The South Caucasus conundrum in the Black Sea

The Black Sea port city of Batumi in Georgia. Photo (CC) https://www.pikist.com/free-photo-sxwga

Historically a space dominated by international trade, the area is now increasingly an arena of geopolitical competition and rivalry. This situation is only aggravated by the complexity of the conflicts that exist along its shores and by a notable lack of multilateral arrangements that are capable of ensuring some sense of balance. It is even more important for the three South Caucasus countries to develop a basic framework for co-operation. Certainly, even though the South Caucasus “big three” – Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan – do not agree on regional geopolitics, it is important that they coordinate their ambitions for trade and commerce. Reality, however, has proven that these ideas will be difficult to implement. This lack of agreement can be explained by the domestic and international outooks of these states.

Interests old and new

The Black Sea region is unique in many respects. It is a perfect example of how interactions between “old” powers have been rendered more complex by the “new normals” of our changing world. For Russia, the geostrategic significance of the Black Sea has remained unchanged since the Crimean War of the 1850s. Despite this, the region has become even more important nowadays as NATO and the United States have replaced individual European states as Russia’s main geopolitical competitors. This trend is also strengthened by Russia’s belief that its neighbours are now acting as ‘entry points’ for Western attempts to shape its informational space and internal policy. The Kremlin’s modus operandi reflects all these concerns. While trying to prevent neighbouring countries from escaping from its perceived sphere of influence in line with the ideas of Primakov’s doctrine (who has called on Russia to strive for a multi-polar world), Russia aims to undermine their ability to build competitive and sustainable states. In purely strategic terms, the ultimate purpose of these objectives is to maintain “strategic depth” along Russia’s borders. At the operational level, however, Moscow’s actions rely upon a series of modern hybrid warfare tools designed to be used in “grey areas” or low-intensity conflicts. These actions follow the Gerasimov tactics, which focuses more on hybrid and information warfare.

NATO has long described the Black Sea region as “important for Euro-Atlantic security” (see, for example, the Bucharest Summit Declaration of 2008). However, it was not until the Warsaw Summit in 2016 that NATO pledged to increase its presence in the region. This promise was further emphasised in various NATO and NATO-Georgia Commission statements. Indeed, the latest statement by the North Atlantic Council in Batumi speaks of “new priorities for the coming period”. Such strongly voiced interest is hardly surprising as Russia attempts to create a new Iron Curtain across the Black Sea. As a result, the region is now increasingly taking the form of a new defensive perimeter, running along the fault line of two normative worlds dominated by democracy and authoritarianism respectively.

In light of these developments, it appears that we are witnessing the reintroduction of George Kennan’s containment strategy, which focused on the USSR after the Second World War. However, this comparison is only partially true. This is because many of the Alliance’s inner contradictions are now challenging its ability to respond to modern asymmetrical warfare.

Georgia as the “frontrunner”

The Black Sea region and Tbilisi’s geopolitical outlook are marked by a series of specific features. For example, an “unfortunate” geography has effectively forced the country to exist as a sort of “in-between” state. This difficulty is only made worse by the fact that the Alliance continues to focus on the Baltic rather than the Black Sea. As a result, NATO appears unprepared to act near Georgia’s borders, should the need arise. Recent NATO statements and decisions still continue keeping a disproportionately larger interest in the Baltic at the expense of the Black Sea region.

Another point of consideration is related to unrestricted and unimpeded maritime access to the Black Sea itself. In this respect, the long-standing issue of free passage through the Turkish Straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles) and the extent of the Montreux Convention’s limitations are compounded by Turkish attempts to balance national and regional interests, as well as NATO’s attempts to strengthen its regional presence. Coupled with its new ambivalency of a “special” relationship with Russia, Turkey is increasingly walking a fine line with regards to its interests. Furthermore, Moscow is now attempting to re-establish a “closed-sea” doctrine in the Black Sea. Russia has justified this goal by stating that it is essential to its own defensive interests in the area. By claiming de facto sovereignty over the Sea of Azov, future Russian moves may well endanger the wider Black Sea region and by extension the Eastern Mediterranean.

For the record, however, it must not be forgotten that of the six Black Sea states, three are now NATO members and two others have officially voiced their desires to join. This has effectively transformed the sea into a “NATO lake”. For Georgia, this dangerous geographical position between Russia and the West has only increased the need for a highly sophisticated and rational policy. Therefore, Georgia’s strategy should simultaneously involve robust domestic reforms and strong engagement with international partners in order to enhance national security.

Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Black Sea

A key feature of Azerbaijan’s policy is to avoid a zero-sum game in the broader region of the Black and Caspian Seas. This is achieved by reconciling the expectations of all regional stakeholders. Baku is trying hard to balance its interests, never detaching itself fully from one regional player, should it temporarily cooperate with another. This is a maverick policy which requires an extensive knowledge of statecraft. By choosing this strategy, Azerbaijan avoids full political or economic integration, at least for the moment, with any of the regional powers. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline exemplifies how Baku extracts all of the possible benefits offered by its position at the crossroads of North-South and East-West transport networks.

Oddly enough, Azerbaijan remains a member of the Russia-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), but has not joined the Collective Security Treaty Organization. At the same time, it is also a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme. This is despite the fact that it has declined to host scheduled joint military exercises with the United States, possibly due to pressure from Moscow. Hikmat Hajizadeh, an Azerbaijani political scientist, summarised the essence of Azerbaijani policy, stating that “[We are] a neutral country and there can be no danger to you via our territory”.

Armenia has great potential to co-operate and play a part in regional transportation, but is destined to be a “prisoner of regional geopolitics” for the foreseeable future. First and foremost, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh still places tremendous pressure on the country due to the continuous need for material and physical resources. Moreover, Armenia is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, which further restricts its foreign policy decisions. Yerevan specifically has a defence pact with Moscow, which also arms Baku.

All in all, Armenia continues to resemble a Russian protectorate. This situation has been created by Moscow through the strengthening of autocratic governance and pro-Kremlin economic agreements within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union. This provides Moscow with a strong influence on Yerevan, as it meddles in its internal affairs. It also helps Moscow to constrain Armenia’s broader policymaking in relation to both European and Euro-Atlantic agendas. There is hope, however, that potential co-operation with Georgia, as well as a possible breakthrough in Armenia-Turkey relations, could allow the country to develop a more independent voice.

Hurdles, puzzles, outlooks

As Georgia’s regional security environment in the Black Sea and Middle East faces rapid change, the country is searching increasingly for options that will strengthen its security. These options may come in a variety of forms, but must always be considered in a cautious manner. For instance, a recent – and highly controversial – study by the RAND Corporation entitled “A Consensus Proposal for a Revised Regional Order in Post-Soviet Europe and Eurasia” discusses a possible “third way” for countries located between Russia and the West. The think tank has proposed various mechanisms for easing existing tensions through the establishment of a new regional order. At the same time, Georgia could instead sign a defence treaty with the United States, its key strategic partner. This would help the country bypass ongoing uncertainty regarding the question of NATO’s expansion near Russia’s borders, as well as negate Moscow’s veto rights.

When speaking about NATO in the Black Sea region and the idea of Georgian membership, one must bear in mind that, in addition to rifts between member states over the idea of the Alliance increasing its presence in Russia’s “near abroad”, there is also the difficult issue of ongoing “ethnic” conflict. Of course, Moscow is very much aware of the issues faced by the Black Sea countries in relation to their multicultural societies and has attempted to exploit such problems for its own gain. This policy of “divide, deter and dominate” has been met with no clear strategy from the West. That being said, the West must realise once and for all that these supposedly “ethnic” conflicts in the region are actually geopolitical. Subsequently, NATO should formally welcome Georgia as a fully-fledged member, since offering Tbilisi “just enough partnership” merely increases Russian hostility.

In light of the new level of co-operation between the countries of the Black Sea region, the Alliance must focus on working even more closely with regional partners that share its vision. At the same time, NATO must remain open to opportunities that may allow for the reduction of regional tension. Might this be feasible, in the long run, through agreement on the principle that the Black Sea region serves as a bridge between Europe, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia? Certainly, it may be possible, should the Alliance create a meaningful Baltic-Black Sea strategy and Black Sea countries manage to balance their conflicting interests.

It is in the interests of the South Caucasus countries to realign their desires as much as their egos may allow. Various proponents of a new multipolar world foresee the growing importance of rivalry between emerging geopolitical “poles”. This would subsequently impact the ability of individual states to protect their own economic and security interests, as well as their overall voice in a changing global order. As a result, only a handful of truly sovereign states may remain. Others, particularly small states, are bound to sacrifice their own sovereignty in the name of a safer, more prosperous world. It is also to be seen how COVID-19 will impact the “moving sands” of the regional geopolitical scene while such impact is to be assessed thoroughly and specifically.

These ideas are something that Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan should be actively discussing. They should now attempt to identify common goals that may bring together their sovereign interests. That would hopefully encourage some new prospects for a peaceful and prosperous Black sea region.

Victor Kipiani is the chair of Geocase – a think tank based in Tbilisi.

Black Sea, security, South Caucasus