The intervention in Kosovo revisited. Twelve lessons for the future

Photo: United States Marine Corps / Public Domain commons.wikimedia.org

The intervention in Kosovo remains an important case study because state-building continues to be a relevant matter. Most state-building initiatives have failed or struggled to achieve their desired outcomes. However, Kosovo is a different story: a short moment in history when the international community proved they could co-operate, set aside differences and invest time and resources for the purpose of maintaining peace, safeguarding stability and promoting democracy. As we passed the 20th anniversary of the NATO campaign in Kosovo, we see that the lessons are still relevant today. As the 21st century unfolds, new cases where international commitment is needed arise. And there is a growing fear among observers that similar cases of humanitarian catastrophes could take place in the future. Admittedly, no historical analogy is precise, but it is the least misleading thing we have. Mark Twain reportedly said that history does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme. Thus, lessons should be drawn from past experiences. Here I offer 12 important lessons from the intervention in Kosovo and its aftermath.

1. Exhaust all diplomatic alternatives

The case of Kosovo shows that an intervention should only take place when you have exhausted all diplomatic options, including negotiations and discussions at the UN Security Council. In this way, co-operation among states will become more realistic. When countries agree on military intervention, there must be a concrete plan on how the action will unfold. In addition, humanitarian intervention cannot be initiated without considering both moral and practical factors. The moral dimension is the basis for international coordination, and legitimising the intervention means using the humanitarian argument. Often the imperative to prevent ethnic cleansing and violence will change the opinion of those who oppose humanitarian interventions.

2. Don’t count on sanctions

Several rounds of international sanctions were imposed against Yugoslavia during the 1990s. The intervention in Kosovo proved that sanctions without a commitment to use force are a waste of time. Sanctions affect a country’s economy, but they almost never reach the desired outcome. On the contrary, sanctions can have a boomerang effect; in other words, they could strengthen the position of the oppressor and further weaken the domestic opposition. The ones who suffer the most are the citizens and refugees whose well-being further deteriorates from bad economic conditions. Sanctions are most efficient when there is a commitment to use force.

3. Pick a side

Intervention means choosing a side, and choosing which side to support is immensely important. Loss of life is an inevitable consequence of military intervention. Therefore, it is essential to know beforehand who will govern afterwards and which group you are going to support. Making peace means determining how the war ends. Not taking sides will extend the war and, in the end, will cost more lives. For instance, the “safe areas” (territories set under the protection of United Nations) in Bosnia and Herzegovina created more chaos than solutions. The Bosnian Serbs took advantage of this in order to expand their conquest. As Richard Betts noted, “limited intervention may end a war … trying to have it both ways usually blocks peace by doing enough to keep either belligerent from defeating the other, but not enough to make them stop trying. And the attempt to have it both ways has brought the UN and the US to varying degrees of grief in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia and Haiti.”

4. Don’t limit your military options in public

Rejecting the idea of ground forces outright may create a sense of comfort for the perpetrator. NATO allies, since the very beginning, ruled out the deployment of ground forces, and, further, they did not hesitate to state their firm position publicly. The then US President Bill Clinton stated before the air campaign was launched: “I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war.” This created a sense of comfort for Serb leader Slobodan Milošević in believing that he could survive a couple of weeks of bombardment. Had the West remained silent, Milošević would have probably felt more threatened and conceded defeat faster. Excluding military options, at least in public, can have consequences for the overall operation. Nevertheless, NATO prevailed, proving most of its critics wrong, that war can be waged without considering the option of ground forces.

Although relying heavily or exclusively on air power proved successful in Kosovo, this does not guarantee success in every case, especially when one deals with mountainous terrain. Operating on a desert is much easier than in towns or cities. The air campaign had a serious impact on the oppressors’ thinking, especially when they were bombed by the strongest military force in the world. Historically, armies fight until they are depleted 30 to 50 per cent. The fear of losing support and being abandoned by his people brought Milošević to the bargaining table and led to his ultimate withdrawal from Kosovo.

5. Build a narrative

When the Srebrenica genocide happened in 1995, the world was shocked. Western audiences were stunned to see thousands of dead bodies appear in their newspapers and on their television screens. They demanded answers and many campaigned to stop the murders. By the time the situation in Kosovo had started to deteriorate, people were already filled with anger and disappointment. Hundreds of international journalists and OSCE staff were reporting daily from the ground. This made the option of international intervention a more plausible one for onlookers.

However, the media presence also meant that mistakes had to be minimal. The bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade illustrates that one mistake can have fatal consequences and it can seriously question the mission’s credibility. With any modern war, a public diplomacy strategy is often swept away (or aside) by the tide of events, particularly by media images of those events. After the Račak massacre and during the first two weeks of bombing, US public diplomacy, far from being a carefully planned strategy, was largely reactive and improvisational. At Račak, it was improvised literally on the spot. However, that did not prevent it from being successful. A crucial element of success was the sense of how westerners viewed Milošević and the forces he commanded, which enabled US spokespeople to use Milošević’s atrocious actions to rally western support rather than dishearten public opinion.

6. Keep your allies together

Multilateralism is essential for successful humanitarian intervention; however, this is a difficult feat. During the air campaign in Kosovo, every decision had to go through all NATO member states and choices had to be considered. Similarly, after the intervention, European nations had different approaches when it came to determining Kosovo’s final status. The European Union does not have a compatible foreign policy strategy. Each country represents its own interests. Although most EU states recognised Kosovo as an independent state, there are still five member states (i.e. Spain, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Cyprus) who have not, and this has diminished hope of a coherent EU policy in regard to the Western Balkans.

7. Go in, go hard

A symbolic use of force does not usually achieve anything more than frustration on the opponent’s side. Half-choices or half-measures (like in Bosnia and Herzegovina) are not solutions, instead they may make things worse, inspire more violence, and lead to more domestic casualties between ethnic groups. The use of limited force has little or no impact. Sometimes the international community uses small amounts of force to send an important message in the hope of the oppressor backing down. However, such a strategy conveys weakness rather than strength and commitment. As Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon wrote in Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo (2000): “The use of force is based more on the hope that it will be effective rather than on the certainty.”

Additionally, this may send the wrong message to the oppressor: that the international community is not ready to fight a war or lacks the political will to do so. The use of force should ensure victory rather than simply hoping it will achieve it. The Powell Doctrine, applied to the use of force, remains valid. The Powell Doctrine is a term named after the former US Secretary of Defense, General Colin Powell, in the run-up to the first Gulf War which states that the US should only use military force after exhausting all other alternatives, and then only decisively to achieve clearly defined political objectives.

8. Invest time and resources in state-building

Winning the war is relatively easy, but keeping the peace is difficult. State-building is essential to maintain stability; however, restoring the rule of law and building a multi-ethnic society is difficult. After intervention, a sense of stability and peace must be maintained. This way refugees can start returning to their homes, people can start reconstructing their damaged properties, and the international community can start funding capital projects. But in order to initiate reforms, the newly-elected government has to be compatible with democratic principles. Otherwise, an undesired outcome is more likely to happen as the new cadre of leaders – full of political ambition – may undermine democracy and pursue personal interests at the expense of citizens.

State-building requires substantial investment. Since the end of the Cold War, Kosovo has had the second-highest level of assistance on a per capita basis, and ranks fourth in the world in terms of total assistance (800 US dollars per resident). Yet Kosovo has not managed to transform itself into a well-functioning, prosperous democracy. Nevertheless economic growth varies from three to five percent – which is progress – but not enough considering Kosovo’s potential. The large-scale investments made in Kosovo demonstrate that the economy can be restored rapidly. Promoting the rule of law is one of the most difficult aspects of democratic reform. In comparison, designing constitutions and holding elections is comparably easy. Legislation means nothing without proper enforcement.

9. Initiate construction, not reconstruction

The transfer of knowledge and resources means that everything does not need to start from scratch. The international community knows how to organise and supply government services. What it knows much less about, however, is how to create self-sustaining, indigenous institutions. When the international community commits to state-building, it should be aware that it is not arriving with bricks, trucks, cranes and architects. They should not do all the work themselves but instead assist the locals build their own society. The Kosovars understood that they were not capable of creating their own institutions, thus they welcomed knowledge and learned everything from an amalgamation of different organisations in Kosovo.

The UN helped facilitate and construct local institutions, and provided minimal functions such as public goods, relative security, public health, fiscal policy and macroeconomic management. In addition, the international community has helped enormously by investing in infrastructure projects and human capital and conducting training courses and scholarships. The problem with the UN was that it failed to improve the quality of education, tackle poverty and inequality, guarantee environmental protection and boost sustainable economic growth and effective governance. It also did not manage to create a monitoring system for the institutions or enforce punishment for those who misused public office, thus leading to a culture of corruption and nepotism.

10. Be patient

Having functioning and efficient institutions are key features for a state. Therefore state-building requires strong institutions. However, it is important to add that institution-building requires both substance and time to be successful. While Kosovo is a parliamentary republic with a multi-party system and free elections, it falls behind in terms of substantive democracy.

Democracy is easier said than done. It requires a relatively large pool of educated people and a sizable middle class who are willing to embrace democratic ideals. Most importantly, society must have a culture of tolerance and a dose of secular divide. Formal democracy is a prerequisite for producing substantive democracy. Kosovo shows that uncertainty over its final status can be a motive for further democratic reforms. Democracy is the foundation of state-building, and for it to work it has to be liberal (being liberal and democratic are not one and the same). Germany, for instance, is both liberal and democratic; Iran, on the other hand, is democratic but not liberal. It is important to establish basic principles of democracy based on liberal values as elections in post-conflict states can sometimes have a counter-effect and bring authoritarians to power. Liberal democracy has proven to be the best system of governance, since it is based on individual freedom, justice, dignity and respect. As such, building a state means building a liberal democracy.

11. Have an exit strategy

Staying too long does not guarantee success, while leaving early ensures failure. After the intervention in Kosovo, the US established the Camp Bondsteel military base. The camp can hold up to 7,000 soldiers which makes it the largest military base in the Balkans. Building a military base sends an important message of security and stability. The establishment of this base and the presence of troops demonstrates an enduring US commitment to security not just in Kosovo but in the Balkans as a whole. Throughout the years the US slowly departed, reducing the number of its troops significantly, and thus paving the way for European states to take charge of various aspects.

12. Deal with the past

After the war, the West failed to eliminate Serbian nationalists from positions of power and rebuke their nationalist approach. After the Second World War, the Allies had a concrete plan for overcoming nationalism in Germany, an initiative otherwise known as “denazification”. At that time, documentaries were produced to remind Germans of Nazi horror crimes; tour visits were organised to concentration camps in order to give a first-hand experience of the Nazi genocide; campaigns were launched for the purpose of developing a German sense of collective responsibility. Moreover, Nazi symbols and books were banned. As a result of years of commitment, the Holocaust memorial stands proudly in the German capital today.

However, this was not the case with Serbia. Two decades have passed and around 1,600 people remain missing with Serbia having neither apologised nor shown any empathy for what happened during the Kosovo War. Serbian politicians often refer to Albanians using the derogatory term, siptari, implying cultural and racial inferiority. When the Serbian President, Aleksandar Vučić, visited Kosovo, he described Milošević as a great Serbian leader. The Serbian Prime Minister, Ana Brnabić, recently branded Kosovo Albanians as people who emerged from the woods. There has to be a change in mentality that openly discusses the crimes and legacy of the Serbian regime in Kosovo and throughout the former Yugoslavia. The war in Kosovo illustrates that without dealing with the past, sustainable peace and reconciliation cannot be fully established.

S:Enduring commitment

Kosovo was a milestone in the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. It serves as a good example of when a regime topples, it takes significant amounts of energy and resources to build or rebuild the state. Sustainable peace requires local partners with the capacity to govern and the integrity to lead. State-building requires time and substance, and, most importantly, it requires an enduring commitment. International co-operation is critical in order to overcome post-conflict challenges. Providing humanitarian assistance, security and civil administration were key in establishing a peaceful environment in Kosovo.

Visar Xhambazi is a policy researcher at the Democracy for Development (D4D) Institute. He has worked as a consultant, policy researcher and project manager in international relations and foreign policy analysis.

intervention, Kosovo, lessons, NATO