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A referendum at the crossroads: Moldova’s democratic test amidst presidential elections

On October 20th 2024, Moldova will simultaneously hold its presidential elections and a crucial referendum on the country’s accession to the EU, a strategic confluence that was initially seen as a mobilization tactic by President Maia Sandu but now looms as a substantial risk. If the referendum fails to engage sufficient voter turnout, it could not only undermine the current government but also potentially benefit pro-Russian factions in upcoming parliamentary elections.

June 14, 2024 - Alexandru Demianenco - Analysis

Photo: A pro-EU demonstation in Chișinău on May 21st. Photo: Lalandrew / Shutterstock

In the landscape of Eastern European politics, small nations often face outsized challenges. Moldova, a parliamentary republic with limited presidential powers, is currently at a pivotal juncture. The upcoming referendum, aligned with the presidential elections, is President Maia Sandu’s gambit to consolidate support and affirm her policy direction amid rising tensions and external security pressure. Initially framed as a tactical move to galvanize the electorate, the referendum is increasingly perceived as a precarious venture that could dictate the nation’s future.

Moldova’s path toward European Union membership has been marked by significant achievements and recognition, including a formal invitation from the European Council to commence accession processes. However, these successes are overshadowed by escalating aggression in political rhetoric from neighbouring Russia, with officials like Maria Zakharova, director of the Information and Press Department of the Russian foreign ministry, openly challenging Moldova’s European tilt. Within this charged atmosphere, the referendum is not merely a procedural formality but a crucial barometer for the country’s geopolitical orientation and internal consensus.

The internal political scene in Moldova is equally fraught with tension, largely due to the activities of Ilan Shor, a pro-Russian figure and the leader of the (banned) Shor Party. Shor, currently in exile in Moscow to avoid corruption charges at home, remains a significant political force in Moldova. His party, strongly supported by certain Russian elements, has been accused of fomenting instability and undermining Moldova’s European aspirations. Shor’s influence is particularly strong in regions like Orhei, Balti and the Gagauzian autonomous region, where his party has implemented socially populist projects funded by mysterious sources, which many believe to be from Russia (and from the stolen money from the Moldovan banking system). This support base could play a critical role in the referendum, potentially swaying the outcome through strategic boycotts or mass mobilizations against the pro-European agenda.

Adding to the complexity is the formation of “Pobeda” (Victory), a coalition created in Moscow and involving various pro-Russian parties and organizations within Moldova. This coalition aims to consolidate Russian influence in Moldovan politics, presenting a united front against the pro-European government led by Sandu. “Pobeda” seeks not only to influence the outcomes of elections and the referendum but also shape the public narrative around Moldova’s foreign policy orientation. The emergence of this coalition underscores the significant external pressures Moldova faces and highlights the internal divisions that could be exacerbated by the upcoming electoral events. These dynamics charge the referendum with the critical role of a battle for the soul of the nation, making the stakes higher than ever.

Referendum dynamics: potential pitfalls and strategic risks

The strategic decision to hold a referendum concurrently with the presidential elections in Moldova is laden with risks that extend beyond the immediate political landscape. The most pressing concern is the potential for low voter turnout, which could nullify the referendum’s results due to insufficient participation. This risk is heightened by historical precedents, such as the 2010 constitutional referendum aimed at changing the presidential election process, which failed due to low turnout (30.29 per cent). A similar outcome could jeopardize not only the referendum but also Maia Sandu’s chances in the second round (if it will be necessary) in the presidential election and the 2025 parliamentary elections.

Pro-Russian factions, led by figures like Ilan Shor, have the capacity to influence key regions like Gagauzia, Balti and Orhei District. Their influence could significantly skew the referendum’s outcome and escalate tensions in the country. Ilan Shor’s significant influence in Moldovan politics underscores the complexities of external interference and regional influence. His ability to mobilize opposition in strategic areas not only threatens the success of the referendum but could also destabilize the central government if the referendum passes by a narrow margin with substantial non-participation from his strongholds. Such an outcome could intensify regional disparities and exacerbate tensions, threatening national unity at a time when cohesion is most needed.

Moldova’s political structure as a parliamentary republic, where the president’s role in shaping policy is limited, makes parliamentary elections crucial. President Maia Sandu, recognized as a strong pro-European leader, faces significant opposition from pro-Russian elements (and not only). The referendum is seen as a critical measure to uphold the governing party’s reputation and influence. However, the possibility of a strategic boycott by Russian-backed elements looms large, aiming to ensure the referendum fails to meet the necessary participation threshold. This would delegitimize the process and provide a legal pretext for further challenges, reminiscent of the tactics used during the controversial Balti elections.

One likely scenario is that the Shor candidate for the presidential elections will be banned from participation due to illegal financing from Russia, which could be used to legitimize the potential boycott of the elections. A probable candidate for this strategy could be one of the key figures involved in the Moscow presentation of the new coalition “Pobeda”. This would make the cancellation more apparent and could involve a figure such as Alexei Lungu, the leader of the Sansa Party.

Moldova’s path towards EU integration has been complicated and uneven since the country first set its objective for rapprochement with the Union in 2003. Despite complex challenges such as political instability, corruption scandals, economic crises and weak or compromised governments, popular support for the EU has always prevailed over scepticism, albeit by a small margin. In 2021, Moldovans gave a decisive vote to a pro-European majority in the parliament, and in 2020, they elected the strong pro-European figure of Maia Sandu as president, voting out the incumbent pro-Russian leader Igor Dodon. The second round of the 2020 presidential elections registered the highest ever voter participation in Moldova (58 per cent), showing Moldovans’ capacity for strong social mobilization for a unifying cause. However, the pro-Europeans’ mandate was clouded by several consecutive unprecedented crises (energy crisis, inflation, a war at the borders, and a resulting refugee crisis), negatively impacting Moldovans’ support for a pro-European course and contributing to fear, indecision and apathy.

Yet, even amid these crises, particularly after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Moldovan authorities took decisive steps towards the country’s accession to the EU. In March 2022, Moldova applied for EU membership and was granted candidate status in June 2022. In December 2023, EU leaders decided to open accession negotiations. At the end of the year, President Maia Sandu called on the Moldovan parliament to organize a referendum on Moldova’s accession to the European Union, which would be held on the same day as the first round of the 2024 presidential elections. In early 2024, it was announced that the October referendum would be a constitutional one, aiming to enshrine the irreversibility of the country’s accession to the EU in the constitution. For a country long struggling with Russia’s malign influence and resulting societal division, this referendum represents a unique opportunity to finally settle the country’s course for geopolitical development. However, several challenges need to be considered.

Firstly, the nature of the referendum as a constitutional one puts significant strain on ensuring its success. The validation threshold is declared valid if more than a third of the number of people registered in the electoral lists participate, according to the Electoral Code. In the last referendum, which took place in February 2019, together with the parliamentary elections, the participation rate was 38 per cent, five percentage points above the required minimum, respectively. The referendum was subsequently validated. The participation in the first round of the 2020 presidential elections in Moldova was not that high either – 48.54 per cent. Considering these precedents, the 2024 referendum is at high risk of not being validated if boycotted by the pro-Russian opposition.

Secondly, holding the referendum concurrently with the 2024 presidential elections discourages pro-European opposition parties from mobilizing their supporters to participate in the referendum, fearing the transfer of votes from pro-European supporters to Maia Sandu. This could contribute to lower participation in the referendum (according to the latest IRI Moldova survey, pro-European opposition parties have at least ten per cent of citizens’ support) and jeopardize its results.

Finally, the last decade has seen the growing impact of information manipulation in Moldova and repeated attempts at destabilization financed by Russia. For more than a decade, information sources originating from or financed by Russia have spread narratives aimed at promoting a distorted image of the EU and undermining the idea of European integration. This has led to a distorted image of the EU in the country, with 23 to 43 per cent of Moldovans likely to mislabel statements about the EU. These malign narratives also aim to spread pessimism about Moldova’s prospects of joining the EU and fear of possible Russian aggression. According to a 2024 study by WatchDog.md, as much as 26 per cent of Moldovans are apathetic towards politics, which could further impact referendum turnout.

The case for the referendum: mobilization and EU integration

The upcoming referendum in Moldova offers significant opportunities despite the risks. Current polls indicate that around 56 per cent of the population supports the referendum, suggesting a strong mandate for the government’s pro-European Union agenda. This widespread public backing could undermine pro-Russian narratives advocating for alignment with the Eurasian Economic Union, and reinforce Moldova’s commitment to European integration.

The success of the referendum could mark a critical step towards solidifying Moldova’s European path. With a large majority voting in favour, the legitimacy of Moldova’s European trajectory would be bolstered, making it difficult for opposition groups to argue that Moldova’s future lies with Russia. This clear endorsement would help the country in further negotiations and dealings with the EU, providing a stable and predictable political foundation.

Moreover, the political mobilization spurred by the referendum is leading to significant alignments within Moldova’s political landscape. Similar to Romania’s Snagov Pact, Moldovan parties are forming coalitions and alliances, which are crucial for creating a more cohesive and strategic approach to pro-European governance. These coalitions could enhance the government’s ability to implement reforms and maintain stability. The formation of these alliances also indicates a maturing of Moldova’s political system, with parties recognizing the benefits of working together to achieve common goals. This collaborative environment is essential not only for domestic governance but also for strengthening Moldova’s position in international relations.

Lastly, these developments are happening against a backdrop of increasing pressures from Russia, as evidenced by recent aggressive rhetoric from Russian officials. The referendum, therefore, is not just a vote on a specific policy but a reaffirmation of Moldova’s sovereign choice to pursue a European future, contrasting sharply with the Eurasian alternative offered by Russia. This decision point highlights the importance of the referendum in defining Moldova’s path forward, both internally and in its foreign relations.

A referendum of great consequence

Moldova’s referendum, set to occur alongside the presidential elections in October 2024, represents more than a routine electoral event – it is a profound test of democracy that will decisively shape the nation’s future. This referendum is not just about a single policy issue; it is a critical gauge of Moldova’s commitment to European integration and its determination to resist external pressures, particularly from pro-Russian factions that favour a different trajectory.

The stakes of this referendum are exceptionally high. While it carries significant risks, including potential electoral manipulation and the deepening of regional divides, the benefits of a strong mandate for EU integration cannot be overstated. A decisive vote in favour of the referendum could substantially strengthen Moldova’s geopolitical position, solidifying its path towards European Union membership and diminishing the influence of those pushing for alignment with the Eurasian Union. This outcome would not only reinforce the current government’s pro-European agenda but would also offer a more stable and predictable environment for implementing necessary reforms.

In conclusion, Moldova’s upcoming referendum is a pivotal moment that will determine the country’s future direction on the European stage. It offers a unique opportunity for voters to voice their commitment to European values and to take a clear stand on their country’s strategic direction. As such, the October referendum is much more than a procedural necessity; it is a crucial moment of decision that will either affirm Moldova’s European course or expose it to increased instability and external influence. The results will not only shape the immediate political landscape but will also set the trajectory for Moldova’s engagement with Europe and its resistance to pressures from more dominant neighbours.

Alexandru Demianenco is a graduate of the College of Europe in Natolin, currently working as a Senior Programme Officer in an international organization accredited in Moldova. His research interests include the internal politics of Moldova and Romania, as well as geopolitics, security and defence.


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