Ostpolitik after the German election

During last year’s elections in Germany, international affairs were not on the top of the debate agenda for both the voters and political parties. Photo: Lutsenko_Oleksandr / Shutterstock

The previous approach regarded any diplomatic recognition of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) as an unfriendly act. Ostpolitik was also greatly influenced by Egon Bahr, whose 1963 speech at the Protestant Academy of Tutzing is often viewed as the doctrine’s founding moment. The new approach outlined, in part, a policy of mutual understanding and the implementation of the “change through rapprochement” political principle.

Increasing conflicts in Eastern Europe

Brandt’s vision would eventually influence both the revolutions of 1989 and the Soviet collapse of 1991 that transformed Central and Eastern Europe. Many of the newly independent countries of the region are now full partners in key joint institutions, such as NATO and the European Union. Most of the other states also have close western relations and aspirations to join these bodies. Whilst many historical problems have been solved, other issues have started appearing in the region. In the 2000s regional development was guided by a paradigm of reconciliation and partnership-based relations between East and West. The Russian leadership chose to challenge these arrangements, resulting in elements of the Russian state pursuing conflict that often involves military action. Russia has pioneered a new means of conflict, leading to the new term “hybrid warfare”. Such measures include infiltrating civil society using government-organised non-governmental organisations (GONGOs) and manipulating migration and human trafficking for state purposes. Older elements of state propaganda have been put to new use. For example, pro-Kremlin Russian-language media in European countries now target large contingents of people whose primary language is Russian. Moscow has also attempted to use deliveries of natural gas for political ends.

Recent regional conflicts include the ongoing divide between Belarus’s democratic opposition and the country’s state apparatus headed by Lukashenka. In the South Caucasus, the simmering territorial dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020 ultimately turned into the Second Karabakh War. Ukraine has been a site of armed conflict at varying levels since Russia seized Crimea in early 2014. In many cases, the Russian government has been actively involved in such conflicts, building its influence under a president who has expressed interest in rebuilding the Soviet Union. Putin certainly made it clear in 2007 that he viewed the end of the Soviet Union as the biggest disaster of the 20th century.

Developing a new Ostpolitik

Finding a way out of the current deadlock clearly requires a new Eastern policy that will eventually establish a new form of Ostpolitik. The new policy will open chances for political dialogue and economic co-operation. A new Ostpolitik should consider the region’s various problems and crises and ultimately aspire to become a European strategy. The Eastern neighbourhood countries should not be seen through the prism of the former Soviet Union but rather as independent, reforming European countries. In light of increasing pressure to act in the region, this issue became an important part of Germany’s recent troika presidency in the Council of the European Union. The 18-month programme was prepared by Germany, Portugal and Slovenia during the first half of 2021. Responding to growing European pressure to act, the German foreign ministry and various international affairs experts started debating and planning a new European Ostpolitik. The main priorities of the approach included security, economic co-operation and understanding.

The global impact of the COVID-19 pandemic overshadowed Berlin’s EU presidency. Like every other European country, Germany had no alternative but to make the pandemic its top priority. Even as conflicts in and with Eastern Europe were increasing, Ostpolitik was not viewed as an appropriate focus for both national and European budgets. In Germany, the issue was certainly debated in the run-up to the September elections. However, dialogue strategies dedicated to conflict resolution and global peace were generally a non-issue during the election campaign.

A new Ostpolitik during the German election

Winning sympathy from the population is more based on solutions for national problems and less on problems of international affairs. The 2021 German election fits this model. Real priorities can be seen in the programmes and plans of the most important political parties. The Christian Democratic Party, after 16 years of guidance by Angela Merkel, has not yet developed a post-Merkel agenda. Merkel was famously a European contact for Vladimir Putin as well as for the heads of other European countries in the eastern neighbourhood. In this regard, she was known for frequent meetings and telephone calls. After the election, when Merkel was still caretaker Chancellor, Belarus and Russia were using migration from the greater Middle East as an instrument for creating a European conflict.

Merkel’s strategic task was to use her knowledge and European profile to develop a successful reconsolidation agenda. In this regard, Merkel held telephone conversations with Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who remains in power in Belarus. Even if this was not much desired by other European heads of state, due to the illegitimacy of the dictator, Merkel attempted to establish a channel of communication during the migration crisis. Because of the missing European strategy, the effort had limited success through late November 2021. The whole world was talking about the pictures across the Belarusian-Polish border while Lukashenka continued his authoritarian repressions in Belarus unhindered. Belarus became a North Korea in Europe.               

In this way, a European Ostpolitik is needed to prevent such situations through dialogue. Another example was the Minsk I and II peace process to limit armed conflict in Ukraine guided by Merkel and the French president at the time, François Hollande, along with the presidents of Russia and Ukraine. Since the beginning of the conflict in 2014, the involved participants were trying to negotiate peace and stability in the region. Although Merkel was an important contact point for the peace talk, years of talks in implementing peace and co-operation in the conflict zones of eastern Ukraine and Crimea did not go beyond personal contact. Putin continues to assert Russian influence in the region while, on the other side, Ukraine has been trying to protect its territorial integrity while pursuing transformation toward European and democratic values. Completing its integration in European institutions remains a goal for Ukraine. Yet the European Ostpolitik has met with limited success – just as the process guided by Willy Brandt 50 years ago had limited success for quite some time. Progress towards this goal would have been a priority during the German EU presidency in 2021 but it was overshadowed by the pandemic. Since Merkel failed to put the Minsk peace talks in institutional terms, an Eastern policy from the CDU did not enjoy success beyond personal networks, and it became difficult to continue during the election or as a part of a potential new coalition.

Traditional Eastern policy is an agenda of the social democrats (SPD), who can draw on the tradition of key actors such as Willy Brandt. During the last decades, SPD Eastern policy was run by Gernot Erler, a member of the parliament between 1987 and 2017. Erler served as the German government’s coordinator for Inter-Societal Co-operation with Russia, Central Asia, and the Eastern Partnership Countries at the Federal Foreign Office. From 2015 to 2016, he assumed the position of the Special Representative of Germany for the country’s chairmanship of the OSCE. Since Erler’s departure from both these roles and the parliament, the SPD lost a position for running German Eastern policy, and now nobody is implementing an Eastern agenda.

The problems of hybrid warfare

Central and Eastern Europe was not a priority during the election for the Free Democrats (Germany’s liberal party) and the Greens. Whilst the liberals concentrated on their core issues of trade and finance, the Greens focused on climate change to the extent that it became a national priority. As a result of voters’ low interest in foreign affairs, the election programmes of these political parties did not mention Eastern policy.

Soon after the election, a consensus emerged around building what is known as an “Ampel coalition” (traffic light coalition) between the Social Democrats (red), Free Democrats (yellow) and the Greens. Setting of priorities started right after the election as all three parties attempted to build a coalition and agree on each group’s political role. In the meantime, talks regarding Eastern policy once again appeared in the country. For instance, the aforementioned migration crisis on the border between Belarus and Poland occurred around this time. Berlin’s regional policy once again remained without a broader political framework.

The low priority of foreign policy generally, and Eastern policy particularly, could be seen during debate shaping the election. In this regard, foreign affairs questions appeared in the information the parties distributed, but they were not a major part of discussions. One example is the Wahlomat (Elect-o-meter) run by the publically-financed federal Agency for Civic Education. It is an online series of questions designed to show which party’s positions are most closely aligned with the participants. The Wahlomat has existed since 2002 and has established itself as a consistent source of information in the run-up to elections: in total, it was used over 100 million times in the pre-election period. The Wahlomat was based on political party programmes. Foreign affairs were mostly limited to the question of whether Germany should leave the European Union, a far-fetched notion that effectively plays no role in German policy discourse.

Various campaign elements, such as TV debates and the parties’ election programmes, reflect the limited importance of foreign affairs during the election for both voters and the parties. Even if Ostpolitik was not named as a priority during the vote, various issues connected with Eastern policy were being debated, particularly in relation to its political and economic effects. This is exemplified by Gazprom gas pipeline Nord Stream 2, which could potentially allow Russia to directly provide Germany with energy. Of course, this project is an instrumental part of Russia’s plan to offer gas more directly to the West. The SPD’s Norbert Walter-Borjans was in favour of commissioning the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, emphasising that Germany can rarely choose suppliers based on political sympathies. The deputy leader of the Free Democrats, Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, also discussed the pipeline’s benefits, stressing that the exact route through which Germany’s energy travels is not an especially important issue. The Christian Democrats’ position has traditionally differentiated between economic needs and Russia’s ongoing challenge to democratic development in the European neighbourhood. In contrast, the Greens have recently spoken out against an operating permit. Nord Stream 2 became an issue dividing political and economic interests between the political parties during the election campaign without shaping a new Eastern policy. Meanwhile Belarus was using migrants as an instrument to further develop its European influence.

Positive developments in German-Polish relations continued through the 16 years of Angela Merkel’s chancellorship. Even if the Polish stance changed to a more complicated issue, the legacy of co-operation would continue. Germany supports Poland in the EU framework. Germany is an advocate of Poland for European relations as well. In this regard, the election will not change much. That also means not overreacting to the latest regional challenge.

European Eastern policy and the new German government

To sum up, there is an imbalance between problems of relations between the countries of the Eastern neighbourhood, the Russian government, and the members of the European Union. Problems of hybrid warfare caused by the Russian government are related to illegal migration to Poland and Lithuania and require a strategy for a European Ostpolitik. Germany, guided by the dialogue-first approach of Angela Merkel, was an important actor. The new government, based on a traffic-light coalition of liberals, Greens and social democrats, is to be carefully observed for its stance on Ostpolitik amid multiple conflicts in Eastern Europe that threaten peace and co-operation. The old Ostpolitik does not provide European solutions and should be developed further to solve European problems.

Concerns have now been raised about Russian troop movements on the Ukrainian border. This development could lead to various actions, such as simple intimidation or even a limited operation in Donbas. Putin could soon consolidate his grip on the pro-Russian satellite republics in the region and further destabilise Ukraine as a whole. Hence, a European Ostpolitik should be a strategic answer to the hybrid problems challenging Eastern and Western actors and institutions. Europe after the German election should react accordingly.

Iris Kempe is a non-resident fellow of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies. She was previously a senior advisor at the Council of the Baltic Sea States and regional director at the Heinrich Böll Foundation South Caucasus.

Eastern Policy, Germany, Ostpolitik