Clan war instead of fighting coronavirus and corruption

Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan: Monument for Manas, hero of ancient kyrgyz epos, together with national Kyrgyzstan flag on Bishkek central Ala-Too square By Teow Cek Chuan / Shutterstock

At the same time, the council was forced to assemble in a hotel, since on the first night after the election the actual parliament building was looted and set ablaze by rioters.

As Jeenbekov finally resigned, the council nominated Sadyr Zaparov to be the new prime minister. It was his third nomination, but the previous two were not accepted by most MPs. The president himself took his time to accept it. In the end it took place on October 14th when the Supreme Council, led by Kanatbek Isaev, the new speaker chosen the day before, voted on the cabinet with a quorum. However, the state of emergency has not been lifted in sunny Bishkek and the demonstrations have not ceased – in a country with six million confused citizens and where a second wave of the coronavirus is still taking place.  

Loss of control

Chaos is probably the most accurate word to describe what has been happening for the last few weeks in the smallest Central Asian republic. It is the only republic where political pluralism not only exists but is so advanced that the Kyrgyz people find it difficult to understand who is currently seeing eye-to-eye with whom, who is against whom, and who calls the shots. The recent weeks were full of twists and turns and it turned out that nothing was what it seemed. Let’s start with the chronology of events.  

On October 4th an election to the unicameral 120-seat Supreme Council called Jogorku Kenesh took place in Kyrgyzstan. According to the Central Election Committee, two pro-government parties won the election. These were Birimdik (Unity) with 24.9 per cent of the votes, followed very closely by Mekenim Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyzstan my fatherland) which received 24.3 per cent. Two other parties, the social-nationalist Kyrgyzstan (8.9 per cent) and the nationalist Butun Kyrgyzstan (United Kyrgyzstan 7.3 per cent), also crossed the seven per cent election threshold. None of the liberal opposition parties won a seat. In response to the results, concerned residents of Bishkek organised a rally in the main city square.      

The official election results showed that the effort the new intelligentsia put into  change went down the drain. They stated, however, that they would not give up without a fight. The example of Belarus was an additional incentive for the protests. Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime is very widely hated among the pro-democratic Kygryz people since it is in Minsk that Kurmanbek Bakiyev, the ousted president, found refuge in 2010.

Initially it was mainly young, well-educated and peaceful capital city residents who attended the rally on Monday October 5th. Within a few hours the atmosphere changed. By nightfall various political groups sent their supporters to Bishkek and the rally turned violent. Several hundred people were hurt in clashes with law enforcement officers and with each other. A 19-year-old man lost his life.

During the night, crowds stormed the so-called White House, the seat of the Kyrgyz Supreme Council and the presidential administration. A fire broke out in the building. Some groups associated with the opposition, not necessarily the liberal or democratic ones, made their way to various prisons in the capital in order to free political allies. This is common practice in Kyrgyzstan: in times of political unrest, politicians who were imprisoned during the rule of the ousted government are freed. This time a dozen or so were released, including two key figures: Almazbek Atambayev, the previous president who was sentenced to 11 years for corruption in July; and Sadyr Zaparov, who over the next few days could potentially be the next prime minister of Kyrgyzstan.

Competing for the top seat

Zaparov was sent to prison for the 2013 “kidnapping” of the governor of Issyk-kulskaya Oblasti (a province). Zaparov co-organised a protest over the Kumtor gold mine located in the mountains on the southern bank of Lake Issyk-Kul. A Canadian company deals with its exploration. The demonstrators demanded more civil participation in its operation and took the regional governor hostage. The court decided it was Zaparov who was in charge of the kidnapping.

Zaparov had been an advisor to the notorious Bakiyev, so it was easy to blame him for everything. As soon as the indictment popped up, Zaparov fled the country. He took refuge in Cyprus, among other places, and soon after he returned in 2017, he was placed behind bars. The day after his release, Zaparov became the number one choice for taking power in the country from the then prime minister who had resigned. The weakness of the central authorities was becoming overwhelming. On Tuesday nobody knew about the president’s whereabouts and the election commission declared the election invalid, but they did not announce a date for a new one (it remains unknown when or if the election will be held).  

A number of MPs gathered in Hotel Dostyk. As the then chairman had been dismissed, the proceedings were chaired by Myktybek Abdyldayev, a politician from BirBol (Together), a small party regarded as liberal. He resigned three days later. Despite the lack of quorum (fewer than 50 MPs present), the Supreme Council nominated Zaparov as prime minister. Soon afterwards the liberal parties of the opposition announced that the young politician Tilek Toktogaziyev would become the new PM while the freed former president, Atambayev, pushed Ömürbek Babanov, the former rival of Jeenbekov in the presidential campaign and the wealthiest man in the country, for this position.

On October 9th the president declared a state of emergency in the capital where another rally had been planned, this time against organised crime and its impact on politics. Nevertheless, the demonstration took place. Speeches were made by Atambayev and Toktogaziyev, who was injured onstage after being hit with a stone thrown from the crowd. The politician was covered in blood and was taken to hospital. Zaparov’s supporters gathered nearby and burst into the rally.

Who is behind Zaparov?

In his speech Zaparov declared himself prime minister and assured everyone that he strongly cared about the stabilisation of the situation in the country. He went as far as to claim that Raimbek Matraimov belongs in jail. Matraimov is the former boss of the Kyrgyz customs services and is believed to be one of the most corrupt public officials in the country, and for that reason he has been nicknamed Raimbek Million. Zaparov’s critics claim, however, that it was only for show since it was actually Matraimov’s clan’s support that helped him become the front runner for power.

On October 10th the Supreme Council held another sitting, this time in the government residence, Ala Arcza. Facing the resignation of another Toraga  (i.e. chairman), two of his deputies, Mirlan Bakirov from Mekenim Kyrgyzstan and Ida Kasymaliyeva from Birimdik, disagreed about who would fulfil this role. In the end, Kasymaliyeva left the residence claiming there were people putting pressure on her and other MPs who were sceptical about Zaparov. Bakirov was presiding over the debate. His party also believed to have close ties with the Matraimov clan. During the proceedings, Zaparov’s appointment for prime minister was officially confirmed. There was an immediate reaction from both the lawyers and absent MPs. They claimed the decision was taken in violation of the law since there was no quorum. It remains unknown how many MPs were actually present. We only know that the number was far from 120, the total number of MPs in parliament. Despite that, after the proceedings Zaparov began acting as if he was the fully-fledged prime minster and the government press service started labelling him that soon afterward.  

The same day Atambayev was, once again, taken to prison. This time he was accused of organising mass riots. President Jeenbekov also became more active. Over the weekend he met with a number of politicians, including the former president, Roza Otunbayeva. It was still unknown, however, whether he would support Zaparov as prime minister since he did not sign any nominations. In accordance with the Kyrgyzstan constitution, if the president takes no action within three days from the vote, the nominee’s mandate takes effect. On the other hand, it does not provide any solutions to the case of dubious nominations.

There were dozens of young protesters on the streets, many with some foreign education. They demonstrated against behind-the-scenes agreements and the close ties between often shady business and politics. Their main slogan was keeping the most corrupt players away from public affairs. During the rallies and on social media, they called to drive Kyrgyz politics away from regional and clan-related animosities.

Clan wars

What happened during the days that followed also played out in accordance with previous events. Atambayev noted this in his prison correspondence passed through his attorneys that were posted on his Facebook profile. He mentioned the first Kyrgyz revolution in 2005, the so-called Tulip Revolution: “As a result of the hatred to the family-clan style of governing under Akayev, Bakiyev, the new president, promised that he would not let his relatives run the country. Yet, by the time he settled down as president, the whole country was taken over by the Bakiyev clam.”

Atambayev discreetly omitted the period after Bakiyev’s ousting when, following the short interim presidency of Otunbayeva, he ruled independently. Instead, he jumped to 2017 when Jeenbekov, whom he supported at that time, succeeded him. “He also, similarly to Bakiyev, swore to the entire nation that he would not allow for family-clan ruling and would keep his relatives at arm’s length and fight corruption. Not a year passed that the country saw the Jeenbekov and Matraimov clans strengthen their position.” 

It would be difficult to disagree with Atambayev apart from one tiny detail: during his term things were not any better. Kyrgyzstan has only witnessed different political groups exchanging power. Once Askar Akayev and then Atambayev were in power, northern clans held the reigns. The southern clans took over when Bakiyev and then Jeenbekov were in charge. Politicians who prioritised qualifications and education were like meteors in Kyrgyz politics. But they do not last long either.

The Reform party was born out of a desire for change. It gained the support of many young and well-educated people before the election. The party is currently led by Klara Sooronkulova, a former judge of the Constitutional Court, who during Atambayev’s rule openly called the law introducing biometric documents illegal. Her reasoning was due to the fact that the new law immediately deprived those who did not manage to get the new documents issued before the election the right to vote. She was removed from the Constitutional Court for allegedly breaking the regulations (she spoke about the issue) and the law was passed anyway.

Sooronkulova and her supporters are now calling for the breaking of ties between the clans and politics and they are advocating for a more transparent system. The problem is that they are not entirely free from suspicion either. Before becoming the leader of Reform, Sooronkolova co-operated with Melis Myrzakmatov, the mayor of Osh, the country’s second-largest city, accused of inciting ethnic hatred between the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks from the region. This could be forgiven especially since she cut herself off from her former employer. However, her secret pre-election meeting with Raim Million raises concerns whether it is even possible to conduct clean and transparent politics in Kyrgyzstan.   

It matters not that progressive ideas are widely supported by young and well-educated urban dwellers – graduates of the American University of Central Asia and beneficiaries of European grant programmes – since whenever it comes to measuring forces everyone calls their regional buddies for help. Big city intelligentsia, once it is cut off from power, is left alone with their beautiful ideas.

“The boy who died during the demonstration was called Umudbek,” says Elmira Nogoibayeva, one of the young protesters. “Umud means hope in Kyrgyz. Some believe his death may be a symbol. They say that hope has died again.”

Translated by Justyna Chada

Ludwika Włodek is a sociologist and a reporter. She works as an assistant professor in the Centre for East European Studies at the University of Warsaw where she heads the Central Asian division.  

Kyrgyzstan, parliamentary elections 2020, politics, protests