The ghosts of Armenia’s past

While the revolution was all about domestic politics, it does not mean that foreign affairs will not be a core concern of the Pashinyan administration. Photo: Travail personnel (CC) commons.wikimedia.org

There is no absence of shallow interpretations of an unpredictable future. What is lacking is a more detailed and nuanced description of the factors that, throughout history, have led to such political ruptures in Armenia. Those moments could be described as a backlash of dignity. Unfortunately in the past they were followed again by periods of immense apathy. Thus, it is not needed to depict an outline of events. It is also vain to predict the aftermath. The first issue has been broadly discussed in the media; the second is unachievable as far as a revolution continues and the outcomes are still unfolding. Hence, the only thing that can be done is to investigate the cyclical and universal patterns, which like a haunting apparition repeatedly returns to disgrace the revolutionary momentum – something that no one in power in Armenia has been able to defeat thus far.

Geopolitical determinism

The most important task ahead for Pashinyan and his allies is to avoid the idea of inevitability in geopolitics. Analysts often tend to overestimate geopolitical determinants, considering them an unbiased way of understanding the truth. A combination of geography and politics, however, does not stand as an objective reality which inescapably shapes circumstances and robs political actors of any ability to change it. For a long time Armenian politics has been dependent on this misbelief. And because of this deterministic approach to geopolitics on the international level, Armenian politicians have acted anxiously, rooting their positions in a specific type of nationalism narrated by the ideology of miatsum (in reference to unification with the Nagorno-Karabakh region), a united Armenia and a prehistoric mythological ethnogenesis of the nation. This approach should not be too surprising, however. Since antiquity, different Armenian statehoods were surrounded by expansionist neighbours. The diplomatic manoeuvres and direct clashes with the Roman and Persian Empires continued in the Middle Ages with the arrival of Turkic tribes, followed by the appearance of Tsarist Russia and then the Soviet Union. Armenians were usually considered as a burdensome minority spread amongst three antagonistic political entities, sometimes a crucial piece in the game of empires. In effect, they developed the idea of survival as the key determinant of national existence.

Long-lasting hostile circumstances have led the vast majority of modern Armenian politicians to take the international backdrop for granted and as something that is unavoidable. Miatsum became a core value which perfectly fits the ideological narrative of this survival mode. However, its moderate and more pragmatic version offers a compromising alternative. This alternative is a strategic alliance with Russia, maintained more out of necessity than of free will. The first number of months following the 2018 Velvet Revolution confirmed that Pashinyan is aware of the difficult situation he is in, and his foreign agenda will be no different than his predecessors. He paid a visit to Stepanakert (the largest city in Nagorno-Karabakh) pledging support to the authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh (or the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh). A few days later, he visited Moscow.

Already after the elections and in light of the turmoil due to the arrest of Yuri Khachaturov (head of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization or CSTO), Pashinyan confirmed the determination for deeper integration with Russian-led projects like the Eurasian Economic Union and the CSTO. These tactical steps were intended to be a strong signal to Baku that, despite profound domestic change, Armenia still has Russian support in its international affairs. Meanwhile, Armenia sees the alliance with Russia as unfavourable but necessary. While the survival of the nation remains the axiological core of any given Armenian ideology, security, even in the form of the status quo (not certainly the best option), is a must for Armenian policymakers. Thus, in the substance of geopolitical enemy Pashinyan has no further moves for the moment. But there are other areas where Pashinyan may try to make some headway.

The shadow of genocide and war

The mass protests which brought Pashinyan to power were concentrated around the tragic economic situation and the reluctance of the oligarchic political system to seek solutions. Frustration and apathy reached their peak after Serzh Sargsyan’s decision to take over the position of prime minister was seen as the final straw. In other words, the revolution was all about domestic politics, not about Armenia’s foreign affairs. Obviously, it does not mean that foreign affairs will not be a core concern of the Pashinyan administration. What is more, the approach to Nagorno-Karabakh is strictly related with another ghost from the past – namely, the Armenian genocide and the search for its international recognition.

At the same time, Pashinyan’s post-revolutionary coalition openly supports a new opening with Turkey. Pashinyan strongly emphasises that Armenia can speak about establishing official relations “without any preconditions”. This is a very significant break from previous policy, as Armenia no longer expects its Turkish counterparts to first recognise the atrocities of the past as genocide before any talks can begin. Early on, Pashinyan understood that softening relations with Turkey could help restart negotiations with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. However, soon after Pashinyan’s announcement, Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, stated decidedly that any problems between Armenia and Turkey can be discussed only with the “absolute precondition which is the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh” dispute.

Clearly, the Turkish president slammed the door on Pashinyan’s attempt of reaching out to him. Yet, in some sense, Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) are hostages to a fragile co-operation in the Turkish parliament. To maintain a minority government, the AKP needs to count on the support of the National Movement Party (MHP), which represents the harshest approach to the Armenian question and resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh. Furthermore, in March this year important local elections will be held in Turkey. Thus, it is naïve to expect any serious developments from the Turkish side.

As a result, Pashinyan has decided to change course. To hunt down the overwhelming shadows of the past, the new Armenian government is now trying to achieve progress through a new opening of peace talks with Baku. Surprisingly, positive statements from Armenian officials (in the form of Twitter messages) were met with a positive response from Azerbaijan. Ilham Aliyev, Azerbaijan’s president, and Elmar Mammadyarov, the foreign minister, shared Pashinyan’s willingness to continue genuine peace talks.

This is not the usual diplomatic courtesy of Baku officials for the newcomers. It is also not just a smile required by diplomatic protocol. A further and more serious step was connected with a reshuffle amid Azerbaijani officials responsible for Nagorno-Karabakh. The most visible change was the appointment of Hikmet Hajiyev as Aliyev’s foreign policy adviser, and Tural Ganjaliyev as head of the government body representing the interests of the internally displaced Azerbaijanis in Nagorno-Karabakh. Both are considered moderate and reasonable in their approach to Armenia. This move was followed by an official statement by the foreign ministers of both Armenia and Azerbaijan, announced during the last meeting of the OSCE Minsk Group in Paris, which declared a new agreement that seeks possible economic co-operation and the preparation of populations of both countries for peace. This statement is the most positive outcome of direct talks in years. Still, many obstacles and disagreements exist, including the participation of the authorities of the self-declared para-state and representatives of the IDPs. It is still premature to call these developments a breakthrough, yet in the context of a permanent deterioration of relations during the last ten years, they are certainly encouraging signs.

The enemy within

In addition to the abovementioned ghosts, Armenia has created the greatest enemy of all – the enemy within. Since regaining independence, Armenian politics has become a continuous cycle from hope to despair. The threat of security has led to a deterioration in human rights and a decline of democratisation. The previous authorities’ approach – that the Nagorno-Karabakh issue can only be resolved by those directly connected with region – has resulted in the creation of the Karabakh clan. Close alliances between the Karabakh clan and unions of veterans (a strong interest group) have resulted in the creation of a deeply corrupted oligarchic system of clientelism and patronage, without a single trace of transparency or institutional border between business and politics.

All of those issues are related to the deep animosities within Armenian society and ambiguous influence of the diaspora on domestic politics. A deep dependence on foreign investments and remittances from Armenians working abroad throughout the years has further led to administrative decisions which are often reliant on external support. These factors have helped create a complex network of interests, relations and dependencies. It will require great patience to systematically face all the abuses of power and political corruption.

To defeat this enemy from within, the new authorities will have to challenge not only the long-lasting institutionalised and consolidated abuse. Only a revolution in the Armenian mentality will avoid a retreat and return to apathy. On the surface, it seems that Pashinyan understands this necessity.

Armenian’s destiny is emphasised through the suffering and repeated downfalls. The only solution is to demolish all of what is left in the name of an uncertain future. And only then can Armenia build a stable future. All we can do is to wait and see whether Pashinyan is able to break the vicious cycle.

Bartłomiej Krzysztan is a research assistant at the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences. His research interests include cultural memory, identity in the post-Soviet space, and politics in the South Caucasus.

Armenia