Yerevan’s close security links with the Kremlin have encouraged beliefs that the country simply follows orders from Moscow. However, Armenia’s diverse experiences related to the ongoing war in Ukraine show that this could not be further from the truth.

The Russo-Ukrainian War has left Armenia in a difficult situation. The state’s attempt to adopt a low-profile neutrality on the issue has been met with criticism at home and abroad. Given the country’s circumstances, however, it appears that this may be the best option currently available.

Armenia’s support for the recent CSTO intervention in Kazakhstan may seem unusual at first glance. However, this move is ultimately part of a wider strategy in Yerevan that involves both domestic and international affairs.

While China struggles to consolidate its economic position in the South Caucasus, Pakistan has cemented its strategic alliance with Azerbaijan. Simultaneously, India has entered a new phase of relations with Armenia. Even though the presence of Asian powers in the region represents an opportunity for economic development, it may also entail some risks.

Asian powers have recently shown increasing interest in the South Caucasus. In particular, Pakistan and India have stepped into the region, joining and partially balancing China's strong presence. Several factors have contributed to the entrance of these new Asian players and this is particularly true regarding the new balance of power established by the 2020 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. At the same time, the European Union and United States’ lack of engagement with the region has left more room for action by other external powers.

Ankara and Yerevan’s ongoing talks to normalise relations could result in radical change at both the bilateral and regional level. Despite this, various historical and contemporary issues continue to challenge this process.

Recent unrest in Kazakhstan naturally attracted the attention of a Kremlin administration eager to bolster its position as regional hegemon. Despite this, the event also further revealed Yerevan’s increasing reliance on Moscow.

Whilst Armenia has suffered from many problems since the end of its recent war with Azerbaijan, its experiences with COVID-19 have seemingly been better than many countries. This is despite the fact that various social and institutional factors should have resulted in the opposite outcome.

Connections between the Kremlin and Europe’s far right have become a topic of great debate in recent years. Despite this, the far right’s extensive support for Armenia in last year’s conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh largely went unnoticed by the continent’s media.

Recent clashes along a contested road between Armenia and Azerbaijan have only further revealed the weaknesses of last year’s ceasefire agreement between the two states. Despite this, talks regarding this issue may present a path towards a more durable peace.

Events over the past few weeks have seen relations between Baku and Yerevan once again hit a low point. Now focused on recent military clashes, both sides continue to hold very different perspectives on the Karabakh conflict and its future.

The agreement that ended the 2020 Karabakh War called for transportation links to be put on the geopolitical agenda of the South Caucasus. According to the statement, Armenia should guarantee the security of transport connections between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. However, recent tensions in the Syunik region will likely impact the success of these developments.

The 2020 Karabakh War has caused a significant shift in the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan naturally strengthened its position, while Armenia was plunged into an acute political crisis without any clear solutions. Even the victory of Nikol Pashinyan’s “Civic Contract” party in the June 2021 early Parliamentary elections did not put an end to the domestic instability. Russia and Turkey have also increased their influence in the region. Moscow achieved its crucial goal of deploying troops in Karabakh, while Ankara has sent a clear message that it is now a leading regional powerbroker.

The CSTO has been promoted as a regional counterpart to NATO ever since its creation in 1992. Despite this, the purpose of the organisation remains unclear, with official talk of mutual defence often giving way to unilateral action in a region still dominated by Russia and its military.

Almost two decades after its establishment, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) remains a difficult entity to define. Although often described as a vehicle for Russian foreign policy and a security guarantee for member states, it is anything but clear how the CSTO serves these purposes. Indeed, Moscow has always preferred to act unilaterally in the face of tensions in the vast Eurasian region, while member states repeatedly invoking the organisation's support have never obtained it. Furthermore, the limitations of the CSTO and the lack of clarity about its actual objectives have made it incapable of attracting new member states. Now that NATO's dramatic withdrawal from Afghanistan has been completed, new challenges await Russia and its partners. Is the CSTO ready?