Moldovan lessons in European integration

A rally in support of Moldova's entry into the EU in Chișinău, December 2023. Photo: Shutterstock

Moldova’s two-week political thriller has come to a happy end: the European referendum has passed and Maia Sandu, leader of the pro-western political camp, has won re-election in the presidential elections. EU leaders rushed to congratulate her and flooded social media with photos of Sandu. But a more distanced analysis reveals more cause for concern than joy. This is especially true since in a few months – at the end of summer 2025 – parliamentary elections will be held.

A glance at the results shows that both the positive outcome of the referendum and Sandu’s re-election were only possible thanks to the votes of the diaspora. In the first round of voting – in which Moldovan citizens were asked “Do you support the introduction of a constitutional amendment for the Republic of Moldova’s accession to the European Union?” – 50.42 per cent of voters answered in the affirmative. This result was much lower than expected, as government representatives had expected support to be around 60 per cent. To make matters worse, the referendum would have failed if only the votes cast at polling stations in the country itself had been counted.

Diaspora versus Russian interference

The results of the second round of the presidential election are similar. Sandu received 55.35 per cent support, giving the impression of a certain victory. Nearly 328,000 Moldovans living abroad took part in the vote, 83 per cent of whom supported the incumbent head of state. The mobilization of the diaspora was unprecedented: almost a fifth of all votes were cast abroad! Unfortunately, if only the votes cast in the territory of the Republic of Moldova are taken into account, Sandu’s rival Alexandr Stoianoglo, backed by the pro-Russian Socialist Party, had a 51.33 per cent lead.

As soon as the elections were over, the Socialists announced that they would not recognize the results, arguing that Sandu had no “national” legitimacy and was supported only by the diaspora and “western sponsors”. This is an absurd argument, both legally and morally. The right of citizens living abroad to vote is widely recognized around the world, and is all the more important in the case of Moldova, where financial remittances from the diaspora largely sustain Moldovan society. This absurdity, however, does not detract from its appeal.

The results of both elections were also influenced by Russian interference. On the eve of the first round and the referendum, Moldovan police reported that a political group linked to the wanted Moscow-based oligarch Ilan Șor had attempted to bribe some 130,000 people. That is ten per cent of the electorate. In return, during the second round, Șor and Russian services organized campaigns to transport Moldovans living in Russia to polling stations, including those in Turkey, Azerbaijan and Belarus. They were also paid for a visit home for several days.

Disappointment

Maia Sandu and her Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) came to power in 2020-21 on the back of public resentment with years of oligarchic rule and fatigue with geopolitical narratives. They promised to fight corruption, renew the state, reform the judiciary, build effective institutions and develop the economy. The European Union and the West were in the background, but it was not the desire to integrate with them that drove voters’ emotions. Meanwhile, a large part of the public would now describe their attitude to the Sandu and PAS governments with one word: disappointment.

Of course, a lot of things did not happen because of external factors, namely Russia. Back in 2021, Moscow used energy blackmail against Chisinau. The subsequent full-scale invasion of Ukraine not only temporarily undermined Moldova’s future as a sovereign state, but also limited the conditions for investment. Chisinau became effectively independent of Russian gas, a major political achievement for PAS. At the same time, this has meant a sevenfold increase in the price of raw materials for ordinary consumers. Many have concluded that they have to pay for (geo)political successes out of their own pockets. PAS has also been guilty of serious communication failures and has failed to reform the judiciary. They have not held accountable the oligarchs who have been stealing from the state for years. Political opponents like to accuse PAS and Sandu of using the rule of law as a political weapon. It must be acknowledged that politicians in the ruling camp have themselves fuelled this argument, which had its hiccups during the recently concluded election campaign (discussed in more detail below).

Do not play with the big idea

PAS and Sandu were aware of the erosion of support, which is why they decided on pursuing the referendum. It needs to be clear that this vote was neither necessary nor formal. It was organized to bolster Sandu’s election result and to create good conditions for the upcoming parliamentary elections. A signal was sent to the public: whatever you think of Sandu and PAS, this is about Moldova’s European future. However, the final effect was the opposite. Disillusionment with the PAS government lowered the level of support for European integration.

A large part of the population began to feel dissonance, triggered by the juxtaposition of successive diplomatic successes (including the granting of EU candidate status and the opening of accession negotiations) and the lack of positive changes in their own lives. For some voters, Moldova’s growing standing with the West was a source of pride and a harbinger of a better future. Many others, however, saw a smiling Sandu in pictures with European leaders juxtaposed with rising bills and no real change in the functioning of the state.

The fact that the referendum was held at the same time as the presidential elections only reinforced the impression that European integration was merely part of the government’s ideology. In the eyes of a large part of the public, European integration has become a polarizing rather than a unifying idea.

This was perfectly exploited by Sandu’s rival and the socialists who supported him. Alexandr Stoianoglo was Attorney General from 2019 to 2021. He was stripped of the post after PAS took power. Many of his actions were indeed highly controversial – such as the release of the oligarch Veaceslav Platon, who was accused of creating a mechanism for laundering Russian money through Moldova’s banking system. The new authorities have set a series of legal trials for Stoianoglo. Unfortunately, none of them have yet resulted in a verdict. The former prosecutor general also won a case before the European Court of Human Rights, which ruled that the authorities had violated his right to a fair trial. Stoianoglo thus presents himself as a victim of the “Sandu and PAS regime” and its understanding of the rule of law. The fact that he belongs to a national minority – he is Gagauz – also helped him in this narrative.

Neutrality versus pro-Russianism

Moldovan society is usually portrayed as divided between supporters of integration with the West and supporters of Russia. Situations such as the referendum or the second round of the presidential elections tend to reinforce this dualistic image. However, as sociologists, including those at Watchdog.md, argue, the picture is much more complex. Rather, we should imagine Moldovan society as stretched on a scale, rather than divided into two rigid segments. At one end of the scale we find supporters of NATO integration (up to 20 per cent), and at the other end those who favour a close alliance with Russia (16 to 18 per cent). In between are people who are sincerely attached to western values and see themselves as part of the western and European cultural area, who hope for EU integration but are already uncertain about NATO (another 20 to 25 per cent). The next group – around 35 to 40 per cent – is made up of those who have an aversion to the need for geopolitical and identity definition, and for whom international neutrality is of great value. This includes those who cultivate a desire to keep their distance from all disputes, as well as those who have been brought up in Russian tradition and culture. On the one hand they do not like Putin’s Russia, but on the other hand they feel excluded by the anti-Russian language of contemporary politics. We can call this group “neutralists”.

It should be noted that this scale concerns the part of society that is involved in social and political processes. The level of exclusion, often caused by poverty, is enormous in Moldova. This is where Ilan Şor has found his niche, involving the poorest in political processes by simply paying them to participate in demonstrations and elections, thereby increasing the potential of the pro-Russian group.

The key to winning and keeping power in Moldova is to win over a significant proportion of the neutrals. Maia Sandu understood this when she won the presidency four years ago. She used inclusive language, focusing on common goals rather than polarization. Of course, it will be harder to use such language after 2022, but it is still possible, as the president reminded herself between the first and second rounds. In the meantime, however, some of the pro-Russian groups, including the Socialist Party, have moved to the centre. This led, among other things, to the candidacy of Stoianoglo, who had not previously been widely associated with either the party or Russia.

Sandu’s rivals also understood that public attitudes had already changed over the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Moldova’s involvement in it. While there was no room for an overtly pro-Russian narrative, there was room for a “neutralist” tune. It sounds more or less like this: “We are not pro-Russian and anti-European, it is just that Moldova is too small to get involved in geopolitical games. Sandu and PAS look after the US and Kyiv’s interests, not those of ordinary people. We sympathize with the Ukrainians, the war is terrible, but the West is also pursuing its interests in it. Western unity is crumbling, Trump will win and we will be left with Zelenskyy.

In western media reports, Alexandr Stoianoglo has often been portrayed as a pro-Russian candidate. We need to understand that many Moldovans perceive their own reality in a more complex way, so Stoianoglo was also seen differently than in Western Europe.

Russia, resilience and a lesson for the European Union

Russia’s interference in the Moldovan elections and referendum showed that the Kremlin is not letting go of the “near abroad” and is ready to use not only dirty methods but also large financial resources in political struggles. Such a signal was sent to the West; to Russia’s supporters in Eastern Europe and the Balkans; and to its own citizens. In this case, the calculation of electoral effects was combined with a public relations effort to show that Moscow was still strong and a force to be reckoned with. At the same time, it exposed the low resilience of Moldovan society and the state to outside interference. Between the first and second rounds, local police reported further arrests of people from the “Șor network” and the seizure of large sums of money. This demonstration of efficiency begs the question: why could a similar operation not have been carried out before the first round? Unfortunately, the Moldovan services did not pass this test, which shows that they still have a lot of work to do on the road to the EU.

There is an important lesson for the European Union in all this – it must constantly seek a way to ensure that the idea of European integration does not become hostage to the interests of any one political grouping. The invasion of Ukraine and the hybrid war that Russia is waging against the former Soviet republics and the West are obviously leading to a decline in political trust. Betting on one camp – “our people in Moldova/Georgia/North Macedonia etc.” – is obviously easier. There is a constant fear that reaching out to a different political group will undermine the position of our existing partners and undermine previous efforts. Nevertheless, the European Union must be able to afford such diplomatic and political acrobatics.

The political tempo in Moldova is not slowing down. Everyone is already preparing for the upcoming parliamentary elections, which will be a much more important test of the country’s pro-European course. May we all learn lessons from the past two weeks.

Piotr Oleksy is an assistant professor at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan and senior analyst at the Institute of Central Europe in Lublin.

Public task financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland within the grant competition “Public Diplomacy 2024 – 2025 – the European dimension and countering disinformation”.

The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the official positions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland.

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Alexandr Stoianoglo, EU-Moldovan relations, Maia Sandu, Moldova, Moldovan politics, referendum, Russian interference