Ukrainian democracy in action. Why a successful strategy to counter authoritarianism includes Ukraine’s membership in the EU and NATO
February 15, 2022 - Hanna Hopko
February 15, 2022 - Hanna Hopko
February 3, 2021 - Basil Kerski Iwona Reichardt
February 3, 2021 - Henrik Müller Markus Krzoska
July 31, 2020 - Archil Sikharulidze
June 18, 2020 - Valentina Gevorgyan
April 6, 2020 - Roger Berkowitz Simona Merkinaite
November 15, 2019 - Valentina Gevorgyan
April 19, 2019 - Stefan Jajecznyk
January 15, 2019 - Iwona Reichardt
June 20, 2018 - Maxim van Asseldonk
October 31, 2017 - Mariya Y. Omelicheva
The assassination of Boris Nemtsov in front of the Kremlin on February 27th 2015 marked the first time since the execution of Lavrentiy Beria in 1953 that a viable contender for Russian power was summarily eliminated. By the time Brezhnev forcibly ousted Khrushchev from power in 1964, the Soviet elite had tacitly agreed that power struggles between them would not result in murder; Khrushchev died eight years later, with a pension. Since 1953, the Russian political elite who came to power through illiberal and undemocratic means did not generally purge the allies of their predecessors for fear that the same would be done to them if and when they were succeeded. Perhaps, whoever ordered the assassination of Boris Nemtsov harbours no such fears.
May 31, 2017 - Naphtali Rivkin