Why Russia has very little to offer

Photo: Liya_Blumesser / Shutterstock

Moscow’s relationship with its western neighbours has never changed over time and has always been characterised by recurring elements in the economic, political and identity spheres. These are namely dependence, the preservation of state inefficiency and a hierarchy of status. This approach creates relationships based on ownership rather than mutual growth. It is therefore not surprising that the neighbouring European populations, and among them the Ukrainians, want to move away from this reality. They want to dream not only of independence and freedom, but, above all, of an improvement in their economic and material conditions.

Economic blackmail versus opportunities

Over the years, Russia has not abandoned its imperial attitude towards its neighbours. The ongoing war waged against Ukraine proves this once again. Moscow considers its fate linked to that of Kyiv not by culture or history but by unquestionable divine right. In the 30 years since Ukraine’s independence, coercion and blackmail have systematically characterised Russia’s approach to Ukraine. Soft or even smart power strategies have never been considered by the Russian leadership.

Russia’s actions in its neighbourhood have always been tied to a clientelist approach to regional political elites. This has never taken into account the needs of the population. Lacking in strategic vision, the Russian leadership has based its influence in the region, and therefore also in Kyiv, on discounts on energy supplies, the sale of arms and offering jobs to migrants who seek remittances to send home. This has created growing dependence among inefficient and indebted states. Moscow has either used this weakness to impose its agenda or to look benevolent by offering debt relief or debt for asset swaps. The unstable equilibrium created by Russia was destined to collapse mainly because on the other side of the border there is an “opponent”. This is namely the European Union, which for historical reasons knows nothing but an economic approach that better meets the needs of former Soviet populations.

As a result, Moscow’s idea of economic relations resembles more of a seller-client relationship than a partnership between states on an equal footing. Moscow’s use of its trade balance is also linked to creating dependency, rather than fostering economic convergence and promoting growth and welfare in the neighbourhood. The trade surplus that Russia maintains with its neighbourhood through its abundance of raw materials also offers an example of an imperfect view of inter-state relations. It is enough to think about the United States and its huge trade deficit to understand that dependency can also be viewed in the exact opposite way.

Russia’s structural inability to offer anything other than tips to its neighbours has allowed other international actors to get closer to Russia’s partners. Another example of Russia’s incorrect use of trade strategies can be seen in its free trade agreements. The Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is, in fact, more about creating dependence than providing opportunities. Indeed, while the European Union’s Association Agreement does not preclude states from concluding similar agreements with other countries, the EAEU is an exclusive agreement. For instance, Ukraine and Georgia, which have concluded agreements with the EU, also benefit from free trade agreements with Canada and China respectively. In addition, the EU moves funds around the common market in order to redistribute wealth from richer to poorer regions. On the contrary, Russia has never pursued any principle of redistribution from the centre to the periphery and this has only fostered discontent in its European neighbourhood.

Oligarchic regime versus institutional reforms 

The shock therapy imposed on the Russian economy in the 1990s, largely inspired by neoclassical economic theories, betrayed expectations and turned Russia into an oligarchy. Since then, in line with what powers have done throughout history, Russia’s aim has been to support and sponsor similar systems in countries within its sphere of influence. Moscow subsequently hopes to foster dependence and loyalty and reduce the sovereignty of neighbouring states. Countries such as Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and Armenia have tried to rebel against this imposed vision of a weak state led by a strong leader. This model is very clear with regards to Belarus and Kazakhstan. In this context, what the West has to offer is very attractive. In particular, with the launch of the Eastern Partnership, the EU offered its neighbours a new democratic model of governance and financial support for institutional reforms. This initiative was perceived by the Russians as an encroachment on their backyard. In 2009, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov even defined the Eastern Partnership as “an attempt to extend the EU’s sphere of influence” at Russia’s expense. Looking at Ukraine, the EU’s engagement has, in fact, been remarkable. Since 2014, EU institutions have sent more than 15 billion euros in grants and loans to support reform processes in Ukraine. US aid to Ukraine in the same period amounted to some 5.6 billion US dollars directed, among others, to the security sector. 

One of the main opportunities offered by the West was the granting of scholarships and visas to citizens of the former Soviet states. This allowed people from these countries to visit, study and live in western democracies. They experienced an alternative way of life, more effective models of government with strong civil societies and, above all, better living conditions guaranteed in the EU by strong health, education and welfare systems. Having a better and more appealing offer, they made their choice to reject the Russian outlook through revolutions. In Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004, 2014), Moldova (2009) and Armenia (2018), citizens fought for social justice and freedom against corruption and the autocrats who were misusing their power for personal gain. Since these oligarchic systems were deeply rooted in the public spheres, it was hard to make the transition from one regime to another. A vivid example of old regime resistance was seen after the Orange Revolution, when Ukraine stepped back from its EU Association Agreement under Russian pressure. As a result, the Ukrainians made their desires for European integration clear during and after Euromaidan. In that case, too, Russia tried to mend the rift by offering 15 billion dollars in economic aid, but with little success. This proved that citizens were not just asking for solidarity but were overall seeking a better future. 

If we approach Ukraine’s European integration process critically, we can undoubtedly find many drawbacks. To cite one example, academia has introduced the concept of “declarative Europeanisation” to criticise the lack of commitment to implement comprehensive reforms in Ukraine. However, even if the reforms implemented by Ukraine are far from ideal, this does not remove the fact that Ukrainians want to integrate with the EU. This is where Russia should ask itself what alternative it offered its neighbours to convince them not to take the Euro-Atlantic path.

Inferiority versus national identity 

Driven by an imperial vision, Russia has always thought of itself as the centre of an empire, much like during the Soviet Union. After all, it ruled a huge multinational territory and was always militarily stronger than the people who inhabited the country’s sphere of influence. The golden rule for any state holding an imperial vision of inter-state relations is to present itself as the “saviour” of others, and Russia is no exception. The recurrent use of the term “little brother” in relation to partner states exemplifies Russia’s nationalism and sense of superiority over the other republics of the former Soviet Union, as well as the states and ethnic groups in the Russian Federation.

At the same time, it is worth emphasising Russia’s “special” attitude towards the Slavic nations of Ukrainians and Belarusians. In particular, they are considered to be Russia’s little brothers par excellence. While relations with Belarus are (for the moment) good, as they are based on a vulnerable president in Minsk, Ukraine proved more resistant to Russia’s approach to state relations. Russia’s special feeling towards Ukraine was perfectly described by Zbigniew Brzezinski, who argued that Russia without Ukraine loses its character as a Eurasian power. In other words, without Ukraine, Russia remains a local Asian power. This vision is totally at odds with Moscow’s claim that it should have a global role and a strong presence in the world. This outlook is made clear in recent speeches by Putin and Lavrov regarding their justification for the invasion of Ukraine. They constantly repeat the idea that their actions are aimed at ensuring European security and that Russia is an integral part of Europe.

Another part of Putin’s narrative states that Ukraine is a historical part of Russia. Needless to say, in the regularly updated maps provided by the Russians on military operations, the name Ukraine is even absent while those of neighbouring countries remain. This shows that the Russian elite’s general perception of Ukraine remains unchanged.

For Ukraine to remain with Russia would mean always having the inferior status of a little brother. Independence in 1991 opened a new chapter for Ukraine, allowing it to become a sovereign state. From this point of view, the further Ukraine moves away from Russia, the better it is for its nation-building process. This idea was crystallised especially after the annexation of Crimea, which encouraged Ukrainians to further strengthen their national identity by striving to differentiate themselves from Russia. For this reason, Euro-Atlantic integration was the best and only possible alternative route. 

For any nation, crucial historical moments can become the foundation for building a national identity. For Ukrainians, these moments are often related to the Soviet past and its legacies, such as the Holodomor and Euromaidan. Such moments shape the collective memory of Ukrainians and encourage them to feel that they share the same pain and happiness. Today, Ukraine is probably experiencing the most crucial moment in its history. If before the annexation of Crimea, Eastern and Western Ukraine had different foreign policy visions, now the country’s unification is clear. Against one of the world’s most powerful enemies, Ukrainians are more than united. Regardless of the material outcome of the war, Ukrainians will win spiritually, as their nation-building will be considered complete precisely because of the aggression from their Russian “big brother”.

Tatevik Hovhannisyan is a political scientist specialising in political communications and civil society affairs. She is a graduate of the College of Europe in Natolin and Yerevan State University. Her areas of interest include EU-Neighbourhood relations, civic participation in developing countries and advocacy.

Tiziano Marino is a political analyst and researcher specialising in international security and macroeconomics. He is a graduate of the College of Europe in Natolin and Roma Tre University. His research interests include the EU Neighbourhood, the South Caucasus and South Asia.

Russia, Russian imperialism, Ukraine, Ukraine at war