Neo-totalitarianism as a new political reality in Belarus

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It also resulted in the restriction, or complete destruction, of democratic participation and the elimination of people’s autonomy in the political process. By 2022, the Belarusian system of state power has reached the level of absolute control, while the regime adopted a model which we call neo-totalitarian.

(Neo)totalitarianism

The definition of (neo)totalitarianism refers to the form of the highest political supervision by the state over its institutions and social groups. It is aimed at strengthening the existing power structure through the elimination of internal threats. This can be achieved with legal (from the point of view of those in power) and illegal tools. These instruments can range from court hearings to direct physical violence applied by state structures against citizens or social groups that are perceived as threats to the regime.

(Neo)totalitarian supervision is also inclined to a long-term policy of ideological expansion and information control. It thus envisions the dismantling of non-governmental organisations and opts for the maximum restriction of civil liberties. In line with these assumptions, the Belarusian regime has embarked on the process of eliminating all kinds of civic activities that it perceives to be unfavourable to the legitimacy and stabilisation of the political system. This process, in turn, has led to a visible simplification of political life and social reality. In other words, the fewer social and political activities or initiatives that are organised, the easier it is to exert control over political life. In this situation, it is also easier for the regime to steer the society towards a preferred type of political behaviour and emotions. 

Belarus’s fast transformation in the (neo)totalitarian direction can be also explained by the course of the most recent crisis (first electoral, then political). It started during the 2020 presidential elections, when it became evident that Lukashenka decided to forge the results of the vote. This crisis, which started with mass mobilisation and protests, clearly showed that there is a real threat to Lukashenka’s power. The response of the regime at that time was to apply military methods against those who opposed it.

The militarisation of politics which took place in the aftermath of the August 2020 elections marked the beginning of a transition towards the new political model. By then, it was already clear that with the high level of social discontent the regime could no longer rely on its earlier semi-democratic mechanisms. Lukashenka knew all too well that the only way to keep the situation under control was to engage with the repressive security apparatus and use violence against those who protest. These new methods of state control over society were eventually legalised by the referendum organised on February 27th 2022.

It is evident that despite the repressions and widespread terror, Lukashenka is a weak leader and there is a deep disconnect between society and the state. This is also why he opted for a systemic restructuring of the state and its institutions. However, practice shows that authoritarian systems, despite their reliance on force, repressions and forgeries, need some form of social support. It is said that the level of guaranteed support should equal around 30 to 40 per cent of voters. In addition, they need devoted loyalists in the state’s bureaucratic and security apparatus.

Façade democracy and hybrid practices

Under Lukashenka, Belarus has seen a number of crises which have made a serious impact on the structure and functions of its political system. Almost all the presidential elections that took place in Belarus in this century (2001, 2006, 2010) were accompanied by protests against vote fraud. The reaction of the authorities has always been repressions against the participants and civil society at large. The noose around non-governmental organisations and the opposition as a whole was tightened as a result. These actions were followed by an increase in the politicisation and “ideologisation” of the education system, as well as greater control of labour unions and restrictions on independent media and the information space.

Throughout almost the whole period of Lukashenka’s presidency, the majority of society remained indifferent to politics, also treating the opposition with great distrust. The crises that occurred in reaction to subsequent elections did not seriously affect Lukashenka’s position nor the integrity of the system. Therefore, the regime did not need to abandon its “democratic tools” and continued to pursue the so-called façade democracy. The lack of systemic change also allowed Minsk to avoid pursuing repressions and state terror. Once the crises were over, a return to some form of hybrid practices was possible. 

Thanks to these few elements of democracy, even if they were used for propaganda and manipulation purposes, a bit of freedom and autonomy was afforded to civil society. Also faced with a favourable geopolitical context, the Belarusian regime was soon described as “authoritarianism with a human face”. Thanks to all this and the myth that Lukashenka is the guarantor of the country’s stability and independence, the regime was allowed to engage in dialogue with the West.

These aforementioned democratic elements of Lukashenka’s authoritarian rule not only served as a basis for the legitimacy of his power but also gave the illusion that political participation and justice were present in Belarus. This allowed for the model of façade democracy to become rooted in the system for a long time. It allowed opposition parties to operate and participate in elections at all levels even though it is also true that they were used by the authorities as part of their political manipulation. Such was the case with Tatsiana Korotkevich, the pseudo-opposition candidate with the “Tell the Truth” organisation, who participated in the 2015 presidential elections.

In the country’s façade democracy, civil society organisations were allowed to operate alongside some independent media outlets (for example Radio Svaboda, European Radio for Belarus, Belsat, the opposition publishing houses Narodnaya Volya and Nasha Niva, etc.), which even enjoyed some degree of editorial freedom. There was unregulated access to various alternative internet-based resources, especially the website Tut.by , which was an online publication that did not necessarily position itself as an opposition medium but which, nonetheless, played an important role during the last political crisis, especially in its early phase. Blogs were another form of online activity that proved effective in the consolidation and coordination of protests. There was some freedom in the area of culture and ideas as well as some degree of pluralism in political and ideological debates. As a result, we had Lukashenka’s Soviet  ideology, a pro-Russian (that of the “Russian world”) outlook and the national-democratic  discourse of the opposition. Finally, but also importantly, some degree of private initiative in the economic sphere was  permitted.

An unprecedented year

As argued above, until 2020, despite the obvious political and ideological control of the state, there was some degree of freedom in Belarus. This was especially true with regards to the circulation of alternative information. As a result, opposition politicians could be heard by society and could even access, albeit unsuccessfully, the procedures of the “façade democracy”. Additionally, in crisis situations, such as the spring and summer of 2020, all of these instruments and processes allowed for a fairly rapid mobilisation of society against the regime. As such, they led to the destabilisation of the entire system.

In fact, the 2020 protests and crisis differed significantly from all previous ones for many reasons. First, the political activity that was observed in Belarus in 2020 went beyond the boundaries of an exclusively “opposition electorate”. Second, the protests were a result of rapid politicisation and the involvement of a large part of society in political events. Third, political activity and mobilisation moved outside Minsk and reached peripheral localities. Fourth, mass protests took place in many cities throughout Belarus. Fifth, broad support for opposition candidates was visible at every stage of the election process: registration, signature collection and voting. Sixth, the ideological sphere of the state eventually started to disintegrate following open criticism of the regime by reputable religious organisations. Last but not least, the bureaucracy and power apparatus also began to disintegrate as a result of disloyalty, sabotage or simply the outflow of personnel.

Thus, the large shift that had taken place within Belarusian society that illustrated its high demand for change, on the one hand, and the loss of Lukashenka’s broad support, on the other hand, led the ruling elite to reach the conclusion that it can no longer operate in the same conditions. Its survival now required a complete rejection of any (including façade) forms of democratic participation and autonomy within civil society. Serious restructuring was thus necessary to ensure that the regime maintained overall control of the state. To achieve this, it would have to apply repressions to counter any form of anti-system civic activity.

Many institutions created during the 28 years of Lukashenka’s rule were meant to support and cement the political system. They included agencies of the bureaucratic and repressive state apparatus, the so-called ideological and political “vertical”, many pro-government organisations and the state’s entire system of indoctrination. Altogether, they allowed for a rapid defence against the crisis in 2020 and subsequent restructuring and readjustment of the state. Needless to say, the Russian Federation played an important role in this process. An assessment of the Kremlin’s role and influence in Belarus’s political crises is worth an article in its own right.

Terror and repressions

All non-democratic regimes rely on methods of violence and repressions against political opponents and critical citizens. Lukashenka’s regime is no different in this regard. It also resorts to repressions during political crises, however before 2020 they were not on a scale that we are seeing now. In fact, we can say that from 2020 to 2022 the functioning of Lukashenka’s regime was almost entirely based on the implementation of repressive practices against citizens. Looking to the future, we can also say that all available indicators suggest that the authorities have no intentions of abandoning their current policy of terror. 

Matter-of-factly, terror and repression have become the key instruments of domestic policy in Belarus. This is evidenced both by the functioning of the repressive state and security structures, which use all available resources to destroy the political opposition, and the further restrictions within criminal and administrative legislation. The purpose of these new laws is to create a formal basis for the implementation of repressions. As a result, a large infrastructure of terror has already been created in Belarus. This includes the state security committee, the ministry of internal affairs (the main directorate for combating organised crime and corruption), the prosecutor general’s office and the investigative committee. The goal of these institutions is to eliminate all political threats. In addition, a network of provocateurs and informants has been created and is actively involved in identifying and eliminating all kinds of threats to the regime.

The widespread political terror is designed to ensure the following: an atmosphere of fear in society in order to prevent the potential mobilisation of citizens; stop certain groups and individuals from undertaking political and intellectual activities through arrests and demonstrative long-term imprisonment; push out the passionate part of the population, which grew in number in 2020, and which constitutes a threat to the regime also beyond the state borders; and create an information vacuum to isolate society through the destruction of the internet, which is the main tool of internal communication and societal mobilisation. Here the point is not only to block and take down websites and online publications, but also to control the use of information. Restrictions also help to consolidate the bureaucracy and law enforcement apparatus through the identification and elimination of disloyal employees.

“Re-ideologisation”

The direct result of the introduced policy of state terror is the consolidation of the political space. If earlier the regime allowed for the existence of some form of civil society to show its “managed democracy” in action, in the current (neo)totalitarian system there is no place for such elements. The (neo)totalitarian system allows for the existence of only those political actors who strengthen it. It is also worth noting the changes which are taking place within the system itself. Specifically, we can now observe a profound psychological and mental transformation among all representatives of the power structure. This is translating into a complete abandonment of basic moral norms, as we can see in their direct calls to murder political opponents. These calls for violence are also evidenced in the unmotivated destruction of people’s premises and living spaces.

Another element that clearly serves the consolidation of totalitarian practices is the intensified process of re-ideologisation in political and public institutions. The term re-ideologisation refers to the formation of a unified information and ideological space within society, as well as forcing citizens to accept the official interpretation of both historical facts and current events in Belarus and the world. Examples of this process include the authorities’ attempts to destroy all alternative sources of information, ideas and organisations. Thus, along with journalists and politicians, victims of repressions also include the intellectual elite. In this way, Lukashenka’s regime seeks not only to achieve an information monopoly, but also the complete control of thought in order to hinder the process of building a new ideological system.

Through this intensive process of re-ideologisation, the regime is attempting the following: to provide a theoretical base for the new political system and create a need for maintaining order; introduce an ideological compass for the ruling elite and bureaucrats; rebuild Lukashenka’s image as the protector of the country and its people; recharge the ideological vertical by including the education system within the indoctrination strategy; and create a new group of the so-called “state-people” (referring to state functionaries, employees of militia units, state employees, teachers and others) who work directly for Minsk. Speaking about institutional changes in the country, it is necessary to understand that neither the policy of repressions nor the reformatting of the system would have been possible without a certain amount of loyalty among a considerable part of the population. These people continue to serve the state apparatus and have joined the process of establishing the new system. All said, it should be noted that at the moment the political system in Belarus is in the process of reformatting. New institutions and mechanisms, as well as forms of management that will serve the stability of the regime, are being used to achieve this. The war in Ukraine has contributed to the acceleration of this process, but also generated some new threats to Lukashenka’s regime. This, in turn, is leading to the tightening of an already extremely limited number of freedoms. 

Pavel Usov is a Belarusian political analyst and expert specialising in the study of authoritarian regimes, their modification and transformation. He is the author of the book The forming, consolidation and functioning of the neo-authoritarian regime in Belarus. He is a member of the Analytical Group “BELARUS-UKRAINE-REGION” established by the Centre for East European Studies of the University of Warsaw.

belarus, mobilistion, Soviet Union, totalitarianism