Georgia in the move to a multi-polar world

Photo: Marcin Konsek / Wikimedia Commons / CC BY-SA 4.0

Domestic support for Georgia’s geopolitical agenda is broad-based. The latest poll from the National Democratic Institute found support for EU membership at 75 per cent and NATO membership at 65 per cent. However, significant progress on either front has not been forthcoming. NATO’s 2008 Bucharest declaration that Georgia would eventually become a member has not been followed up with a Membership Action Plan, while EU accession talks have not even been offered – although many argue that Georgia’s democratic development is further along than that of Serbia or Montenegro.

Static agenda

The fact that Georgia has not made progress on its EU or NATO ambitions – despite the EU’s acknowledgement of its democratic progress and NATO’s recognition of the development of its defence institutions – raises the question of why Georgia’s geopolitical agenda has remained so static. Most international relations scholars, not to mention many Georgian citizens, recognise that NATO and EU membership is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, Georgia’s geopolitical agenda has remained stable, given the constant Russian threat.

A key factor affecting this situation is the continued presence of the Russian military in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Kremlin unilaterally recognised these statelets as independent in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and has only deepened its presence in both territories since. In November 2014 Russia and Abkhazia finalised a new friendship treaty, the terms of which include having the authorities in Sukhumi co-ordinate its foreign, defence, economic and social policies with the Kremlin. Georgia decried the move as a step towards the annexation of its sovereign territory. The treaty came only months after Abkhazia’s so-called “May event,” which Carnegie Europe Senior Fellow Thomas de Waal noted was “seen variously as a popular uprising or a putsch.” This event saw Abkhazia’s then-de facto president, Alexander Ankvab, resign amid a series of protests led by Raul Khajimba, who had unsuccessfully contested the region’s 2004, 2005, 2009 and 2011 elections despite claiming the personal endorsement of Vladimir Putin. Khajimba, however, went on to win the 2014 presidential election, called after Ankvab was forced to resign following a visit from Kremlin aide Vladislav Surkov. Khajimba seized on the populist issue of whether or not ethnic Georgian residents living in de facto Abkhazia (primarily in the Gali District) should be entitled to Abkhaz citizenship. Khajimba’s narrow victory may not have been possible if those potential voters were not stripped of their rights before the election.

Georgia, according to national statistics, is home to some 253,000 internally displaced persons, nearly seven per cent of the total population (although the government census is unable to collect data in Abkhazia or South Ossetia). The overwhelming majority of the IDPs are from Abkhazia. While the 2014 “May event” in Abkhazia made few headlines elsewhere, its effect on ethnic Georgians still living in the Abkhaz-controlled territory would bring back memories of the brutal 1992-1993 Abkhaz conflict not only to the IDPs but the wider population as well – many of whom have personal ties to Abkhazia or the conflict. They were again re-kindled in May 2016 when an Abkhaz border guard shot and killed a Georgian citizen in the Tbilisi-administered territory.

Creeping border

Moscow signed a similar pact with South Ossetia in March 2015. Abkhaz and South Ossetian separatism are often treated as part of the same issue, but there are crucial differences. The former does not actively seek integration into Russia, while South Ossetian authorities overtly do. The geographic boundaries of Abkhazia are also fairly well defined by the Inguri River and the Caucasus mountains. South Ossetia’s demarcation with Georgia is far more ill-defined. This has led to continued tension over the “borderisation process” which has seen South Ossetia, and in turn the Kremlin, gradually move the administrative borderline further into Georgian territory. Georgians are regularly detained by Russian and South Ossetian authorities for violating these lines. Many Georgians are reminded of this process everyday, not least because it has brought the lines of control to within 400 meters of the country’s main east-west highway.

As long as Russian forces loom over Georgia and patrol parts of what Tbilisi and the vast majority of the international community consider its sovereign territory, Georgia’s foreign policy will continue to seek support and alliances elsewhere to keep it away from Moscow’s orbit. While the Kremlin toned down its rhetoric against the authorities in Tbilisi after archnemesis Mikheil Saakashvili’s second presidential term ended in 2013, bilateral relations have yet to be re-established. Meanwhile, the Russian-Georgian conflict found a new outlet when Saakashvili’s involvement in Ukrainian politics enabled the Kremlin to continue to present him as a bogeyman. Georgian volunteers joined the side of Ukrainian forces fighting in eastern Ukraine while a predominantly-Abkhaz battalion, Pyatnashka, was formed to fight alongside Russian troops and their separatist proxies, who were also joined by volunteers from the South Ossetian conflict. Georgia’s domestic conflicts may be frozen, but they are very much alive.

Georgia continues to be seen as a potential battleground for Russia-West tensions. Meanwhile the EU’s policy towards Georgia has remained static, and the United States, under both Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump, has also continued to voice support for Georgia, though with a few notable changes in policy. One area where a more visible change in Georgia’s foreign relations is evident is the shifting trade balances and investment partners in the country. Trade with the European Union has risen from just under two billion euros in 2008 to 2.6 billion euros in 2017, making the EU Tbilisi’s largest trade partner, accountable for 27 per cent of Georgia’s total trade. Yet hopes that the EU’s Association Agreement, and the adjoining Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement signed in June 2014, would greatly boost Georgian exports has yet to come to fruition.

Economic relations with the United States remain limited, even if political ties remain close. One notable exception is the development of the Anaklia Deep Water Port, which will replace the aging infrastructure at the nearby Poti port, and will significantly expand its capacity. This project is being led by the American companies Conti International and SSA Marine. The port development is arguably Georgia’s most geopolitically significant project, and not only because it is nearly adjacent to the boundary line with Abkhazia. Conti outbid a group of Chinese investors seeking to pursue the same project. Chinese companies nevertheless continue to actively affirm their interest in the project, which Conti’s directors have described as well-suited to take advantage of east-west trade. It would fit squarely within the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) project, a core feature of Chinese foreign policy in recent years.

The OBOR project and China’s growing political and economic role in Eurasia stand to affect the region’s geopolitics more profoundly than any event since the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. Georgian trade with China has grown even faster than its trade with the EU, and foreign investment from China is also growing faster than its trade with the EU, or any other country for that matter. Perhaps the most notable investment is that of the Hualing Group, which has built thousands of new homes in an effort to develop a whole new district of Tbilisi, known as Tbilisi Sea New City. China has also bought up banks and is developing an industrial zone outside of Kutaisi, Georgia’s second-largest city. The two countries signed a Free Trade Agreement in May 2017, making Georgia one of only six countries with a free trade deal with both the EU and China.

Some in Tbilisi noted Beijing and Moscow’s present amicable relations in the debate over the future of the Anaklia port, and this tie-up is perhaps one reason that Georgia’s government favoured US investors for the strategically located port over those from China. However, Chinese interest in the port makes sense given Georgia’s free trade agreements and Beijing’s investments in the wider region.

China and Russia have many competing interests across Eurasia. One example is Turkmenistan, which had been exporting nearly all of its natural gas supplies to Russia since 2009 – the same year that saw Ashgabat and Beijing sign a 30-year pact for natural gas exports. By 2016, Turkmenistan sold its gas exclusively to China, having lost both Russia and Iran as customers. China has also loaned billions of dollars to Belarus, which has long counted on the Kremlin for support. In this context Georgia, too, could play a role in future Russian-Chinese competition. Michael Cecire, Project Director for the Eurasia Democratic Security Network at the Center for Social Sciences in Tbilisi, notes that “alternating narratives of exuberance and pessimism relating to Georgia-China relations increasingly represents a sine wave over time … meanwhile, China may not have the wherewithal or interest to challenge Russia’s dominant regional position, but it is still likely to be a major player in trade, investment, and even in defense in limited respects.”

Georgia for Georgians

Georgia is by no means immune to the growing levels of nationalism that have become a feature of western politics in recent years. The country’s historical conflicts with the Islamic world have been repurposed by nationalist groups such as the Patriots’ Alliance, which secured parliamentary representation in the 2016 election, eking over the five per cent threshold. After the election, many claimed the party was a potential pro-Russian force, but that is an oversimplification, to say the least. The party includes quasi-monarchists, such as the former anti-Abkhaz warlord Emzar Kvitsiani and the son of Georgia’s first democratically elected president Zviad Gamsakhurdia – whose “Georgia for Georgians” slogan evidences the nationalism Georgia witnessed in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse. This form of conservative nationalism has always remained a thread in Georgian politics, as demonstrated by the fact that, despite their bitter differences with one another, every Georgian government has enabled the Georgian Orthodox Church’s effort to shape policy on matters ranging from the ownership of non-Georgian Orthodox places of worship to drug policy.

We may see a resurgence of this nationalist trend. While there is no evidence to suggest that parties as extreme as the Patriots’ Alliance will expand their vote share significantly, signs of extremist rhetoric are nevertheless becoming more common amongst mainstream actors. For example, in November 2018, Saakashvili made xenophobic remarks against tourists from South Asia visiting Georgia, by saying he preferred wealthier sheikhs from the United Arab Emirates. This kind of rhetoric risks having the most negative impact on Georgian-Turkish relations, which have long been healthy. The two countries have close economic relations as well, but there are signs their ties could fray, particularly if the Turkish or Georgian economies take a downturn. The Georgian Dream political party was accused of stirring anti-Turkish sentiment ahead of the 2012 election when it came to power. If Turkey does ultimately break its ties with the West and moves closer to Russia, this would have dramatic ramifications for Georgian geopolitics. The groundwork for anti-Turkish sentiment may already be laid. Today, it is common to hear complaints – even from urbane Tbilisites – that Davit Aghmaneshenebeli Avenue, one of Tbilisi’s main shopping streets, has been taken over by businesses owned by, and catering to, Turks and Iranians.

Georgia is a growing tourist destination for Iranians, who enjoy 45 days of visa-free travel there, and it has welcomed investments from Iran in recent years. However, it has a troubled record with those attempting to evade Iranian sanctions – most notably the case where three Iranian businessmen set up a number of Georgian companies in a scheme that ran from 2011 until they were placed on US sanctions lists in 2014. Under the Trump administration, any similar incident would risk a breach of Georgian-US relations. Nonetheless, despite its proximity and growing investment and trade links, Middle Eastern geopolitics tends to have few ramifications for Georgia. Yet, as Turkey’s relations with the Gulf fray and the West faces internal divide over Iranian policy, it would be premature to say that this will remain the case.

New relationships?

Georgian’s foreign policy has long been shaped by a bipolar geopolitical reality. While many describe the decades following the fall of the Soviet Union as unipolar, given the United States’ and wider West’s general dominance in international affairs, Georgia’s reality has been different. This is mainly due to its geography, tucked just south of the Caucasus next to Russia, which even at the nadir of its power in the 1990s stationed troops in Armenia and in Georgia proper.

But Georgia now finds itself in an increasingly multipolar environment. Internal tensions within the West – particularly when it comes to Turkish geopolitics as well as the relationship between the EU and the United States – means Georgia can no longer count on the same policy stability from its traditional partners. Georgia will have to act to ensure that its relationship with regional powers, such as the Gulf states and Turkey, do not damage its ties with the United States over the coming decade. The rise of China globally, and within Eurasia in particular, is a process that is still playing out, particularly with regards to potential flashpoints with Russia.

Just as Georgia looks to NATO as a buffer against a Russian threat, actual membership in the Alliance will not be on the cards for the foreseeable future. In order to deter Russia, Tbilisi may then look to Beijing for a new relationship. If this is the case, the Kremlin is unlikely to risk its relationship with Beijing to improve its position solely in Georgia.

Maximillian Hess is head of political risk advisory and principal analyst for Europe and Eurasia at AKE International. He is also a director of the British-Georgian Society.

Belt and Road Initiative, China, Georgia, Russia