The Eastern Partnership enters a new decade

Ursula von der Leyen / On March 19th the European Commission presented its vision titled “Reinforcing Resilience – an Eastern Partnership that delivers for all”. Photo: (CC) European Commission

. While the 2019 celebrations concluded on a note that the Eastern Partnership had been a success, bringing numerous benefits to all six countries and the EU, there was also a general agreement on the need for strategic reflection and new ways forward beyond 2020.

This need was further highlighted by the crisis in Belarus, which caused additional problems for the EU’s goals in the Eastern neighbourhood and somehow also undermined the Eastern Partnership. Unfortunately, to find common ground and a sufficient compromise that would suit not only the EU27, but also the eastern partners, proved to be even more complicated than originally expected.

Looking for a new agenda

During the summer and autumn of 2019, the EU’s Eastern policy went through a complex reflection and revision process organised by the European Commission which allowed all stakeholders to brainstorm about the future of the EaP beyond 2020. This was not due to the change of power in Brussels after the 2019 European Parliament elections, but mainly because the EaP’s reform agenda of 20 points for 2020 was soon to expire. Apart from that, 2020 represented another milestone for the associated countries and their bilateral relations with the EU and reflected the moment when mutual obligations, as part of the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA), should be delivered and updated. This is particularly the case for Ukraine, but also to some degree for Georgia and Moldova.

Several months of collecting feedback and determining the consensus among the EU member states, partner countries, EU institutions, as well as the expert community and civil society, talks finally concluded in the spring of this year. On March 19ththe European Commission presented its vision titled “Reinforcing Resilience – an Eastern Partnership that delivers for all”. In addition to a strong emphasis on the economy and concrete benefits for the citizens of Eastern Europe, the Commission also set out new priorities for digitalisation and combating climate change. The EU’s executive also came up with a new approach for promoting societal resilience in six Eastern European countries that should be better prepared to resist domestic and external shocks in the future. On the other hand, it acknowledged weak progress on the rule of law, the fight against corruption and good governance, which it promised to amend by closer monitoring and the incentivisation of reform implementation in these challenging areas.

At the same time, the Commission refused to engage in a highly political debate regarding closer political association or any kind of comprehensive vision for the region in the future due to a lack of consensus on the membership of Eastern European countries in the EU. It also did not acknowledge efforts to further differentiate between the EaP countries and gave strong preferential treatment to the three associated countries of the EU: Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. These issues were left for the European Parliament, the EU members and the EaP countries themselves to negotiate and decide before the next high-level summit of the EaP, which was supposed to take place in mid-June 2020 at the very end of the Croatian presidency of the European Council.

Due to the lack of response to some of the fundamental questions related to the future of the EaP, some actors shared their criticism of the Commission’s approach. This was particularly the case given the low emphasis on the fundamentals of co-operation and European values, which constituted the overall framework in the past. In the Commission’s communication, the principles of democracy and human rights, the rule of law and the fight against corruption, the support for independent media, and civil society were mixed in between finance and banking operations, or in the new domain of public health protection, without significant hierarchy on the list of Commission’s priorities. This might not come as a complete surprise, given the Commission’s emphasis on pragmatism in international relations based on the 2016 EU’s Global Strategy, but it became a subject of criticism from some member states anyway. Others, particularly members of the European Parliament, lambasted the Commission’s unwillingness to promote further differentiation and move relations with three associated countries to a higher level, as Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova requested.

The European Parliament, on its own, took time to reflect on the future of the EaP, but then resolutely supported both of the contested issues of deeper economic integration and closer political association. Referring to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, it called for proper guidance and further steps for the associated countries and their reform processes and proposed inclusion for observers from the associated countries in the activities of the Commission and the Council, as well as an emphasis on the core values of the EU in mutual relations or security concerns. It recommended the inclusion of the associated countries in selected EU agencies and intra-EU programmes and initiatives, as well as sectoral integration in the Energy Union, Transport Community, and the Digital Single Market.

Resilience to current challenges

When assessing the current state of the Eastern Partnership and the individual countries, it is useful to apply the logic of resilience, which the EU sees “in the areas of democracy, society, economy, energy, security, cyber, media, environment, health, notably in the context of the current COVID-19 pandemic, and human security”. The crisis of public health caused by COVID-19 has exposed numerous vulnerabilities in partner countries (and the EU) to domestic and external threats. The region has seen many old problems to become more exposed and worsened by the emergency.

In Azerbaijan and Belarus, for example, local regimes cracked down on political opposition, as well as civil society and independent media who were blamed for causing the pandemic. Dozens were jailed in administrative detentions, repressed financially or by other means. This authoritarian tendency was further bolstered after the August 9th presidential election in Belarus, when Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime cracked down on the peaceful demonstrators and suppressed the democratic and fundamental rights of its citizens. Other countries, such as Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine, have a higher degree of social cohesion and co-operation between the state and its citizens, including civil society. Yet even there, local elites could not miss the opportunity to strengthen their positions and power over citizens, as well as take the credit for economic redistribution and providing their citizens with basic means of protection.

This was especially true in four out of the six Eastern European states which are supposed to hold presidential or parliamentary (in Ukraine, local) elections over the next several months. Moldova has recorded a high level of societal tension and polarisation before the crucial presidential election, not least due to miscommunication and chaos in society. Moldova alone has witnessed an escalation in relations with medical personnel  – who have criticised the government for a lack of preparedness to face the crisis – as well as other conflicts surrounding freedom of speech and the government’s negotiations for a loan from Russia.

To further add to the pile of domestic challenges, EaP countries continue to face problems with separatism and parastates which are not operating under the jurisdiction of the six partner countries. While the situation of the self-proclaimed people’s republics in Donetsk and Luhansk proved immensely complicated, the relative isolation of Crimea made the spread of the disease in the peninsula also hard to tackle. In Nagorno-Karabakh, we have first witnessed a complete isolation of the local population and a lack of support from the international community. Later, since the end of September 2020, there was the complete breakdown of the ceasefire and the largest level of hostilities during the full-fledge war between Armenia and Azerbaijan since 1994. On the other hand, experts have identified Georgia’s approach to Abkhazia as exemplary, since it allowed the local population to enjoy the benefits of co-operation with international organisations such as the World Health Organisation. The consequences of disinformation surrounding the pandemic, further exacerbated by Russian propaganda, presented another regional challenge as they continue to sow social mistrust and increase the divide between the state, its institutions and citizens.

The economic crisis hit EaP countries with small, open economies (except for Ukraine) particularly hard. Georgia had been the most affected of the six countries, with a 10.2 per cent decline in GDP, according to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Georgia has paid a high price for its early and efficient start of the pandemic, which protected many lives but crippled the economy. Armenia, Ukraine and Moldova reported around eight per cent decrease in GDP, while Belarus and Azerbaijan reported a 6.2 and 5.4 per cent decrease respectively.

On the other hand, citizens showed immense resilience towards these domestic and external shocks and could mediate the most severe implications of the pandemic. In Armenia, citizens managed to raise a significant amount of money for state authorities to implement the necessary measures and to provide protection to the most vulnerable groups in society. In Ukraine, the co-operation between civil society and the local business community managed to mobilise resources, provide medical equipment and help the elderly and sick. Belarusian civil society has for its part completely supplemented the state in raising public awareness, mobilising resources, as well as buying and creating personal protection equipment, including face masks.

Armenian and Georgian civil societies also delivered assistance to their citizens and offered their expertise to the state to confront the pandemic. While the region has seen a mix of positive and negative practices and responses from the partner countries, these generally reflected a long-term trend in the behaviour of state authorities and their interactions with citizens and civil society.

Looking to the future

Despite all the input from numerous state and non-state stakeholders, much remains to be seen about the future of the Eastern Partnership beyond 2020. The EaP will, in any case, have a less than ideal start to the new decade due to the COVID-19 pandemic and its multi-level implications for the EU and EaP countries. Nonetheless, while many things remain unpredictable, there are reasons to remain hopeful and to believe that the Eastern Partnership will remain a priority for the EU and its foreign policy. For that, the EU needs to meet several conditions.

First and foremost, the EU must realise that, except for the Western Balkans, the Eastern Partnership is the second most important and closest region in the world, in which the EU should take action – as it promised when the new European Commission called itself “geopolitical”. It might also be the geopolitical and geoeconomic approach, which the Commission started using in Southeastern Europe, that might ultimately win the hearts and minds in Eastern Europe. This could get local citizens and elites on the side of the EU by pursuing closer economic and political integration, while at the same time decreasing the influence of third parties, such as Russia and China.

The EU’s promised economic aid and macro-financial assistance to respond to the pandemic, while bringing in economic recovery in a mid- and long-term horizon, might present the right approach. Apart from that, the EU also needs to apply “smart conditionality” to push for pro-democratic and pro-market reforms, which could move EaP countries closer to the EU. At the same time, it is essential to carefully manage mutual expectations and support local pro-reform circles, including politicians, civil society or business, by sufficient financial and technical means. It has to be clear to EaP countries that the prospect of EU membership is realistically off the table for the foreseeable future.

Before the next Eastern Partnership summit in March 2021, there should be more clarity on the political narrative and a serious offer to develop relations with the Eastern partners over the next decade. It is obvious that the European Parliament and several EU member states, especially from Central and Eastern Europe, are interested in keeping the EaP high on the EU’s agenda and deepen the mutual relations not only on economic matters but also on political ones. However, it is crucial to convince the rest of the EU that this investment will pay off in the future and bring prosperity and stabilisation to the Eastern Neighbourhood, not only in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, but to all the EU member states. If the EU stands united, despite the challenges of COVID-19 and differing priorities, at the end of this decade we might see an Eastern Europe that is well-prepared for deeper political integration with the EU.

For the Eastern Partnership, the Belarusian crisis has posed a challenge on multiple levels. While nobody predicted a democratic and smooth transition of power, the brutality of Lukashenka’s regime against protesters has surprised many. To a large extent, it has caught both the EU and Russia off guard. Even if the EU had been swift and firm in its reaction and rejection of the presidential election of August 9th 2020, it failed at pushing through a strong and credible sanction mechanism.

The EU’s Eastern Partnership has been rather side-lined in the policy response to the crisis and offered only a limited response to the current situation. The same, however, cannot be said about the elites of EaP countries, among which is Armenia’s Nikol Pashinyan, who has been among the first leaders to congratulate Lukashenka on his “victory”. On the other hand, Ukraine sided with the EU’s tone. The Belarusian crisis has therefore split the EaP countries and their societies along geopolitical fault lines.

Furthermore, the situation in Belarus has demonstrated the limited capacity of the EU to face and counter Russian meddling in countries of its shared neighbourhood. Even if the EU’s sanctions against Russia have been discussed, they have not yet materialised. It is clear that the EU still needs time to look for a credible and sufficient response to pressing foreign policy issues and it can be easily paralysed by the particular interests of its member states.

Czech and V4 contributions

During 2019-20, Czech diplomacy continued to be among the most active and reputable players on the Eastern Partnership front. After two high-level conferences in 2019, hosted by ministries of foreign affairs and industry and trade, Czechia came up with its influential non-paper showcasing resilience as the future framework of the EaP which was circulated among EU member states and finally endorsed by more than ten of them, including the Visegrad Group. After a public consultation in the summer and autumn of 2019, to which Czechia and the V4 countries also contributed, this approach was adopted by the European Commission as a new meta-narrative for the future of EaP beyond 2020.

The Czech V4 presidency in 2019-20 also had the EU’s Eastern policy at its core. This was the case both at the level of state officials and their coordination meetings, as well as in high-level consultations among foreign ministries. The latter in April 2020 presented a Visegrad Joint Statement on the future of the EaP beyond 2020 and established the new programme V4EastSolidarity to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic in Eastern Europe, as part of the International Visegrad Fund. A ministerial conference of the V4 and EaP was only cancelled due to the coronavirus pandemic.

The high-level Eastern Partnership summit, planned for June this year, had to be rescheduled for March 2021, despite opposition from Czechia, the remaining Visegrad countries and other EU member states. While at least the meeting of Eastern Partnership leaders took place in mid-June 2020, there is still an urgent need to adopt a future agenda for the policy since the “20 Deliverables for 2020” are about to expire at the end of the year. This might provide additional opportunities for Czechia and the Polish V4 Presidency to shape the agenda and push for their interests regarding the content of the future EU’s Eastern policy.

Even if the new long-term priorities, leading up to 2030, remain unclear, they will certainly reflect the new EU’s focus areas of digital and green agendas, as well as resilience as a new framework for future political and economic relations. What is important from the Czech and V4 perspectives is that the newly formed basis for co-operation provides an opportunity to move relations with Eastern partners to a higher level. The Czechs should also place a strong emphasis on the basic values ​​of the EaP and the deepening of the Euro-Atlantic orientation, especially with the associated countries of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.

The main challenge for Czech and Visegrad diplomacy will be to not only motivate partner countries to implement complex reforms and deal with security-related issues, but also to fulfil mutual relations with sufficiently ambitious content, especially if Czechia is to host the next EaP summit during its EU presidency in the second half of 2022 in Prague. The Czech government should keep this option on the table despite the recent changes caused by the COVID-19, but also turn this opportunity into a foreign policy success and create another Czech footprint, with new elements to its long-term priority. The V4 format of co-operation and the Polish V4 Presidency will certainly be a good ally and platform for such negotiations and coordination with other European partners.

Lacking consensus

The last year of the Eastern Partnership brought not only a strategic reflection on the future of the EU’s Eastern policy but, more importantly, some concrete policy proposals for development over the next decade. Thanks to the complex and inclusive approach of the European Commission and the involvement of many European and Eastern Partnership stakeholders, including think tanks, the expert community and civil society, the public consultation process produced many new ideas. Some of them, such as the new overarching framework of resilience, to which Czech diplomacy actively contributed, are steps in the right direction. However, a consensus on the future of policy is still missing and its contested political narrative should motivate EU leaders to further debate this crucial component of the Eastern Partnership.

Another big task over the upcoming months will be the preparation of a new set of deliverables and the new framework that will be discussed among EU member states, the partner countries, and civil society. It will be necessary to determine concrete benchmarks and increase the EU’s capacity to measure the progress of individual countries on the ground. Due to these difficult challenges, it might be beneficial to have the next high-level summit of the Eastern Partnership only in March 2021, when it becomes clear how and where to go next over the next decade.

Pavel Havlíček is an analyst with the Association for International Affairs based in Prague.

COVID-19, Eastern Partnership, European Union, geopolitics