EU resilience in the Eastern Partnership: what does the case of Georgia’s political crisis tell us?

Photo: Tai Dundua/Shutterstock

The European Union decided to get involved and help the parties find a resolution to this political impasse between Georgia’s major players. It was vital for Brussels to mitigate this difficult situation and facilitate dialogue between the parties, as the EU’s eastern frontier has faced crisis after crisis over the last several years. Along with the aforementioned problems in Tbilisi, Europe’s eastern frontier has witnessed a military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and a great amount of Russian hybrid warfare. This includes Moscow’s potential invasion of Ukraine in the near future. The bloc is also facing a democratic backslide in many Eastern European countries, especially in Hungary and Poland. For Brussels, therefore, involvement in Georgia was a matter of showing its credibility and resilience. Whilst the EU put a lot of effort into brokering an agreement, it has failed to keep the signatory parties committed to it. This failure has raised questions regarding whether or not the Association Agreement’s incentives have exhausted themselves. Is the EU losing its normative influence over the region?

The EU’s failure to find a breakthrough

The main Georgian parties’ disagreement over the 2020 parliamentary election results escalated into a protracted political crisis, with the majority of the opposition boycotting the parliament. It quickly became clear that the only credible actors left in this “Mexican standoff” were the country’s western partners. The EU first got involved through its representative in the country. However, the President of the European Council Charles Michel soon became personally involved in the mediation process. On April 19th 2021, the agreement titled “A Way Ahead for Georgia” was signed by the parties. This outlined several important reforms needed to increase trust in future elections. More importantly, it also established a one-time threshold (43 per cent) that the ruling party needed to meet in the 2021 local elections in order to avoid a snap parliamentary election.

Despite some ambitious goals and proposed reforms regarding the electoral system and judiciary, the document was ultimately unworkable from the very beginning. One of the largest opposition parties – the United National Movement – refused to sign it, a fact that was later used by the ruling Georgian Dream party to withdraw its own signature and declare the agreement “annulled”. Appointments to the supreme court, which were supposed to be on hold according to the agreement, still went ahead despite criticism from western partners. This resulted in the EU refusing to provide financial assistance to Georgia.

The US ambassador to Georgia, who was personally involved in the mediation process, described these developments as “going against the spirit” of the April 19th agreement. This was a surprising turn, especially considering the levels of support and trust that the West has enjoyed in Georgia over the years. High support for Georgia’s EU membership suggests that the organisation’s appeal remains strong even in the face of these recent setbacks. The next couple of years will certainly prove decisive for the EU’s role in the region. Brussels will need to engage more with countries that have signed an Association Agreement and offer more incentives than just funding. The EU will also need to shift the focus of its resilience strategy from governments to civil society and the population as a whole.

The Associated Trio – keeping Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova on track

On July 19th last year the heads of Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia signed a declaration at the Petra Fortress near Batumi in Georgia. The purpose of this agreement was to reaffirm the signatory countries’ commitment to European integration, a foreign policy choice that no third country could influence. Most importantly, the declaration pledged that the three associated countries would cooperate with the EU to counter hybrid threats, disinformation and other common challenges. While the document focuses on the Associated Trio (the three countries of the Eastern Partnership that have signed the Association Agreement with the EU: Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia – editor’s note), it also reiterates its support for the Eastern Partnership. The signatory parties also pledged to work together to ensure that the partnership develops even further.

Since its formal establishment, the Associated Trio has slowly gained prominence in high-level discourse among policymakers and politicians within both the Eastern Partnership and the EU. During a joint press conference with the three countries’ foreign ministers, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell emphasised that the most crucial part of the Eastern Partnership was cooperation within the region. These more coordinated actions, as well as the establishment of a formal framework between the three associated countries, are especially relevant in the context of the recent 2.3 billion euro package allocated for the Eastern Partnership. Borrell remarked that the project remains at the top of the EU’s agenda.

It has been suggested that the Associated Trio is modelled after the Berlin Process, a German initiative that supports the integration of the Western Balkan countries. However, these two projects have one key difference: the Eastern partners’ membership prospects remain rather vague. The so-called discussion papers submitted to the European Commission by France in 2019 and 2020 stated that while the Eastern Partnership was about economic and political cooperation, it did not imply any mechanisms or prospects for future EU membership.

In contrast, the Western Balkan countries were promised membership already back in 2003. Both Albania and North Macedonia are on the verge of starting accession talks with the EU (Bulgaria is currently blocking progress due to its dispute with North Macedonia over history and language), while Serbia is expected to complete the process by 2025. In other words, while the Western Balkan countries have a goal towards which their partnership with Brussels is heading, the Eastern partners still lack that clarity. The institutional and policy framework that the Associated Trio platform potentially holds for the signatory countries, on the other hand, could provide that destination for the best performers.

Nothing left to offer

Questions surrounding where the Eastern Partnership is heading and whether it is still able to address the EU neighbourhood’s challenges have become especially relevant given recent regional developments. As aforementioned, the last couple of years have seen Brussels attempt to deal with events such as the Second Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This dramatically shifted the geopolitical balance in the region. It is also worth remembering the alarming situation in Belarus that ended with Minsk declaring its intent to suspend participation in the Eastern Partnership and recall its envoy from Brussels. At the same time, the looming Russian intervention in Ukraine also continues to cause anxiety in the region.

Against the backdrop of these events, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova are trying to further push their European agenda and coordinate their approach towards Brussels. This is all the more impressive given recent challenges to democracy in the region. These three remain the last glimmer of hope for the EU’s resilience and transformative power in the region. Yet, the most recent developments in Georgia, along with the violent attacks on journalists in the streets of Tbilisi in July 2021, have become a matter of great concern for the EU.

Consequently, the Eastern Partnership faces an uncertain future, as the European Union cannot offer any viable incentives to the best performers in this neighbourhood beyond more funding. Some scholars claim the EU has exhausted its ability to keep prospective members committed to democratisation, since there is not much left to offer beyond visa liberalisation and access to the Single Market. EU resilience in the region is now clearly facing many challenges. In the context of China’s growing global influence and Russia’s resurgent foreign policy, it is uncertain if Brussels will manage to remain a credible actor in the region. Questions must be asked as to what kind of format could help the Eastern Partnership’s best performers remain on the path of democratisation and reform amid today’s challenges.

The Association Agreement has indeed helped the signatory countries from the Eastern Partnership quickly catch up with their Western Balkan counterparts. Yet, with no prospects for membership in the foreseeable future, the EU needs to take bolder actions to keep Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova on track. As a result, further support for the Associated Trio could be an important way of stopping, and probably even reversing, these alarming developments in Georgia-EU relations. This format has the potential, at least for the time being, to take Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine’s long and bumpy European journey one step further.

 Shota Kakabadze is a junior policy analyst at the Georgian Institute of Politics.

Association Agreement, European Union, Georgia, politics