We need innovation and courage to rejuvenate democracy

Photo: Grzegorz Mehring / ECS Archive

As early as the second half of the 1980s, there was a very intense debate on the Finlandisation of Central Europe. Therefore, when Solidarity returned in Poland in 1989 and when Hungary launched a new wave of democratisation, there was enthusiasm, but no surprise. What was surprising, however, was the strength of this wave and its impact on the centre of the Soviet empire. Just as much as was the reunification of Germany, and then the collapse of the Soviet Union, whose anniversary we will be celebrating this year.

Moving on to the next decade and the process that preceded it, let us not forget that the period of the collapse of the Soviet Union was also the moment of the beginning of the crisis in the Middle East, when Iraq attacked Kuwait – this is a forgotten but very important event that resulted in the freezing of the Iraqi issue. Even then, Iraq’s policy and the stability of Saddam Hussein’s regime were largely dependent on relations with Iran. This conflict returned in 2001; and 9/11 is not only a symbol of the globalisation of Arabic Islamic terrorism, but from that moment the attention of the whole world was drawn to the order, or rather disorder, of the Middle East. Thus, the example of the beginning of these two decades shows us that there are certain processes that we, as Europeans or the Transatlantic community, witness and accompany, but at a certain point, they gain their own strength, of course through single and unexpected events…

And what about the financial crisis of 2008? Was it a surprise and a marker of a new decade?

This crisis was also hardly a surprise. It was accompanied by the great disappointment of many democrats with the economic system, which was not interested in political consequences and global capitalism, which did not seek to secure its foundations with political methods. Instead, liberals focused on fast money-making and the possibilities of new technologies. In this way, capitalism abandoned its earlier ideas of multiplying not only material values, but also other values ​​that are needed for people to work effectively and create an innovative quality. All this had started collapsing earlier, but 2009, with the crash of banks such as Lehman Brothers, was a symbol of this crisis.

And the second decade of the 21st century…

This last decade has been very interesting indeed. Several important processes characterise it. Let me start with the most positive, which was the formation of a more critical liberal democratic discourse on capitalism. Unfortunately, this discourse did not contribute to the emergence of a strong political party that would make any change. At least I do not see such a force, yet. There may have been successes of individual politicians, such as Emmanuel Macron in France, or earlier Barack Obama in the United States; now Joe Biden and Kamala Harris. They are all, in a sense, the voice of this humanitarian liberalism that criticise an inhuman  approach to capitalism. However, the voices criticising global capitalism, less focused on democracy and human rights, were also louder in this decade. In this way, paradoxically, it turned out that inhuman capitalism has more supporters than it seems. Let’s take a look at contemporary authoritarian systems – they also function thanks to global financial markets.

What, then, did the democrats miss in the last decade?

The last decade, within the ​​social sciences, has brought many valuable ideas for reforming democracy. Nonetheless its image is weaker than populism. Populism, as I said earlier, emerged from criticisms of global capitalism but does not reform it at all. It uses capitalism, which we can best see in the example of Donald Trump  who has shown us how much show business there is in politics. Trump is, above all, a kind of false spokesman for the victims of new capitalism.

Can we not say the same about Putin?

Exactly the same! Putin is a spokesman for global capitalism, which knows no homelands. A homeland is a community of values and as such it serves everyone, and not only for the few to profit. But let’s go back for a moment to the second decade of the 21st century. Just like when the 1980s ended, this decade began with hope of another wave of democratisation. It is worth remembering that in the 1980s democratisation was not only limited to Central Europe. It was a global wave that spanned processes in Asia, Africa and Latin America, although it did not bring democratic changes everywhere. Returning to the last decade, it also gave great hope that it would be possible to overthrow authoritarian regimes and complete the democratization that had begun earlier. Today, however, we have a different picture after a decade of catastrophe: Democracy is still lacking in Egypt; the civil war in Lebanon has worsened; and in Libya it has been frozen. In Syria, we have witnessed one of the cruellest wars, which is also a failure for us Europeans. Nevertheless, while the war in Syria was unexpected, the same cannot be said of the Arab revolutions, which were propelled by earlier waves of democratisation, but also by the presence of democratic states in the Middle East. The latter, among other things, contributed to the overthrow of Hussein’s regime. We know that in Iraq this process was a disaster and we, in the West,  are to blame for this – but this is a well-known topic.

And what world do we have now?

Now we are seeing the dynamics of these three decades interact. To begin with the Middle East. Those who announce that the Arab Spring is over are wrong. Certainly, the reconstruction of such countries as Syria or Iraq is a process that exceeds an individual’s time horizons, but the very process of the democratisation of the Arab world will come back. I would even compare the Middle East with Poland in 1980. The martial law introduced in Poland in 1981 destroyed everything, including the positive civic power of the Solidarity movement. What is worse, Poland never returned to this optimistic social force and lost this positive attitude to democracy. But let us also remember that any force that legitimises its power through violence will eventually lose. The same will happen in Syria. The bigger problem, however, is establishing a democratic culture. This challenge is not only limited to the Arab states and Central Europe. It was also a problem of the transformation in Western Europe after 1945. Nevertheless, I am optimistic.

Do you see Belarus in a similar way?

Yes, even if the current situation seems to be at a stalemate. We know that democratic forces will not overthrow Lukashenka by peaceful means and only such instruments will guarantee the support of the West. We know that Lukashenka has Putin’s support, but we can see that his power has hit a certain barrier and thus he will not be able to manage the country without Russia’s military assistance. Yet, I have a feeling that, after Ukraine and Crimea, Russia will not opt for such an intervention…

I don’t think so either…

Even the little green men no longer seem possible. In the case of Belarus, Russia clearly lacks the myth of secession that it had in Crimea, where the little green men appeared to legitimise the Russianness of the area. And it worked, even in the West. Coming back to Belarus, it seems to me that what is happening on the streets in that state is the last stage of the process which began in 1991. We are the witnesses of historical events. If Lukashenka does not survive, and he will not, a new model of the Belarusian state will emerge. We do not know yet what form will it take – whether it will be fully democratic, or some compromised model which will include the old elite. Regardless, Belarus’s political independence will be a defeat for Putin who built his power on nostalgia for imperial Russia, traditionalism, anti-western rhetoric, as well as the claims of Russia’s spheres of influence. Therefore, democratic, or at least politically independent Belarus, together with Ukraine and the Baltic states, will cement the defeat of Russia’s imperial aspirations.

Would you then say that we will end the decade of the 1990s sometime in the next decade?

Perhaps. But what is happening in Belarus is a process that actually began in the period after the First World War. It was an attempt to build new states after the collapse of three empires in Central Europe. The order that was to emerge as a result was not only to take the form of nation states, but also democratic societies. It failed. The Soviet Union also contributed to the creation of a new order which was based on the principle of spheres of influence. Today’s protests in Belarus would not be possible without Ukraine. As a matter of fact, the key to their understanding lies in Ukraine. What I have in mind is the emergence of an independent Ukraine which is a strong nation state. Today, Ukraine, paradoxically, owes its strong national identity to Putin. Of course, it owes independence to its intellectual elite at the same time. The elite, whose memory is impressive and who have followed a similar path to that of Polish émigrés in the 20th century. It was a path of critical self-reflection. This is the strength of the Ukrainian intelligentsia.

Let us once again analyse this relationship between democracy and capitalism … How do you see its future in the next decade?

The populist experience of the last decade has forced democrats to strengthen and reform democracy, but also to start thinking about how to change the free market economy so that it begins to bring positive effects again. Here we can reap the benefits of the last two decades if we wish to, and build appropriate political alliances. Clearly, the reforms I have in mind cannot only be national. They must bring about change internationally. The last decade was also the one that taught us something new about the democratisation that started in 1989-1990 in Central Europe. After all, that wave of democratisation did not only change Central Europe. Its result did not bring about the Finlandisation of Central Europe, as there is no such thing.  The Central European countries – especially Poland, the united Germany, and Hungary – rather sought to redefine Europe. It is thanks to them, as well as the positive role played by France and Germany, that Europe has deepened and expanded its integration. But, this last decade has been a greater disappointment. These last five years in Poland and ten years in Hungary are an incomprehensible negation of this order.

And now there is also a pandemic…

The pandemic is now an additional, unexpected catalyst. A factor which nevertheless fits into the ecological discourse where humans should return to harmony with nature. Through the pandemic, humanity has also faced its limitations. After all, the pandemic has changed every aspect of our ​​life. It affects all of humanity, every human being…

In a sense it is very democratic…

Indeed, and we actually have a state of emergency now. I would not use the word “war” because these two concepts are incomparable. The only thing comparable with war is that during the pandemic we have a shorter horizon of expectations. What we worry about is whether we will survive the next day or be healthy next week. Who in our family will survive? This may not be as dramatic as war, of course. The pandemic does not generate mass violence, but it has a very strong influence on our existence. We are unable to plan anything; all our plans are hypotheses. Most importantly, we do not know how the pandemic will affect the dynamics we talked about.

Maybe we already know something. In the United States, it was the pandemic, among others, that likely removed Trump from power…

But the pandemic can also serve authoritarian regimes and their consolidation. Therefore, while it is easier to define the negative health and economic consequences of the pandemic, I suggest that we start treating the pandemic as an opportunity.

What do you mean by that?

My hope is that we will see a return to the kind of thinking that was popular in the 1980s and 90s on the principle of subsidiarity. On the one hand, this principle sees a place for decentralisation – in other words, it assumes that services should be tailored to the needs of the people living in a given region, village, or state. On the other hand, it also assumes co-operation among nation states and democratic entities. The pandemic has demonstrated how important it is to have a good doctor nearby and access to effective public services. At the same time, the pandemic is a global challenge which raises such questions as: Why should we not subsidise healthcare? Why should we not create a European health service? The pandemic is a chance to rethink how we want to organise the world and respond to the cycles of the last three decades which we have been talking about.

In a pandemic, we see how difficult politics is. After all, it is the politicians who have to make strategic decisions. Immunologists or epidemiologists can only help by providing partial answers. Yet, when the political process is transparent and accompanied by wide consultations then politicians can show their citizens that they are making rational decisions. Here I agree that Trump has lost as a result of the pandemic. It seems to me that his arrogant approach to this threat, his disregard for public health and a lack of extensive consultation mobilised his opponents. Here in Poland, the pandemic also caused the propaganda mechanisms to jam.

For these reasons I see a potential opportunity in the pandemic. National alliances, even European ones, will not be enough. Therefore, I am full of hope about the new US administration. I believe that, under this new president, the United States will be an important moderator in the global dialogue among democratic states  – starting from New Zealand, Australia, through the states of Africa, Asia and the Americas. Here the influence of Europe is limited. That is why US leadership is still needed.

You aren’t afraid that Biden will start his term by cleaning the American house first? Today, America is divided and polarised. The new administration, with the support of Congress, will have colossal work to do in order to heal the American society…

 In my opinion, what we need to understand is how deeply America is divided and politically diverse, by its federal system. It is much easier to see Trump’s induced polarisation, but it means following his way of thinking. Likewise, I would say it is wrong to assume that America is a young state with relatively young traditions. Just the opposite, in fact. Looking at its political and legal system, you can see that they have been somewhat frozen to keep peace after the civil war. As a result, America still has an electoral system that I consider deeply unfair. Trump emerged from this system and he has nurtured it with new technologies.

The same holds true for isolationism. Here we  show our lack of knowledge about America. For me, the “America First”policy was not very original either. Especially after I read Martin Pollack’s The Emperor of America, in which he tells the story of the migrants from Galicia, but also how America perceived Europe and the world before the First World War. From this reading, we learn that the dominant rhetoric has always been against something –  against immigrants, the old against the new, it has always been racist or strongly isolationist.

Returning to the topic of US leadership, we need to understand that this role of the US as a global trouble shooter will always be the exception rather than the rule. Thus, it will also be difficult for Biden to be active internationally, depending on the public mood. After all, America never wanted to participate in the First or Second World Wars. Its involvement in the last phases was always the result of public pressure. But we also know that in both cases ethnic ties explain America’s involvement, also in the process of post-war reconstruction. And this has basically come to an end. But honestly, I do not want America to be a hegemon, or to dictate the terms of a world order. Europe does not need America to be like this.

I don’t think even Biden wants that…

Internationally, we now need similar thinking as we have in the European Union: that there are smaller states and larger states, but every state is equal. And in this equality, the larger states must show their wisdom. The United States will therefore have an impact when it proposes good solutions.  I am counting on the Biden administration to address the issues we have been talking about. The pandemic shows that the United States is no longer what it was in the 20th century (i.e. a global player isolated on its own island). I think that Biden’s presidency, or perhaps we should even say Harris’s presidency, will be a time when America will work out a new style through which it will retain its individuality, its passivity also, but will allow itself to actively participate in global processes.

Thus, the democratic world regains a partner and the authoritarian world loses one …

Indeed, with Trump’s loss the world’s autocrats lost their greatest ally. Those of us who respect democracy and oppose authoritarian tendencies we need to speak a different language. We need to recognise the power of the Biden-Harris victory because it has proven that democracy can win over populism. Looking forward, we know that neither Trump nor his voters will disappear, but let’s focus on the positive dynamics because this trend has been noticed – as you said – by authoritarian regimes. This new democratic dynamic will also have an impact on our alliances, including military ones. At the same time, we do not have to expect that this new administration will offer us global and ground-breaking solutions. In my opinion, it is enough for Biden to focus on purely American good practices. This could be a modified migration policy, a return to thinking about a political and economic union of North Americas, or new ecological policies.

To me it looks like this administration will be that of a new generation of Americans. You mentioned the environment, I suspect that representatives of the youth climate movement and those involved in the Black Lives Matters movement will now have a greater say in public life…

Absolutely. Especially in matters of equality.

And issues such as human rights will return to foreign policy.

The values ​​of universal human rights will return for sure. That is why I find the Biden-Harris tandem fascinating. I believe that Biden, because of his age and his life experiences, can really show how to overcome political disputes. And to me today’s political dispute is largely focused around this axis of universal human rights.

And this year we will be celebrating the 45th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, which called for the respect for human rights in the authoritarian Soviet Union. This can be an adequate moment for the reflection on how human rights can help overcome authoritarianism…

But remember that authoritarianism can also be innovative. Putin replaced the authoritarian Soviet-style system with a mixture of freedom narratives, longing for imperialism and an anti-western attitude. We forget how innovative authoritarian systems can be in their eclecticism. And they, too, can benefit from the youth. That is why it is so important for democratic forces to be innovative.

And what does innovation mean here?

Courage. Also in the distance to the glamour of political staging. That is why Obama did not fully appeal to me, although of course I considered his victory important and needed. And what irritated his opponents aroused enthusiasm in me. Yet for me he was also a kind of “Twitter president” – an outsider who won because he had the best staging. In a way, he preyed on people’s dreams and hopes. Clearly Obama did not fool anyone, but he did not bring any solid good either.

That is why I value Biden much more. With his victory I can see that society has truly started to be warier of this political staging. Biden hasn’t changed. Ten years ago, Biden was not a super star, although he was younger than he is now. I do not know if he is a super star now, but he certainly represents people’s dreams of politics that is not technocratic, but still focused on problem solving.

Biden shows that people now dream of credible politicians. I hope that the new decade will bring about this type of politics. Political charisma is not about staging. Charisma means that under your leadership citizens can go to bed in the evening and wake up in the morning knowing that you have done your best to face challenges. Charismatic politicians are not corrupt. They accept that authorities should be controlled. They also know how to balance national interests with the responsibility of the wider world. This, I say, is the ideal of politicians for the third decade of the 21st century.

I do not see this ideal yet, mainly because we may all criticise capitalism, but continue to accept its ugly face, which is digital technologies and the power of artificial intelligence. And it is them who set the stage for narcissistic individuals. Thus, we all have our own narcissists and they speak the language of our communities.

Basil Kerski is the director of the European Solidarity Centre in Gdańsk and the editor in chief of Dialog, a Polish-German bilingual magazine.

Iwona Reichardt is the deputy editor in chief of New Eastern Europe.

democracy, Europe, human rights, transatlantic relations