While the Eastern Partnership marked its 15th anniversary this year, its adaptability to current geopolitical developments has raised questions. Russia’s war in Ukraine and Ukraine’s and Moldova’s progress in EU accession have challenged the relevance of this policy. Yet, despite some shortcomings, the EaP can be a viable instrument to promote the regional agenda of the EU, invest in democratisation of individual countries and foster linkages with the key region of Eastern Europe. There are concrete steps that can increase the relevance of this policy.

Launched in 2009 in Prague, the European Union’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) policy has been one of the most visible and efficient tools of EU foreign policy over the past decade and a half. On the occasion of its 15-year-anniversary, which we celebrated in May 2024, a proper stock-taking of the current state of play is in order. This is particularly important since the EaP is undergoing some fundamental changes, being challenged particularly by the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine as well as by the Kremlin’s aggression against its other neighbours, of which six are united within the regional policy framework of the EU.

EU leaders’ decision to start accession negotiations with Moldova and Ukraine has put the final nail in the coffin of the Eastern Partnership which was never designed to handle enlargement. The time is therefore ripe for a geopolitically more assertive EU to geographically reimagine and thematically widen its Eastern policy. Substituting the obsolete Eastern Partnership for a new Trans-Caspian Partnership could be the solution. In the South Caucasus and Central Asia, the desire to forge closer ties with the EU has increased following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The EU’s decision to not offer Georgia candidate status disappointed a nation that has long aspired to join the bloc. Despite this, European institutions have offered advice to get the country back on track in the face of various domestic issues.

Whilst Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova’s applications for EU membership were submitted before they were really ready, the Russian military assault on Ukraine has put the EU in a very delicate situation. Nevertheless, the EU has given the green light to start evaluating the eligibility of the three associated states for candidate status.

Never before have Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova's European prospects been as bright as they are now. All three partner countries in the Eastern Partnership region have already submitted applications to join the European Union. However, the trigger for this move was not the success of internal reforms or the fulfilment of other political and economic milestones (also known as the Copenhagen Criteria).

In the context of the current crisis with Russia, can the European Union’s Eastern Partnership be able to recover some of the promise it had at the time of its founding? To what extent can it change without change inside the EU itself? Certainly, what the EU needs is not hard power but a hard edge.

In the midst of the greatest security crisis to engulf Europe since the height of the Cold War, the sixth summit of the EU’s Eastern Partnership on December 15th last year might easily be dismissed as a non-event. Whilst relations between Russia and the six members are a matter of high drama across Europe, the partnership attracts no more attention than a non-speaking part in a play. Provocative and discordant on most subjects, the international commentariat has no difficulty agreeing on one thing: the partnership’s irrelevance.

In mid-December, Brussels hosted a key summit of the Eastern Partnership. The Czech Republic has long placed great emphasis on this form of EU neighbourhood policy. However, reluctance on the part of some EU states suggests that the meeting’s outcomes may not live up to the country’s hopes.

This year saw the launch of the “Associated Trio” by Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Eager to pursue further European integration, the three states have prioritised public diplomacy as one of the key parts of these efforts. Yet, recent developments suggest much work is still to be done if the new group hopes to work together effectively.

Various hybrid challenges, as well as the foreign policy realities of the regions of Central and Eastern Europe and the Black Sea, have led Ukraine to increasingly promote itself as an independent and active actor in the international arena. The country’s new projects, such as the large-scale Crimean Platform and a number of regional alliances, including the Ukrainian-Turkish “Quadriga” and the Ukrainian-Polish-Lithuanian Lublin Triangle, serve as evidence of this new assertiveness.

Many of the EU’s closest neighbours are now going in opposite directions. Whilst some are actively rejecting integration, the states of the Associated Trio continue to express interest. Brussels would be wise to acknowledge such enthusiasm.

An interview with Khatia Dekanoidze, a leader of the main Georgian opposition party – United National Movement and candidate for mayor of Kutaisi, the second biggest city in Georgia. Interviewer: Wojciech Wojtasiewicz

Prior to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to the White House, there were a number of statements, innuendos and high hopes. Lots of efforts were taken by the Ukrainian side to have this long-awaited meeting happen despite current geopolitical challenges. But how is Ukraine prepared to access NATO/EU structures now? Will this meeting have a positive impact for Ukraine on its Euro-Atlantic integration path?

Success at the voting booth for Nikol Pashinyan and Maia Sandu confirmed the re-emergence of a strong public mandate for reformist parties

While the EU has been helpful in facilitating negotiations aimed at resolving the political crisis in Georgia, it should remain vigilant when it comes to the threats to democracy in Moldova.