Can North Macedonia survive another painful sacrifice?

North Macedonia's Prime Minister Dimitar Kovachevski during his visit to Bulgaria in 2022. Bulgaria remains the largest barrier on North Macedonia’s EU path and demands that Skopje takes measures which many argue will have a negative impact on the Macedonian identity. Photo: Belish / Shutterstock

It was heralded as a way for North Macedonia to continue on the Euro-Atlantic path, which was previously blocked by Greece. However, five years since the promises of a bright and shining European future, the country is still in the Brussels waiting room.

The political price of the Prespa Agreement

The signing of the document in June 2018 was followed by a feast and a celebratory mood on the shores of Lake Prespa. The then Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras even described the atmosphere as something akin to a wedding – although it was unclear who the bride was. Tsipras and former Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev jointly received a number of awards for their roles in reaching the agreement. Almost all politicians from the European Union and NATO were elated with the news. The former EU commissioner for enlargement Johannes Hahn called the agreement historic, while NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg welcomed it as part of the path for North Macedonia to join the Alliance. Even Boris Johnson, the British foreign minister at that time, called it “fantastic news”. 

The agreement, however, had to still be ratified by referendum in North Macedonia, a referendum with an ambiguous question: “Are you in favour of EU and NATO membership by accepting the agreement between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece?” The referendum failed to reach the necessary consensus, but nevertheless the government decided to push through the name change by changing the constitution. Visits from high-level EU politicians followed, all in an attempt to convince the opposition and the people to accept the process. Stoltenberg, Hahn, Federica Mogherini and even Angela Merkel came to Skopje. Promises of a European future from European and even US politicians were regularly made. In the end, the government succeeded in gathering enough support in parliament, and with the votes of eight opposition MPs the amendments passed. Many have called this a rotten deal, since some of those that voted were and still are facing charges for crime and corruption.

The vote was preceded by protests that were at times violent. One of the leaders of a pro-Russian fringe political party even climbed on top of an armoured truck with a Russian flag in his hands in an effort to convince the protesters to side with Moscow. The next day Zaev, the former prime minister, declared at a press conference “Long live Macedonia, long live North Macedonia”, as a fait accompli. The name of the country was changed and the agreement went into force several months later, in February 2019 when both North Macedonia and Greece notified the United Nations of the agreement’s completion. Greece was even the first country to ratify the protocol for the country’s entry into NATO.

Yet, if one of the goals of the name change was both NATO and EU membership, then the agreement can be judged as only a partial success. While North Macedonia has joined NATO, the country is still as far from EU membership as it was before. The people behind the agreement, Zaev and Tsipras, paid a political price and are no longer in power. Now, five years and several vetoes later, North Macedonia is preparing another change to its constitution for its EU future, and the start of this process coincides with the anniversary of the Prespa Agreement. High-level visits are already taking place, and in all likelihood, they will continue until the country changes its constitution once again. The only difference is that this time good words and promises might not convince the populace.

The “traumatic process” and the benefits from it

A lot has changed in the five years that followed the Prespa Agreement and many still have mixed feelings about it. It lifted the Greek veto for North Macedonia and allowed the country to join NATO, something that has added value since the start of Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine. Above all, it recognised the Macedonian language and its national identity. This was no longer an issue for Greece, and the two neighbours who for years viewed each other as adversaries, became allies. For the first time a Macedonian language centre was opened in Greece and a Greek court recently rejected lawsuits from far-right groups demanding its abolition, citing the articles of the Prespa Agreement. In this sense, it was a big win for the progressive powers in both countries. However, this was not just about language or identity, the economic impact was also immense. Greece is one of the country’s largest trade partners and is ranked among the top three investors in North Macedonia. Five years on, the two countries enjoy good and amicable relations, something which was almost unimaginable in the past.

The process of the name change, however, was quite traumatic for a lot of Macedonians. Since its signing, the agreement has touched every inch of Macedonian society. It was not just the name that was changed, but a whole way of life. History and geography books, birth certificates, licence plates and even money are now different. Almost immediately the public institutions that had “Macedonian” in their name were changed. For instance, the “Macedonian Opera and Ballet” become the “National Opera and Ballet”, and “Macedonian Television” became “National Television”. Buildings that had “Macedonian” on their façade even had the respective letters taken off them in public, creating a lot of anger in society.

At the same time that this process was going on, road signs in Greece still point towards FYROM (the old abbreviation for North Macedonia) instead of using the new name, North Macedonia. “Skopia” is still the capital of the country, which some Greeks use as a derogatory term for Macedonians, whom they call “Skopianos”. Many politicians and journalists, myself included, asked why this has not changed? The answer from the politicians in Athens was that it was down to the local authorities and bureaucracy. Bear in mind that Greece is amongst the top places for Macedonians to spend their summer holidays, hence the road signs are viewed as offensive. While all this was happening, another problem was growing on the horizon, and the possible solution coincides with the five-year anniversary of the Prespa Agreement. 

Constitutional amendments

North Macedonia and Bulgaria have a Friendship Agreement that was signed before the Prespa Agreement, and since then some Bulgarian politicians have complained that Greece got a better deal vis-à-vis North Macedonia – as if it was a sort of competition. Bulgarian politicians claimed that the friendship agreement was not respected by Skopje, and for that they have vetoed North Macedonia’s EU accession negotiations. To lift the Bulgarian veto, the French developed a compromise – the so-called “French proposal”.

The French proposal puts this bilateral issue in the negotiating framework for EU accession. Hence, in order for North Macedonia to continue on its EU membership path, it has to place protections for ethnic Bulgarians in its constitution. The passing of the constitutional amendments, as mentioned above, coincides with the anniversary of the Prespa Agreement. However, unlike Prespa, this is seen by the majority of the population as pure blackmail.

A recent report from Freedom House found that only 56 per cent of Macedonians saw EU membership as a benefit for the country. An inquiry by the Macedonian Institute for Democracy “Societas Civilis” yielded similar results. According to the institute, support for EU membership has fallen to 64 per cent, with almost 80 per cent of Macedonians against constitutional changes even if that means stopping on the EU accession path. The EU and the United States are still viewed as the country’s primary partners, but Serbia, Russia and Turkey are right there next to them. According to a different poll by Eurothink, most Macedonians consider Bulgaria as their biggest enemy. Greece, on the other hand, is not even in the top ten and is seen as a favourable partner. The data from inquiries like this show that in the eyes of the public, the EU still cannot retrieve the credibility that it lost after the vetoes from Bulgaria. The results also show the inability of Brussels to keep to its word and start accession negotiations with North Macedonia after the Prespa Agreement.

The key problem is that no one can guarantee that the Bulgarian demands will ever stop. As mentioned above, the promises from the past were not kept. This time it feels like giving an unfaithful girlfriend another chance. Many in North Macedonia fear that changing the constitution again might open a Pandora’s box for further Bulgarian demands.

Is this fear justified? On the one hand the EU cannot risk another disappointment, which would impact the whole Western Balkans. On the other hand, Bulgaria in the past two years has had five elections and four caretaker governments. The only winner in this situation is Russia, since the unstable political environment is ripe for Russian malign influence. The election results show just that. The pro-Russian, anti-NATO and anti-EU political party “Renewal” has doubled its votes in just several months. Supporters of this political party recently attacked the EU’s office in Sofia for its support to Ukraine. The party is led by Kostadin Kostadinov, a politician who openly denies the Macedonian nation and language, calling it a construct of Stalin and Tito. This is not very different to the rhetoric coming out of the Kremlin regarding Ukraine.

The difficult road ahead

The road ahead for North Macedonia on its EU integration path is indeed difficult, especially if Macedonian politicians make it that way. After all the sacrifices made regarding the implementation of the Prespa Agreement, the population is weary of new compromises. The feeling is that “we have given enough”, and the possibility of new constitutional changes is viewed with suspicion. Unlike the Prespa Agreement, this time, the votes in parliament might be difficult to find. The agreement with Greece was indeed historic; but in the end, it had only partial success. It did however show that two countries can achieve a compromise even over an issue that some might consider a matter of life and death. It can be, and it is, used as a good example for countries in the Balkans as a way to overcome disagreements, especially in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue.

Whatever the legacy of the Prespa Agreement is in the future, its value is even more appreciated since the war in Ukraine. The hope is that it can be a good guide for the rest of the countries of the Western Balkans, showing that talking and making compromises on difficult issues can have a positive outcome. Yet for that to happen, the EU must be present and stand by its word.

Jovan Gjorgovski is a journalist based in North Macedonia and an editor with the Kanal 5 television station.