Democracy and imperialism are mutually exclusive. No empire was, is or can be democratic. The British Empire was not, the imperial People’s Republic of China is not, nor will imperial Russia become a democracy, even when a self-professed democrat is installed at its helm. The necessary precondition of democratization in an empire is decolonization.

In February 2024, the death (or rather, extrajudicial killing) of the leading Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny sent shock waves across the democratic world. It could have been a subdued affair, as in the case of the Chinese 2010 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo. Beijing arrested him on trumped up charges in 2008 and withheld medical care, leading to the dissident’s premature death in 2017. The Chinese authorities did not want to turn Liu Xiaobo into a martyr for democracy. Hence, he was cremated and his ashes scattered at sea. No grave means no pilgrimage site.

As Slovaks head to the polls to vote in the second round of their country’s presidential election there is more at stake than the appointment of a new head of state. With the opposition and civil society united, Fico’s government could face a serious setback to its plans to capture more of the state.

Russia ditched democracy as not fit for the country’s needs. As a result, the Kremlin identified elections and relatively brief terms of office as the system’s weak points. Since the 2010s, Moscow has learned how to use the openness of the internet and democracy for destabilizing the West. It costs little and brings huge returns. The Kremlin has successfully weaponized democracy for attacking Europe and North America.

As we find ourselves less than two months away from the Russian presidential election, this analysis offers a timely and direct rebuttal that Putin’s downfall will arise from Russia’s democratisation. Instead, Russian democracy enabled Putin’s climb to power in the first place, while his protracted popularity constitutes a core factor that enables his regime to propagate at present.

The impending Russian presidential election, set to take place in a few months’ time in March 2024, constitutes an exceptional opportunity to reveal and discuss the discord in commentary on the current state of affairs in Russian politics. This cacophony in the analysis of Russian politics has emerged following the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

A few years after its greatest triumph – the overcoming of the European divide as a result of the peaceful revolutions in Eastern Europe – the European idea experienced an ever-deepening erosion: "Europe has run out of a narrative," said Munich political scientist Werner Weidenfeld in 2018. It was the solidarity with Ukraine, which was invaded in February 2022, that was supposed to help the "open societies" get off to a new start. However, the autocratic enemies of these societies are also currently experiencing a process of consolidation.

Like their predecessors in the 1920s and 1930s, today’s populists understand that by dividing society and delegitimising their adversaries, they can get away with blatant violations of the democratic rules. They aim to fuel discontent and toxic polarisation, which transform public debate into tribal wars.

In the mid-1970s three eminent political scientists – Michel Crozier, Samuel Huntington, and Joji Watanuki – penned a famous report on the crisis of western democracy, which they described as declining and overloaded with societal demands. Paradoxically, their report coincided with the start of a democratisation wave that, in 15 years, swept away dictatorships across the globe, including those in Southern and Eastern Europe.

Whilst Ukraine continues to struggle with various internal issues, its ongoing reforms have sent a clear message regarding its desires for western integration. The EU and NATO must now recognise Kyiv’s ambitions and respond in an equally enthusiastic manner.

A conversation with Basil Kerski, director of the European Solidarity Centre in Gdańsk. Interviewer: Iwona Reichardt

IWONA REICHARDT: With 2020 behind us, we are now entering into the third decade of the 21st century. There is a sense that the beginning of each decade can indicate a certain change which determines the years to come. 1989 and 1991 marked the beginning of a new post-Cold War order; the first decade of the 21st century was marked by the terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001; while the second decade of this century started a bit earlier, with the 2008 financial crisis. This time we have the COVID-19 pandemic which started in 2020. In a way, all of these events were surprises as well….

BASIL KERSKI: It is hard to say whether decades are a good measure to describe political and economic phenomena, but let's say that this is some sort of ordering perspective. We must distinguish between two things. First, the breakthrough events are always preceded by some processes that are visible and predictable. Only then, do we see their effects. When it comes to 1989 and 1991, I think that the process that everyone had expected was the democratisation of Central Europe.

An interview with Henrik Müller, a professor of economic policy journalism at the Institute of Journalism at TU Dortmund University, Germany. Interviewer: Markus Krzoska

MARKUS KRZOSKA: In your book, published last year, you analyse “turbo democratism” which, as you argue, poses a great threat to our social life. What characterises this phenomenon and what distinguishes it from the parliamentary democracy from which we have long been used to?

HENRIK MÜLLER: Actually my first idea for the title of my book was “turbo democratism”. It was later decided to be called Kurzschlusspolitik (a short circuit policy or a quick reaction policy). In the 2000s there was a lot of talk about turbo capitalism, which is an unstable economic system and which, as we now know, reached its peak with the 2008 financial crisis. Today, I argue that the political system, just like financial capitalism, is innately unstable. This instability comes from public opinion and society’s tendencies to have knee jerk reactions, which (at least partially) affects the traditional political structures.

The Georgian parliament has adopted constitutional changes that have been applauded by their international partners. As a result, the Georgian Dream government might struggle with an even more alienated opposition.

Public discourse in Armenia today remains beset with problems and the behaviour of the authorities is hardly a role model. If the government does not commit to improving the quality of discourse and its own behaviour, the country may be faced with a long-term challenge affecting other areas of public life.

An interview with Roger Berkowitz, Professor of Political Studies and Human Rights and Academic Director of the Hannah Arendt Center for Politics and the Humanities at Bard College. Interviewer: Simona Merkinaite.