Intermarium in the 21st Century. A new path for Europe?

A bust of Józef Piłsudski Photo: uroburos (CC) www.pixabay.com

His proposal failed, and one by one the nations in Europe’s borderland fell prey to the threats surrounding them. Today, Eastern European nations are again surrounded by threats, from Russian adventurism in the east to sublimation under EU politics in the west. Learning from its mistake 100 years ago in not banding together in solidarity, Eastern Europe should come together in a 21st century adaptation of Piłsudski’s proposal, creating a strong and independent region capable of asserting itself on the international stage.

Piłsudski’s proposal, known in Polish as Międzymorze and by its Latin cognate Intermarium (both of which translate to “between the seas”), was formulated in the context of post-WWI Europe. Recognising that the fledgling nation-states in Eastern Europe could never stand up to the imperial designs of Europe’s power players on their own, Piłsudski advocated for an economic, defence and quasi-political association modelled loosely on the medieval Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In its most ambitious iteration, the Intermarium coalition would have formed a united political community stretching from the Baltic Sea down to the Adriatic and Black Seas, capable of pushing back against economic, military and political pressures exerted by powers both to the east and west.

Piłsudski’s Intermarium

Piłsudksi’s Intermarium drew heavily on his Promethean plan, which was intended to weaken the Soviet Union by supporting nationalist movements among non-Russians to Poland’s east. Through the dual-pronged approach of Prometheanism and Intermarium, he hoped to strengthen Poland’s eastern border and to neutralise the growing Soviet threat. In the first few years of independence after the conclusion of the First World War, Piłsudski attempted to enact both plans, although he never expressed these sympathies explicitly or systematically. Rather, he approached their development much the same way as he engaged in domestic politics – through his cult of personality and personal entreaties.

For several reasons, his efforts were largely unsuccessful. Internationally, Piłsudski met with strong resistance from foreign nationalists due to the legacy of Polish political and cultural domination during the period of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Lithuanians, in particular, were reluctant to re-join any form of union with the Poles, as they had been unequal partners in the Commonwealth. The leader of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, Symon Petliura, was more sympathetic to Piłsudski’s Promethean initiative, as he recognised the existential danger that Soviet expansion posed to Ukraine, although he never expressed outright support for the Intermarium. Belarus, whose territory would have formed the most significant geographical barrier to Soviet expansionism, had only a weak national movement during the early interwar period, with no strong desire to counteract increasing Soviet influence. Ultimately, the only newly-formed nation in Eastern Europe willing to engage in any formal political, economic or military alliance with Poland was Romania, which concluded a series of treaties beginning in 1921 with the Polish state, although none of these treaties approached the level of integration envisioned by Intermarium.

The great powers were likewise reluctant to support Polish initiatives aimed at weakening Russia. Immediately after the war, neither France nor Britain viewed Bolshevism as a serious political development and were therefore unwilling to engage in any behaviour they saw as potentially threatening their longstanding alliance with imperial Russia. Instead, both powers urged Poland to follow Wilsonian principles of self-determination along purely ethnic lines, in the hope that this would satisfy both nationalist desires in Poland as well as traditional Russian foreign policy objectives.

Piłsudski also met with strong domestic resistance, led chiefly by Roman Dmowski and the National Democrats. Dmowski’s vision for Poland aligned with that of France and Britain, namely, an ethnically homogeneous Polish state. Any attempt to incorporate ethnically non-Polish territories into a new Polish state (or federated union) was anathema to his political objectives. This political philosophy was to play a major role in the death of Piłsudski’s Intermarium following the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1921. Dmowski controlled the Sejm during the peace negotiations in Riga in March 1921, meaning that his vision for the future of Poland dominated, as any treaty required formal parliamentary approval. Because of this, Poland’s diplomats negotiated a peace that they knew would pass muster in parliament. This meant only modest territorial gains eastward to reflect the large Polish communities living in the borderlands between Poland and Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. It also meant the ceding of Lithuanian, Belarusian and Ukrainian territory to the Soviet sphere of influence, resulting in the total destruction of the nationalist movements in those countries and the establishment of Soviet republics. This peace, which situated Poland between a strengthened USSR and a weakened but eventually revived Germany, was to last until the dual Nazi and Soviet invasions in September 1939.

Strengthening Europe

Today, Poland and other Eastern European states are, once again, suspended between powers to the east and to the west. This suspension has led to growing nationalist fervour, which many pundits lament may be the demise of the liberal European project. In contrast to what many commentators suggest, however, the hope for salvation may rest not in greater integration within the structures of the EU, but rather could lie in reviving Piłsudski’s dormant Intermarium and adapting it to the needs of today.

Such a proposal needs to transcend the largely symbolic unity of current regional associations, including the Visegrád Group and the Three Seas Initiative. It would require institutional co-operation on a level akin to the European Union with functional decision-making groups comprised of high-level plenipotentiaries as well as working groups commissioned specifically to design and implement pan-regional foreign, economic and defence policies. In fact, an initial framework for such an association has already been proposed. In 2014, Marcin Kędzierski, the president of the Jagiellonian Club, a conservative think tank, suggested in an article for Nowa Konfederacja ten concrete steps that Eastern European nations could take to strengthen regional association, including coalescing defence and economic policies, funding increased transportation and infrastructure networks and bankrolling new, pan-regional educational initiatives. While this should not serve as the final iteration of a 21st century Intermarium, it provides a strong intellectual backbone from which to begin such discussions.

The bifurcation of European association would, in fact, serve to strengthen pan-European ties. It is precisely the premature enlargement of the European community that has contributed to the various pressures now weighing on Brussels. Nationalist politicians in Eastern Europe push back not on the idea of a united European community per se, but rather on the dominance of Western European economic and political values in that community. Allowing Eastern European nations to construct their own regional political identity and to develop their economies so as to be competitive in the 21st century could ultimately encourage greater European co-operation. As Eastern Europe becomes politically independent, conversations in Brussels in regards to economic, political and defence policies will transition from EU-led lectures to true dialogue, setting the foundation for lasting partnership and true collaboration. This collaboration, in turn, will create stronger and more authentic connections between Europe’s east and west than current policies could ever hope to produce, as both leaders and constituents in Eastern Europe will feel like true partners in the European community rather than the liminal step-sibling that they are treated as today.

A united Eastern Europe would also provide the strongest bulwark against Russian aggression. Russia’s meddling in European affairs, which occurs largely through its adventurism in the east, relies on weak states, political disunity and the sense of suspension that current EU enlargement strategies have helped create. Robust, thriving economies in Eastern Europe, coupled with a unity in foreign policy that holds regional autonomy as a central tenet, will do more to disrupt Russia’s strategic game than any tactic employed by the EU and NATO to date.

In sharp contrast to the world in which Piłsudski originally proposed Intermarium, the political climate today is ripe for regional collaboration. Eastern European nations are now long established and, therefore, unlikely to express the reticence that 1920s Lithuania and Ukraine did in returning into union with Poland. Furthermore, while Poland continues to be a trendsetter and leader in the region, it no longer controls the linguistic and cultural dominance that it had during the era of empires, meaning that smaller nations would not have their voices drowned out. Domestically, a strengthened Eastern Europe fits with the current political zeitgeist. Populist nationalists in the region are not, in fact, isolationist; their resistance to globalism rests largely in the desire to preserve some uniquely Eastern European sensibility. An Intermarium would do much to ensconce this sensibility, meaning that nationalists from Poland to Albania should support the idea in principle.

The European Union should also welcome the creation of an Intermarium, as it would relieve enlargement pressure on Brussels while strengthening Europe’s eastern edge. Removing all discussion of Eastern European accession to the EU, even if just temporarily, gives space to politicians in Brussels to re-examine their policies towards existing member states without having to continually project growth. This inward reflection is sorely needed, as recent challenges to the EU have proven the necessity of adjusting priorities to meet the demands of a changed world. Politicians in Brussels should also recognise that a strong, independent Eastern Europe is not a threat; on the contrary, it is an immeasurable asset. Again, the elimination of political disunity and fragmentation in the region will considerably damage Russia’s ability to meddle in European affairs. And the threat of a strong Eastern Europe aligning en bloc with Russia is slim to none; aside from Belarus and Serbia, no Eastern European country has much of a historical reason to ally with Russia. Alignment with Russia is unlikely from a theoretical perspective, as well, as the very concept of a multi-nation political unity rests largely on principles of Wilsonian liberalism. This intellectual tie provides a thread that connects Eastern Europe with the rest of the transtlantic community, bolstering the knots already formed through economic and cultural association.

Piłsudski’s Intermarium failed largely due to a desire among Eastern European leaders to assert their independence. Today, an adaptation of his proposal can succeed for the very same reason. A union of Eastern European nations, born of a Polish idea and midwifed by intellectuals and politicians throughout the region, will be the strongest declaration of independence in Eastern Europe since national polities rose up to overthrow communism in 1989. What is more, it will create a stronger, more resilient European community that is ready to face all of the challenges of the 21st century.

Nick A Cohen is the deputy editor-in-chief of Balkanist Magazine and an MA student at Columbia University. His research focuses on Polish and Balkan history from the interwar period until 1989, with an emphasis on diplomatic and military history.

Intermarium