. What is more worrisome is the fact that less than half of Slovenians think that their country should defend another NATO member state if attacked.

Another surprising trend that has come to the surface recently shows that a mere 30 per cent of Slovenians trust media reports on the Russian invasion in Ukraine, while a high 67 per cent do not trust media coverage of this conflict. This stands in large contrast to other European countries, where the highest trust rate was noted in Finland (83 per cent) and only three countries (Hungary, Greece and Bulgaria) recorded lower trust than Slovenia. These data become less surprising when put together with the 2022 Freedom of the Press Worldwide ranking, which showed that Greece and Slovenia had recorded the biggest fall in media freedom in the region.

A distant war

Where does this scepticism come from? Surely, it has many sources and they all require a separate and thorough analysis. First, it needs to be said that in Slovenia the population feel almost no threat of Russian aggression in the country. This makes the experience of the current war waged against Ukraine similar to that which was felt by Central Europeans in the 1990s with regards to the war in the Balkans. A war that is distant and far away from home. In this way, the Slovenians resemble the Italians or the French more than they do the Czechs or the Poles.

Second, Slovenia lacks historical experiences (including negative ones) related to Russia or the Soviet Union. Instead, there are more abstract pan-Slavic ideas, which were promoted by the Slovenian national movement at the time of the Habsburg Empire and which are still deeply rooted in the thinking of Slovenian society.

 Put together, these factors allow many Slovenians to indulge in a seemingly philosophical approach, reflecting over the causes of this war in “global” terms far away from its everyday brutal reality. This of course is not tantamount to a lack of empathy towards the Ukrainian fight, which explains the current government’s continued support, also militarily, to Kyiv.

As a matter of fact, when it comes to supporting Ukraine there has been no departure from the policy that was started by the previous government led by Janez Janša and followed by the current prime minister, Robert Golob, who uttered strong words during his visit to Bucha in 2022 which are still remembered in both Ukraine and Slovenia today. In his speech delivered in Ukrainian, the Slovenian prime minister quoted the Ukrainian anthem and said: “now we are all with you the ‘brethren of the Cossack people’ and let us together do everything to ensure that you will be able to ‘govern in your own state’”.

Even though Russia is getting weaker in the Balkans, even in its traditional bastions like Serbia or Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the narratives about “traditional values” or anti-American rhetoric are increasingly growing in many of the region’s societies. The spread of these narratives obviously contributes to greater polarisation expressed in large social and political divisions. As a result, local politicians, be it in Ljubljana or Skopje, eagerly exploit such sensitive issues as migration, energy security, inflation, political instability (especially in Montenegro and North Macedonia), frozen ethnic conflicts, Kosovar-Serbian relations, relations between Banja Luka and Sarajevo, EU integration fatigue, etc.

Three decades ago, in the early phase of its independence, Slovenia managed to quickly and painlessly transform from a Yugoslav republic into an independent state. The price for this transition was relatively low and took the form of the Ten-Day War, which lasted from June 27th to July 7th 1991. Compared to what took place in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and in the end also in North Macedonia following an attempted military coup organised by local Albanians in 2001, Slovenia has indeed turned itself into a “success story” and a peaceful oasis. This has convinced its people that the problems of the “South” are not their problems and that they can afford to keep their distance from what is going on in other former Yugoslav states. That is why Slovenia’s current ambition to become a regional player will depend not only on the activities of the government and its recognition of power arrangements in neighbouring states, but first and foremost on the regional effects of the current war that Russia is waging in Ukraine. This is despite the fact that for the majority of Slovenians this conflict seems to be distant from their homes.

Nikodem Szczygłowski is a writer, essayist, translator and traveller. He is fluent in English, Lithuanian, Slovenian, Ukrainian and other languages. He is a recipient of the award for achievements in journalism from the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Lithuania and a graduate of Mediterranean Archaeology at the University of Łódź. He also holds an MBA from the Central European Management Institute in Prague.

Austria, Balkans, Croatia, European Union, Slovenia, Ukraine