For a new European realism

Europe at night. Photo: NASA Goddard Space Flight Center from Greenbelt, MD, USA / wikimedia.org

Many Europeans still indulge in a kind of unyielding nostalgia for the universalism of the European project. They feel responsible on a global scale for the world’s suffering, the advancement of human rights, and the expansion of civil liberties – our continent’s wealth and colonial history precluding a self-interested foreign policy.

This universalist strain of the European idea has become incompatible with the geopolitical realities of our time. The United States’ retreat from the liberal world order has eroded international law and led to the decline of post-war multilateral institutions. Even in the face of attacks against our way of life on our own continent, Europe appears powerless. The pursuit of a just global order has revealed itself to be the product of American power.

As Europeans contend with this new reality, the old humanitarian internationalism and a new sense of realpolitik coexist in a state of paradoxical tension. Tellingly, many of those who advocate an end to the EU’s Association Agreement with Israel also call for a pragmatic rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China to counterbalance American antagonism – despite the CCP’s ethnic cleansing of Uyghurs and the brutal suppression of Tibet.

To escape this paradox, we must reckon with three fundamental conditions. First, a secure, prosperous and peaceful European continent is a precondition for the global survival of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. As democracy retreats around the world, it is no exaggeration to say that if its flame fades at its birthplace – where it still burns most brightly – society may soon descend back into the despotism that has dominated human history for millennia.

Second, a self-interested foreign policy is necessary to avert the collapse of our security, economy and political system – especially in an age where multiple powers compete for influence and the idea of “common values” as the basis of unconditional alliances has lost its salience.

And third, as President James Monroe articulated in 1823 for the United States, “with the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected…” European life has become precariously vulnerable to chokepoints, conflict zones, and foreign spheres of influence in its neighbourhood. Russia alone could drive Europe to the brink of catastrophe, using its influence on the European periphery to simultaneously exacerbate the continent’s migration, energy and economic crises.

Europe must therefore focus its limited resources on its immediate surroundings, where decades of transatlantic dependency, peace dividend-seeking, and the pursuit of false innocence have rendered the continent wholly exposed.

Alarmingly, we are still unable to protect vital trade routes in the Red Sea, even though a blockade would affect the European economy twice as severely as the rest of the world. When the Iran and Russia-backed Houthis threatened precisely this scenario, only US military strikes could avert disaster.

At the same time, European efforts to diversify away from energy supplies and trade passing through this region, as well as from Russia, hang by a thread as Moscow defends its sphere of influence in the South Caucasus – particularly through the consolidation of the present authoritarian Russian proxy regime in Georgia. The recent discovery of intentional contamination in Caspian crude in an act of suspected Russian sabotage nearly led to significant damage at a Romanian OMV refinery – a glaring testament to the vulnerability of the European energy supply.

The fight against illegal migration will continue to be Sisyphean work so long as Europe does not expand its influence in its neighbourhood. Belarus – with Moscow’s assistance – sent over thirty thousand refugees to the Polish border in 2024, while the Kremlin systematically fuels migration crises in the Middle East.

In times of mounting public debt, a faltering economy, and a brutal invasion on European soil, the continent faces tough choices. To protect vital interests, European foreign and security policy must follow relentless pragmatism, rather than moralistic purity.

The most efficient tool of statecraft at Europe’s disposal is its soft power. The European idea has become an aspiration for the peoples of the continent. Rather than its performative selfless universalism, it is Europe’s promise of prosperity and freedom for European peoples that has motivated millions in its neighbourhood to pursue economic, foreign policy, and military alignment and integration.

If Europe plays its cards right, advancing the main source of its appeal – its own flourishing – while also deploying this soft power efficiently, it can achieve a great deal. A pro-European turn in Georgia would, for example, strengthen Europe’s energy security, while averting a Belarusian scenario in Moldova could pre-empt the opening of another front in the fight against illegal migration.

European governments must recalibrate their financial support to these countries. Rather than backing a wide variety of universalist causes, more funds should be allocated to initiatives and organizations that systematically undermine pro-Russian regimes or combat anti-European forces. This would significantly strengthen Europe’s hand vis-à-vis Moscow.

The information space is one crucial battleground. When the Trump administration cut Radio Free Europe’s (RFE) funding, the EU’s version of “stepping up” was to provide a five-million-euro emergency facility to keep the lights on. Much more is needed to support pro-European forces in Ukraine, Serbia, Georgia, Belarus, Moldova and elsewhere. Additional funds could be allocated from the generous budgets currently granted to national English-language media initiatives, such as Deutsche Welle (over 400 million euros per year) and France Médias Monde (over 200 million), to support a European equivalent of RFE dedicated to advancing European interests.

Countries in the continent’s neighbourhood without European ambitions are just as important to European stability, market development, and the fight against illegal migration. Development aid could better serve European interests if it were deployed more pragmatically. In 2023, the EU and its member states provided over 50 per cent more assistance to Central and South Asia than to North Africa. Between 2011 and 2023, EU governments provided over 25 billion euros in aid to South America. We also continue to fund bodies that actively undermine our interests – most recently including the government of Laos, which supports the deployment of its citizens to fight in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

The continent has long been a global leader in per capita aid provision, working alongside the US and its allies to uphold an international order on a worldwide scale. As this system breaks down, Europe must focus development aid on its neighbourhood – where its impact is most tangibly aligned with European interests.

A stronger regional presence and greater control over key nodes would enhance our leverage over other regional powers, such as Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia, facilitating more favourable migration agreements and energy and technology partnerships. Building a more assertive posture in the Middle East is also crucial to mitigating the consequences of the US’ steady withdrawal from the region.

Still, the mere redirection of existing resources in line with a set of refreshed priorities is insufficient for lasting security and prosperity in Europe. When it comes to Germany, for example, Russia’s monthly production of 200 cruise and ballistic missiles threatens a territory defended by only six American-made Patriot batteries – barely enough to protect Berlin.

Europe is currently capable of quickly deploying between 10,000 and 40,000 troops to defend against a conventional attack on its Eastern Flank. They would be outnumbered ten to one, or worse.

So, a military Sword of Damocles hangs over the continent. In the worst-case scenario, especially if the US follows through on its often-claimed withdrawal, this threat alone could subject our societies to the Kremlin’s whims.

Expecting Europe in its current state to advance human rights, democracy, and freedom globally is thus a dangerous illusion. Defending these values on the continent alone stretches Europe’s current strength to its limits. Deeper institutional changes are required to make sure resources are deployed more efficiently and at scale. This includes the merger of European armed forces into a single command structure, as well as the integration of Europe’s entire defence industry.

Similarly, without more integrated financial markets, Europe will struggle to mobilize the funds necessary for long-term rearmament and the expansion of its influence in the region. To retain European savings and build financial firepower, the continent must finally create a capital markets union.

At the basis of this renewal lie our political institutions. They are a key enabler of geopolitical power. European citizens largely support a more assertive Europe with an integrated foreign and security policy. The project of a European army, too, is more popular than ever. Yet as the rise of Eurosceptic movements and corresponding opinion polls show, Europeans will not accept such a consolidation of power unless their control over this power expands as part of a democratic renewal. More democratic European institutions are not just desirable for their inherent merits – they are a crucial element of European security.

We must therefore learn to carry the moral burden of so-called “strategic autonomy”. This demands an unwavering commitment to the European values of freedom, democracy and human rights, but also a reckoning with the fact that, for Europe, foreign policy has indeed become a “hierarchy of imperatives”.

In an increasingly lawless world, Europe is emerging as the last bastion of these ideals – surrounded by totalitarian and revisionist forces determined to create a world in their own image. At the tail end of this long and undoubtedly painful transitional period, a new order will emerge. Its nature will be determined by what values survive the present interregnum. Prioritizing scarce resources for the defence of our interests is therefore not a capitulation in the fight for a better world, but the only way to win it.

This article was first published in German by Swiss newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung

Arthur Kroen is a writer and commentator whose work on European affairs and democratic movements has appeared in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, EUobserver, The Diplomat and others. His research at the University of Oxford focuses on the interaction between national identity and war in 19th century Europe. Follow him on X and LinkedIn.

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Europe, geopolitics