Recent years have seen criticism directed at countries like Poland and Hungary for a level of semi-authoritarianism in their governance. Whilst such issues clearly persist, the parliamentary systems in many of the region’s states have allowed for key checks and balances that have challenged these political shifts.

The region is currently experiencing a wave of elections that could prove pivotal for the future of various countries. If the West is to properly halt Russian designs concerning these events, it must offer a comprehensive plan to both political parties and civil society to strengthen and maintain democratic values in the area.

The West’s failure to support Georgian democracy would have profound implications for its credibility. It would suggest an unwillingness or inability to stand by its allies and support civil movements, potentially leading other pro-western nations to reassess their alliances.

New parties on the right are now challenging Bulgaria’s delicate liberal consensus. These groups promote themselves as defenders of the nation against a force that wishes to challenge Bulgarian traditions. Despite this, such a move only means a restriction of liberal rights to themselves, not the outright abolition of this ideal.

An interview with Samuel Chu, a community organizer for human rights and democracy. Interviewer: Ottilie Tabberer

If in the expression “hybrid regime” the adjective will be the focus of this short essay, understanding the meaning and implications of the term “regime” is an unavoidable starting point. The subsequent questions will be: How do we define a hybrid regime? Are there different types? And what is the crux of the issue today?

The mainstream notion of regime refers to all government institutions and norms, either formalized or informally recognized as existing in a given territory and concerning a given population. When, more precisely, we look at the patterns that shape the channels of access to the leading government positions, the characteristics of the actors who are admitted or excluded from such access, and the resources or strategies that they can use to gain access, we understand that to have a regime we need some stabilization. If there is no stabilization, we are in a fluid transitional phase that can also go towards either an authoritarian solution or a democracy.

From Russia to Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia to Hungary, “foreign agent” style laws have become a preferred instrument for authoritarians to extinguish critical voices, shield their rule from scrutiny and strengthen their hold on power.

By stigmatizing independent civil society, media and other dissenting voices as “trojan horses”, “foreign agent” laws have offered a convenient framing to delegitimize and isolate them. In addition, they have also helped to impose harsh monitoring and reporting requirements and shut critics out of public life. As the promotion of democratic practices and human rights threatens authoritarians’ grip on power, foreign agent laws offer a handy tool to discredit these activities by equating them with promoting the interests of a foreign power.

In the past, authoritarian regimes such as the Soviet Union maintained power through the total control of information and propaganda. Today, the situation has changed significantly. Many of the new features of contemporary dictatorships have been imposed by the process of globalization and technological progress.

Throughout history, dictatorial rulers have been a consistent presence, evolving from tribal chieftains and monarchs to modern-day autocrats. Even in different settings, these leaders had one thing in common: pursuing and maintaining power by utilizing diverse tools to secure their dominance. In ancient times it was often sufficient for a ruler to claim divine endorsement, such as being the representative of a rain or fire god, and to eliminate any threat or expression of disobedience.

An interview with Kacper Rękawek, senior fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. Interviewer: Andrzej Kozłowski

ANDRZEJ KOZŁOWSKI: How is Russia exploiting far-right organizations in Europe?

KACPER RĘKAWEK: This process began over ten years ago and specifically after the 2012 protests in Moscow, when Russians gathered at Bolotnaya Square to express their disagreement with Putin’s third term as president. Having seen the protesters, who in large numbers were representatives of the urban middle class, the Russian authorities came to the conclusion that it was the liberals who were the main threat to the regime. Although these enemies were identified internally, the Kremlin decided to attack them abroad as well.

Across the region there has been a lot of talk about the power of young voters. While this group was seemingly responsible for a recent shift towards the centre in Poland, young people are also linked to growing radicalism. This has seen the youth vote increasingly correlated with a potential threat to democratic values and norms.

The 2023 elections in Poland were historic with a record turnout exceeding 74 per cent. The dissatisfied youth moved against the ruling party, leading to many headlines declaring that “young voters and women saved the elections.” Indeed, many polling stations remained open well past closing time, as videos circulated on social media of queues of voters stretching far down the street. There is no doubt that the youth vote played a decisive role in preventing another term for the populist Law and Justice (PiS) party. But did they also stop the far right from gaining influence?

After the fall of communism, democracy seemed to have won the day all over the world. Thirty years later, autocracy have steadily replaced democratic regimes and is on the rise in Western Europe and the United States, where democracy originated. Many naively believed that autocracy and democracy are mere labels, a choice that would not substantially impact our day-to-day lives.

Democracy and imperialism are mutually exclusive. No empire was, is or can be democratic. The British Empire was not, the imperial People’s Republic of China is not, nor will imperial Russia become a democracy, even when a self-professed democrat is installed at its helm. The necessary precondition of democratization in an empire is decolonization.

In February 2024, the death (or rather, extrajudicial killing) of the leading Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny sent shock waves across the democratic world. It could have been a subdued affair, as in the case of the Chinese 2010 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo. Beijing arrested him on trumped up charges in 2008 and withheld medical care, leading to the dissident’s premature death in 2017. The Chinese authorities did not want to turn Liu Xiaobo into a martyr for democracy. Hence, he was cremated and his ashes scattered at sea. No grave means no pilgrimage site.